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and the Role of Social Norms
in Constructing Faith in Others
by
William J. Berger
Chair: Donald Jay Herzog
This dissertation introduces the concept of affective trust to complement the extant
notions of particular and general trust in political science. While particular trust
comes to explain how people generate localized expectations of others that vary
across different contexts, general trust accounts for one’s default context-invariant
expectation that others will act cooperatively. This project comes to explain trust in
the intermediate case, in which our expectations vary across contexts, even though
we lack information regarding a specific agent necessary to form individuated
credences about her. I argue that affective trust is a warm expectation that others
are likely to act cooperatively, generated in light of social norms or institutional
regularities. Social norms are the right kind of contextual feature to generate trust,
since they construct both conditional preferences to act as well as first and higher
order expectations that others can be expected to conform too. The nature of these
norms makes affective trust second-personal, since we are apt to understand the
norms to be reasons that others will accept. In this way, we are liable to elicit blame
and reactive attitudes when this sort of expectation is upset.
I build this account over four substantive chapters. In the first I use Herman
Melville’s The Confidence Man to demonstrate the shortcomings of extant under-
standings of trust, while also indicating the need to rely on social conventions in
order to construct trust. The second chapter offers a conceptual analysis, building
conceptual intuitions progressively using a series of simple 2× 2 games. I note that
trust should only be thought to obtain in situations of motivational uncertainty.
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When agents’ motives are independently at odds or compatible with one another,
it doesn’t make sense to argue that trust is operative in these contexts. The third
chapter looks toward traditional political theory to claim that affective trust has
political efficacy. Building on the recent literature on sentimental political theory, I
claim that trust is the sort of epistemic feature that can explain political motivations.
Using Smith, Machiavelli, and Hobbes I show the distinctly political character affec-
tive trust can take. Finally, in the fourth chapter I reflect on interviews I conducted
with U.S. Christian Missionaries serving abroad to illustrate and demonstrate the
plausibility of this theory. These individuals operate in environments where they
lack information about the people to whom they reach out. I find that the identi-
fication of and with social norms facilitates their ability to trust others. I end the





In this introductory chapter I lay out the need to examine the concept
that I call affective trust. Though there are other ways of cleaving the
concept of trust, the two prevailing modes of doing so have been that
of particular and general trust. Particular trust understands trust as
an expectation that others act cooperatively in light of pertinent and
individuated information. General trust, in contrast, is argued to be one’s
default expectation that unknown others will act cooperatively. While
both of these conceptions have merit, I argue that they fail to track many
of trust’s behavioral regularities that psychologists and philosophers
note. In contrast I lay out evidence for trust which complements the
two on offer, advancing the need for a conception which is affectively
informed and contextually variable.
It’s old news that trust is an integral element of a strong civil society and flourishing
state (Putnam et al. (1994); Uslaner (2002); Knack and Keefer (1997); Fukuyama
(1996); Inglehart (1999); Zak and Knack (2001)). And there are plenty of good
reasons to trust others. We might know them well (Hardin (2002a)), we might
just be generally upbeat, well-raised citizens (Uslaner (2002); Putnam (1995)), we
might have a strong civic culture that has led us to be trusting (Putnam et al.
(1994); Fukuyama (1996)), there might be equilibria in place that make defection
unreasonable (Fearon and Laitin (1996)), or just that good (institutional) fences make
good neighbors (Levi (2000); Hobbes (1994)).1 And all of these are fine reasons. Each
comes to explain trust in either the most general or particular of cases, however,
1I refuse to cite Robert Frost here.
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rendered either as a basic feature of one’s psychology or a sharp expectation in light
of detailed evidence.
Beyond particular and general trust this project looks at a third manifestation
— affective trust — which aims to reorient how political science reckons with the
concept of trust. Particular trust is understood as an expectation regarding the
conduct of specific actors while general trust is an expectation of arbitrary others.
In contrast to these I argue that affective trust is a warm expectation that others
will act cooperatively. This warm expectation has both cognitive and emotional
dimensions and is apt to develop in light of social norms or institutional regularities.
The nature of such norms and rules is that they obtain broadly over some context—
a norm isn’t a norm if only one person abides by it. I argue that this conceptual
framework explains how one can render such a disposition, along with its associated
reactive attitudes, absent individuated information about a specific trustee. When
one does possess such individuated information about another—consisting of the
relevant attributes that make one fit for a task (e.g. competence, diligence, loyalty,
intelligence, honesty, capability)—we still call this trust, but it isn’t difficult to
explain. If that were indeed all that was necessary to confide in another, trust
wouldn’t be mysterious.
But this clearly isn’t the case, at least not in a whole host of instances where
people elicit trust absent much information at all. The account of affective trust on
offer here attempts to explain how one renders an expectation prior to receiving
individuated information about a trustee. It further explains why trust outstrips
reliance, possessing normative and sentimental valences. The picture is one of
a versatile and robust trust, explaining both variation between contexts (which
generalized trust cannot) as well as its manifestation under information scarcity
(which particularized trust cannot). Importantly, affective trust is not just “semi-
particular” trust—a halfway mark between broad and specific expectations. Instead
of being conditioned as a low level trait or a high-level belief in light of localize
evidence, affective trust is directed by social norms, I argue. This manifestation
argues for a wholly distinctive mechanism to trust, one which accounts for both
its ordinary phenomenology and epistemology. It is not, however, a fuzzy form of
particular trust or a refined generalized trust. The dissertation makes sense of the
loose ends which particular and general trust fail to tie up.
This dissertation is a project of political epistemology, seeking to make sense of
psychological and cognitive phenomena in a way that is compatible with literatures
in political science and political theory. Affective trust, as I understand it is a
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warm expectation that an agent will act cooperatively to obtain some ends or set of ends,
apt to arise in light of an identified social norm or other conventional regularity. Since
trust is a collection of related epistemic features we oughtn’t anticipate that there
exists a unified theory of trust. Indeed, I proceed with the understanding that
this account of affective trust is only one coherent account, among others. This
“messiness” to trust leads me to construct the dissertation as a tapestry of distinct
substantive treatments of the concept in order to make sense of this empirical
regularity. I demonstrate its purchase by showing its traction literarily, conceptually,
theoretically, and observationally. This sort of multi-method approach is best suited
to track a concept that is experientially, rather than mechanistically, unified.
Chapter two launches the inquiry by turning to Herman Melville’s novel The
Confidence Man. Here I set out to problematize extant conceptions of trust, particu-
larly those in the economic literature. By systematically varying the contexts which
elicit trust, Melville sheds light on its distinctive characteristics and vulnerabilities.
I use these depictions to argue that while Melville speaks to the instability of trust,
he does so by identifying the role that settled norms and expectations play in its
establishment, and how their absence vitiates its possibility. Chapter three serves to
advance a conceptual analysis of affective trust. Beginning with examples of trust
taken from ordinary language, I refine a concept of trust which is colloquially and
observationally tractable. Using simple two-by-two games to build intuitions, I
argue that trust is best understood as a coordination problem under motivational
uncertainty. I then proceed to deploy the concepts of conventions and social norms
as conceived of by David Lewis and Cristina Bicchieri in order to understand the
normative and reactive attitudes that accompany trust. Finally, I also address how
institutional analysis, as done in the work of Douglas North and Barry Weingast, is
compatible with the arguments I lay out.
Chapter four explores the political nature of affective trust. Through a close
reading of texts by Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Smith I argue that not only do these
theorists operate with concepts similar to that of affective trust, but they also con-
ceive of it as doing political work, creating bonds between actors as members of
a common community. Finally, in chapter five I report findings from interviews I
conducted with Christian missionaries who have worked abroad. Catholic, Evan-
gelical, and Mormon missionaries all assume risk by making themselves vulnerable
to those whom they preach to. I explain how their experiences of opening up to
strangers under uncertainty conform to an account of affective trust. I end the
chapter by examining the intersection between these missionaries faith in God and
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their trust in others.
1.1 Puzzlement
The inability of the extant accounts of trust to explain many ordinary trappings
of our experiences is curious. As an example of what I have in mind, take David
Laitin’s opening epigraph from his 1996 paper with James Fearon, “Explaining
Interethnic Conflict.”
I grew up in a Jewish section of Flatbush that bordered an Italian neigh-
borhood. Sometimes on our way to school, some Italian kids—nearly
all of them went to parochial schools—would hassle and even attack
us. Although they lived only a few blocks away, we didn’t even know
their names. We just called them “the St. Brennan’s kids.” Our parents
would see our injuries and report the incidents to our school principal,
who was Jewish, but from a different neighborhood. He contacted the
relevant authorities at St. Brennan’s, who would investigate the matter
and punish the culprits. The funny thing was, no one ever seemed to
think of calling the police. They were Irish. (Fearon and Laitin (1996):
715)
Why don’t they trust the cops? It is not because of a thick critique of Brooklyn’s
Finest—a lack of transparency or accountability, for example. Nor is it because of a
general cynicism of all people. Rather the reason given is that the police force was
(predominantly) Irish. Put like that the reason sounds absurd. What does the fact of
Irishness have to do with trustworthiness? Clearly “Irishness” is not itself a reason,
but an explanation, a way of marking social and epistemic categories. And despite
the intellectual porousness of this sort of evaluation, we make assessments like this
one all the time.
Or take this second example from my own research. I spoke to one Mormon mis-
sionary who worked in Albania during the rebellion of 1997. After only six weeks
on the ground he and his colleagues were evacuated by U.S. military helicopter
as the violence grew out of hand. While he enjoyed his time there, particularly
the hospitality he was shown, the situation became more severe than his mission
could contend with. The LDS Church moved him to Wales for a couple of months
until the violence abated. His time in Wales was uneventful, though he noted that
people were colder than in the Balkan region. When he finally learned that he
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would return to Albania—a country he had never stepped foot in before going
on mission—he celebrated like “a child at Christmas.” When I asked about this
sentiment, he indicated that he had more trust and warmth toward Albanians than
the Welsh. He was happy to serve the Church wherever he was called, but he
felt more comfortable in Albania. The trust he felt toward Albanians was not the
result of an idiosyncratic trait of his, but neither was it informed by knowledge
about particular Albanians. Indeed Albania was markedly more dangerous than
Wales, even after he returned. His trust was warranted by an identified norm of
hospitality that existed in Albania that was lacking in Wales, rather than by specific
expectations about outcomes. It was this social norm that served to warrant his
trust within a circumscribed context.
But maybe you think that what Laitin or the missionary express here isn’t really
trust, but something else, some close cousin, not trust per se. That’s the right
impulse, but not the way to proceed here. Trust is not the sort of thing that we can
distill in a lab. It’s a messy human disposition with rough similarity across human
experience. Trust is bound up with associated feelings of expectation, admiration,
respect, dignity, and betrayal, among others. Moreover, trust is ubiquitous, present
in relationships between lawyers at arbitration, derivatives traders, SEC inspectors
and bank executives, bank tellers and managers, patrons and tellers, professors and
students, parents and childcare professionals, parents and children, candidates and
voters, corporations and consumers, the Speaker of the House and the President,
Catholic shopkeepers and Irish Republican patrons, Israeli border guards and
Palestinian laborers. It can’t simply be understood in terms of a principle-agent
problem either. My students trust me to be fair and transparent when filing their
grades, but I trust my students to submit honest course evaluations. Though these
responsibilities are related, they are not logistically contingent on one another.
Because trust is messy in these ways, any definition is necessarily both too
broad and too limited to provide a complete theory. My model of affective trust
attempts to thread an analytic needle, constructing an account which conforms
both to ordinary intuitions about trust as well as observational research. Though
the two dominant modes of theorizing trust are valuable ways of accomplishing
this, they don’t helpfully track much of what we observe. Affective trust goes some
distance to address these lacunas, without claiming to capture trust in all its rich
and irregular detail. By engaging in positive political theory I hope to unpack both
the ‘what’ and the ‘how’ of trust—describe the experience of trust as well as explain
the mechanisms that bring it about. I want to be clear, however, that while I discuss
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normative aspects of trust, I mean this only insofar as people take there to be an
obligation to trust, where one might feel as if they “ought to” or “has reason to”
trust. Descriptively one might be said to act under a norm to trust, even though
moral philosophers would assesses that, all things considered, no such obligation
exists.
This account of affective trust makes sense of the puzzle offered by episodes
like those presented by Laitin or the missionary with whom I spoke. By recruiting
social norms and institutional analysis—studying the rules, formal and informal,
that structure an actor’s environment—affective trust can explain how people de-
velop dispositions which warrant certain expectations, exhibiting confidence absent
individuated information. Our perception of trustworthiness turns on these back-
ground norms. Importantly, trust here is conceived as just an endogenous product
of conventional practice—the consequence of developing attitudes in response to
environmental regularities. In this way institutional constraints can condition our
empathic responses, rendering trust as if it were warranted.
1.2 Distinctions Between Particular, General, and Affective Trust
Particular General Affective
Informational Burden High Low Moderate
Emotional No Yes Yes
Reasoned Yes No Yes
Externally Validated No Yes Yes
Informational Cue Individuated Latent Social
Table 1.1: Relative Features of Conceptions of Trust
Table 1 summarizes important distinctions between particular, general, and
affective trust. While general trust is a default level of trust a person possesses,
it turns on little to no context-specific information. Particular trust, in contrast,
is rendered in light of a great deal of individuated information about the trustee.
Affective trust, however, requires only a moderate degree of information regarding
relevant social and institutional norms.
The emotional valence to trust also varies across kinds. General trust appears
to be emotionally informed, an optimistic disposition which assumes the kindness
of strangers. Particular trust, however, results from considered judgement rather
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than sentimentality. Affective trust synthesizes these types of attitudes within one
framework. It is both an emotional and reasoned reaction typical of hybridized
moral sentiments (Nichols (2004), Greene et al. (2001), Greene and Haidt (2002),
Kumar (2013), Copp (2001), Campell (1998), Campell (2007b), Campell (2007a),
Ridge (2006), Schroeder (2009)). This duality results in trust having both passive
and active states, assuming a “decision” at times and a “disposition” at others.
Though there is copious data on generalized trust from survey responses, there
is not the same sort of observational data of particularized trust. Particular trust
stands primarily as an analytic category, a minimalist model that fails to capture
trust’s observed messiness. Affective trust, like generalized trust, benefits from
observational research which supports its external validity. Lastly, particular trust
is thought to be cued by individuated information which warrant credences of a
particular delegate’s fitness for some task. General trust, on the other hand, is a
stable preference over time rather than a context-specific belief. As such it is not
triggered by any direct informational cue, but a default risk threshold that one
carries in their back pocket. In contrast to these, affective trust is cued by social
information—the presence of a social norm or institutional regularity. This explains
how affective trust varies across context, even absent a high degree of specific
information. While I do argue that the effect of affective trust is primarily germane to
informational contexts that fall between general and particular trust—expectations
of neither complete strangers nor close confidantes—I argue that it constitutes a
unique concept in light of its distinctive mechanism. As opposed to general trust
which is conditioned by one’s early family and civic life and particular trust which
generated in light of individuated information, affective trust is propelled by social
norms.
I should be clear that there are additional modes of classifying trust aside from
the two dominant types I identified. While Wilson and Eckel (2011: 244) point to the
distinction between particular and general trust, Uslaner (2002) identifies trust in
strangers, trust in friends and family, and trust in government as the major distinct
categories. Zmerli et al. (2007), though, discusses the contrasts between social
and political trust, particular and general trust, and trust in contrast to confidence.
I don’t take issue with any of these taxonomies, however, choosing to embrace
Margaret Levi’s assessment that “[t]rust is not one thing and it does not have one
source; it has a variety of forms and causes” (Levi (1998): 79). For my purposes, the
framework of general and particular trust is useful to motivate an other-directed
conception that occupies many of the lacuna that each admits.
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1.3 Extant Notions of Trust: Particular Trust
A clean account of trust is provided by James Coleman who argues that it is the
acceptance of risk when the expectation of gain outweighs the expectation of loss,
formally where pG > (1− p)L (Coleman (1998): 99). The impulse here is to explain
the degree to which people take on risk. A related definition comes from Elias Khalil
who argues that “trust denotes the conviction that one . . . will act in a trustworthy
way, i.e. carry out bidding, fiduciary commitments towards specific individuals
irrespective. . . of ex post incentives” (Khalil (2003): xiv). While more cumbersome
than Coleman’s, they both point in the same direction: trust is the cognitive state
that leads one to accept risk in a social or economic exchange. Neither accounts
for the rich psychological trappings of trust, however. Using a hammer entails
anticipation of both risk and gain, though to trust a hammer rather than merely
relying on it would clearly be affective overkill.
Russell Hardin offers an epistemically richer account of particular trust, carefully
carving out conceptual space that is neither a social capital catch-all nor a synonym
for expectation. Rather, according to Hardin, “trust works primarily at the inter-
personal level to produce microlevel social order to lower the costs of monitoring
and sanctioning. . . Trust is important in many interpersonal contexts, but it cannot
carry the weight of making complex societies function productively and effectively.”
(Cook et al. (2007): 1-2). Though it is an important feature of social epistemology
it cannot alone explain state capacity, Hardin argues. He acknowledges particular
trust’s limited local reach, petering out well before it can effect broader political
solidarity. There can also be a darker side to trust, manifesting as cronyism or rogue
loyalty. Indeed as others also point out, interpersonal trust needn’t be a civic virtue
and can have deleterious effects when misdirected (Putnam et al. (1994), Pettit
(1995), Jones (1996)).
According to Hardin the first component of trust is that people determine that
they share “encapsulated interests.” This arises when “I think it is in your interest
to attend to my interest in the relevant matter. This is not merely to say that you
and I have the same interests. Rather. . . the trusted values the continuation of the
relationship with the truster. . . ” (Hardin (2002b): 4-5). Trust isn’t rendered merely
because of incentive compatibility, but due to an “enlightened self-interest,” as
Karen Jones recapitulates it (Jones (2012): 67). Given the desire for an enduring
relationship, the second component obtains when A expects B to perform X in
a context Q. This conception of trust requires both that the principle has faith in
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the agent’s motives as well as expectations regarding her competence for the task.
Since Hardin believes open ended pronouncements of trust to be nonsensical, he
implicitly requires that the truster has a more-or-less sharp set of credences about
the likely behavior of her trustee (Hardin (2002b): 9). Given the large cognitive
demand here, its application is primarily for small, local interactions where trusters
have a great deal of individuated information about potential trustees.
These accounts of particular trust describe instances where people have high-
quality information about their surroundings and about others. Particular trust is
not terribly politically tractable, though. Insofar as politics is a collective domain,
particular trust primarily gives us means to consider only local, personal interac-
tions. It provides us no tools to understand how trust facilitates the construction of
communities or the instantiation of social boundaries, for instance. A second short-
coming is that particular trust lacks good observational support. Hardin’s account
is especially vulnerable to this critique since it demands that trust be restricted
to contexts where expectations as well as motives can be sharply apprehended.
There is, however, no empirical evidence to indicate that trust operates like this.
We might, for instance, want to understand what Hardin means when he writes
that “trust works.” What is it that trust does? What processes does trust enable
that would otherwise have been impossible? While a helpful minimalist model of
micro-economic exchange, particular trust lacks the external support necessary to
account for much of what we observe, both in the lab and in our own lives.
1.4 Extant Notions of Trust: General Trust
On the matter of trust’s external validity, Eric Uslaner proceeds methodically to
understand how trust can be accurately measured. His meticulous work in The
Moral Foundations of Trust explores the different components of trust in political
life. In contrast to particular trust, general trust pertains to strangers and has been
measured for decades through the American National Election Survey, General
Social Survey, and World Values Survey, among others. The canonical question to
gauge general trust reads, “Generally speaking, do you believe most people can
be trusted or can’t you be too careful in dealing with people?” (Uslaner (2002): 52).
Beyond its normative import, the answer to this question has a strong, positive
causal relationship with traditional dependent variables such as GDP per capita and
economic growth (Inglehart (1999): 115; Knack and Keefer (1997); Zak and Knack
(2001): 307-9). Francis Fukuyama adds to this chorus by arguing that general trust
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allows people to interact more easily, promoting the consolidation of corporations,
thereby lowering the costs of doing business (Fukuyama (1996)).
Uslaner (2002) convincingly demonstrates that survey measures of trust are
stable over time, indicating that trust is a deeply held value rather than a “mere”
preference (quotes in original: 57). Factor analysis yields three distinct dimensions
of trust, corresponding to qualitatively different manifestations: trust in friends,
trust in strangers, and trust in government. Answers to questions such as: Can
most people be trusted? Can your neighbors be trusted? Can people be trusted
where you shop? all form a coherent vector which Uslaner calls “trust in strangers.”
The confidence to trust unknown others is manifest at what psychologists call a
trait-level and important in light of its strong association with increased levels of
participation in civil society. Those who come from trusting homes are themselves
much more likely to trust. Those who have more education are also more trusting.
Younger cohorts with higher levels of general trust are found to have stronger
out-group ties. Conversely, those who report high particular trust are more likely
to have strong in-group ties (Uslaner (2002): 54).
Uslaner’s account of trust provides mechanistic detail to explain the many well
known positive correlates of trust that political science has identified. Raising kids
in happy, supportive environments leads them to be more trusting of others and
participate more actively in civic life. This ability to open up to others appears to
create more vibrant and stable states in which economic and political institutions
can flourish. Trust allows for a virtuous cycle of positive political feedback. Citizens
raised in more nurturing environments are willing to open up to one another,
generating a more robust civil society that in turn instills the next generation with
even higher levels of trust.
General trust provides limited conceptual purchase, however, again in two
important ways. The first is one of measurement. Data on general trust comes
from surveys. Though the measure is stable over time, it is difficult to validate
self-reported responses. Glaeser et al (2000), for instance, does not find a significant
correspondence between self-reported general trust and observed trust. Instead
self-reported trust seems to correlate more closely with a subject’s trustworthiness;
individuals who report higher trust are themselves more trustworthy. William En-
glish’s behavioral study supports this skepticism, finding no significant relationship
between survey responses and experimental behavior, a point which Ernst Fehr’s
review of the literature echoes (English (2012), Fehr (2009)). Further muddying the
conceptual validity of general trust is the close degree to which it tracks one’s level
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of optimism. The two covary so closely that they may indeed be measurements of
the same phenomenon (Uslaner (2002): chapter 4). Validation is just tricky with
tools involving self-report. The second shortcoming is that what Uslaner identifies
is not a behavior, but a trait. One does not wake up in the morning and decide
whether to be a truster, or even how much to trust. General trust cannot explain
variance within, only between, persons.
Though Uslaner’s study focuses on “trusting strangers,” he identifies other
vectors related to trust that also deserve our attention. Specifically I believe what
Uslaner identifies a “trusting friends and family” can help us get a handle on
affective trust. This name is somewhat misleading, though, since the vector actually
consists of trust in proximate, but not intimate, peers. Indicators such as whether
people trust their neighbors, colleagues from work, and members of their church
all load with high scores along this factor. (Ironically, trusting family members
loads with a relatively low score here.) This vector captures trust in those whom
one knows only peripherally.2 We still come to trust though, even without precise
information. I suggest that this dimension might serve as a point of departure to
consider affective trust.
1.5 Affective Trust
You come to a new city and see a homeless woman asking for change, do you oblige?
Even so, do you trust her? You are an eighteen year old missionary sent abroad to
roam the streets and knock on doors of Southeast England. How do you steer clear
of danger? After having served on mission in rural Dominican Republic for years
you came to trust the people in your town implicitly. You let your kids wander
around completely unattended. So why are you mistrustful of your daughter’s
male driving instructor once back in the States? While you yourself might decline
to trust in one situation or another, it’s not unreasonable to think that people elicit
trust in these cases and in these ways. Though such examples are contrived to
illustrate evocative scenarios—pulled from Melville’s fictional The Confidence Man
as well as my interviews with Christian missionaries—I believe they indicate how
trust is more commonly deployed. Trust in the scenarios above is rooted in the same
sort of socially constructed warrant that grounds affective trust more generally, I
argue.
2I held a summer job working with a devout evangelical who turned out to have been sabotaging
lab equipment in order to carry on an extramarital affair with the repair man—you really just never
know.
11
Coleman’s (1990) formal definition provides a simplifying way of contrasting
my approach to that of particular trust. He understands trust as an expectation
that the benefits of some interaction will overwhelm the losses, formally where
pG > (1− p)L. To play on this slightly, I am interested in explaining trust manifest
as an expectation when rG > (1− r)L where r = p− e, that is where trust serves as a
necessary epistemic bridge of size e which inclines us to render a warm expectation
that others will act cooperatively. This is the domain in which trust “acts” to
facilitate interactions that would not otherwise take place. As I point to below,
there is strong observational evidence to indicate that affective trust outstrips
individuated evidence—by an amount I am just calling e for the sake of illustration—
where people trust other humans to a greater degree than they do computers, for
example.
Henry Farrell and Jack Knight have proposed a similar account to mine in
their explanation of the “political economy of trust” (Farrell and Knight (2003);
Farrell (2009)). Their conception also occupies a space distinct from particular
or general trust, maintaining that trust can stretch, so not only can A trust B in
context Q, but A can trust B in Q-like contexts (Farrell and Knight (2003): 541).
They maintain that people come to trust in this way due to both the incentives
institutions construct for actors as well as the informational environments which
make trust sustainable. This “dynamic account” of the emergence of trust (ibid.:
539) comes about via, “cooperation through compliance with institutional rules, in
particular social settings, [which] affects an actor’s beliefs about the propensity of
others to cooperate (their level of trustworthiness) in similar settings, which affects
that actor’s willingness to cooperate at some subsequent point in time in that same
social setting” (ibid.: 543).
While this is the sort of account I want to endorse and bolster, it does not explain
the experiential or epistemic trappings that ordinarily mark trust. Social norms
can provide a better process-oriented account of how trust comes about. Such
norms are perfectly consistent with Farrell and Knight’s account of the institutional
distribution of information, but also speak to the phenomenology and epistemology
of trust—how it is that trust is rendered and experienced by actors. As such,
affective trust also explains the endogeneity of trust that Ernst Fehr identifies (Fehr
(2009): 236); the manner in which trust can emerge from actors’ coordinative actions.
As it stands, Farrell and Knight’s claim that institutions create trust by broadcasting




Affective trust is “personal” in the terms of Phillip Pettit and has many of the
trappings of what Jane Mansbridge calls “altruistic trust” and Bernard Williams
refers to as “thick trust” (Pettit (1995): 218; Mansbridge (1999): 290; Williams
(1988)).These descriptions of trust presented in political theory don’t share much in
common with the paradigm of particular trust advanced by Coleman or Hardin,
however.
Theorists like Pettit, Mansbridge, and Williams are working, at least in part,
with intuitions of trust primed by ordinary language. Indeed, behavioral psychol-
ogy research echoes many of these considerations. Berg et al (1995) provides the
canonical experimental design here, using what has become known as the Trust
Game to demonstrate that people regularly trust others absent obvious incentive
compatibility. In the experiment two players are given a $10 endowment. Player
one, let’s call her Alice, is then told that she has the option of transferring some or
all of the sum to the second, anonymous player, we’ll call him Bob, whereupon the
amount will be tripled. For example, if Alice were to give Bob $4, he would now
have $22 ($10 + $(3× 4)).That second player then has the opportunity to return
some or all of the amount back to the first. On average $5.16 was sent from the
first player to the second, resulting in a back-transfer which left the first person
$4.66 better off on average. Although the Nash equilibrium for the game is for
no exchange to occur, this experiment reveals that participants are willing to trust
anonymous others lacking any explicit assurance of returns.
Yet the results of the Trust Game differ substantially from other games for
which the Nash equilibrium is also for no exchange to take place. The “divide
the dollar” game, for instance, which has the same Nash equilibrium but which
turns on altruism rather than trust, has a far lower average transfer.3 The dissimilar
outcomes illustrates that trust differs from sheer altruism. And trust also appears
to be distinct from simple risk tolerance. People are shown to be less trusting when
playing against computers than with other humans, even when the expected payout
is the same (Kosfeld et al. (2005); McCabe et al. (2001)). Trust is thereby not purely
a rational endeavor, but is also manifest as an affectively informed attitude (see
for instance, Adolphs (2002), Delgado (2008), Delgado et al. (2005), deQuervain
3In the Divide the Dollar game one player is endowed with $10 and asked if she would like to
give some amount thereof to a confederate. In contrast to the Ultimatum Game, there the recipient
has no ability to refuse the offer. Here, for instance, the modal transfer was zero, though the mean is
not. See Forsythe et al. (1994); Kahneman et al. (1986); Roth et al. (1991); Hoffman et al. (1996).
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(2004), King-Casas (2005), Kosfeld et al. (2005), Rilling et al. (2004), Tomlin (2006),
Xu et al. (2009); Rilling et al. (2002): 400). Elias Khalil’s large edited volume contains
a section for projects that understand trust in compatible terms by scholars such
as Amitai Etzioni (“moral utility”) and Amartya Sen (honesty and pride). Khalil
identifies these approaches as a “taste” for particular pro-social values, but points
out a lack of strong theory to unify these accounts (Khalil 2003: xx-xxii).
Research in cognitive psychology supports these behavioral findings, providing
mechanistic insight to the process of trust. Brain regions which absorb the neurohor-
mone oxytocin, a strong marker of trust (Kosfeld et al (2005)), are also responsible
for processing affect (Huber et al. (2005)) and empathy (Krueger et al. (2007); Tomlin
(2006); King-Casas (2005)). This constellation of neural mechanisms is also asso-
ciated with envy, gloating (Shamay-Tsoory et al. (2009)), and in-group preference
(though it does not generate animosity towards out-group members, Dreu et al.
(2010); (2011)). These results speak to a clear emotional valence to trust beyond the
purely rational. And in as much as this literature identifies in-group affiliation as a
variable of interest, it would indicate that the neurological phenomenon of trust is
at least partially socially conditioned and constructed.
Ernst Fehr examines much of this research and concludes that “trusting cannot
be captured by beliefs about other people’s trustworthiness and risk preferences
alone, but that social preferences play a key role in trusting behavior” (Fehr (2009):
236). Fehr’s helpful intervention here is to locate trust in the domain of the social,
arguing that the disposition is a function of social features, rather than idiosyncratic
psychological traits. If trust is indeed a disposition cued by social norms, we can
construe it as an expectation given a conditional preference to conform to some
conventional practice.
The expansive evidence from cognitive and behavioral psychology indicates
that many of our intuitions regarding the affective character of trust are borne out
by good evidence. What I take to be affective trust is not a marginal instance of trust,
but identifies core features of the phenomenon. That it exists is unimpeachable. The
account I provide will better identify its mechanisms and explain its conceptual
coherence.
1.5.2 The Conventional Production of Affective Trust
As noted above Ernst Fehr discusses trust in terms of a social preference. Along
those lines, social norms and institutions can come to explain the processes which
generate these socially-held beliefs and preferences. Since one actor’s preferences
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are often conditional on the actions of others, conventions, norms, and institutions
all come as collections of rules that direct actors towards one equilibrium or another,
guiding them towards Paretian outcomes. From any number of “good” options
we might choose, an institution helps us endorse particular ones. Once a group of
actors settles on some convention, additional institutional scaffolding may well be
constructed to instantiate those equilibria. Institutions also come to explain how
agents operate in contexts of limited information or bounded rationality (Denzau
and North (2000)). I argue that the process of developing these regularities, both
constructing incentives and conditioning first and second order expectations, leads
people to trust by giving them reason to believe and hold those beliefs as warranted.
This can help unpack trust as an endogenous byproduct of institutional design.
This mode of inquiry is well established in political science. Already in the sev-
enteenth century Thomas Hobbes understands religious faith as a kind of affective
trust in others, conditioned by social norms and institutions. Hobbes quotes St. Paul
from Romans 10:17 to explain that “faith comes of hearing” (Hobbes (1994): 213).
By this Hobbes doesn’t mean that faith comes as divine premonition, but in light
of social and contextual features that lead one to regard specific expectations and
actions as warranted. More recently, works such as Paul Milgrom, Douglas North,
and Barry Weingast’s paper on the role of the law merchant in medieval guild
society (Milgrom et al. (1990)) and Avner Grief’s work on Maghribi and Genoese
traders of the 11th and 12th centuries (Greif (1994)) explain the effects of medieval
political institutions by demonstrating how particular rules reduced transaction
costs and produced variation in higher-level social order. Change some of the rules
and you can get radically different outcomes. Robert Axelod, Scott Page, and Jenna
Bednar have also offered probative accounts of how formal rules under simple
constraints can help us explain low-level social structure (Axelrod (1997); Page
(2007); Page and Bednar (2007)). I use these methods of analysis to explore the
political dimensions of affective trust.
* * *
This framework helps make sense of Laitin’s anecdote. He expresses a lack
of reliance in light of some salient reason—the Irishness of the cops. But we can
dig deeper. There is not a particular task or duty that the police are anticipated to
serve here—the worry is not that they will bungle the breakup of these fights or
one of partiality. The implicit concern was that somehow the Irish cops were not
the right sort of persons to intervene. It was a trust that pertained to fitness to the
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task (qua Irish cops), rather than their handling of the task of intervention, per se.
Affective trust is mediated by the socially normative similarity among agents. Since
Laitin’s actors lacked such common ground with the Irish cops, they also lacked an
(apparent) reason to trust them.
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CHAPTER II
Melville’s Model of a Conventional Trust
ABSTRACT
This chapter looks at Herman Melville’s The Confidence Man in order to
explore the phenomenology and experiential elements of affective trust.
I argue that Melville self-consciously uses the novel to interrogate the
nature of trust. The project serves as a model to systematically explore
the means by which trust is upset or undone. Through Melville’s effort
to show the tenuousness of trust, both among characters and between
author and reader, he reveals the importance of settled conventions
and socially normative expectations in supporting the kinds of ordinary
trust we regularly experience. Indeed the author repeatedly places
himself in the midst of the discussion, explicitly acknowledging his
role is structuring the narrative. In these moves I find that he advances
an argument that fiction can be used to explore behavioral dynamics.
This conscious modeling effort on the part of Melville speaks to the
import of conventional dynamics in structuring trust. In addition to the
marked lack of social conventions in the novel, his reflections on fiction
serve as another indication that trust can only develop in the presence
of a priori norms and social expectations. Much like the conventional
account I offer, the possibility of trust for Melville is contingent upon
settled expectations, precisely the sorts of norms that are systematically
scrubbed from the novel’s landscape.
What I call affective trust is, at least at first, motivated by a practical or natu-
ralistic concern. The trust implicit in the cries “just trust me” or “I trusted you”
which indicate the deep affective aspect to trust that outstrips its credential com-
ponent. Trust consists of a belief, sure, but it is more than that too. It holds people
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accountable for upsetting expectations in a way that is not entailed by the usual
process of belief updating. Withholding trust or failing to make good on one’s
trust is commonly accompanied by an attendant reactive attitude along the lines of
how could you?! It is this emotional valence to trust, outstripping a common belief,
that leads to particular kinds of openness in contexts where people share common
norms. I argue that even when people lack individuated information about trustees,
the emotional attitude of trust can act to bridge one’s faith.
As I have laid out in the introduction, I don’t believe trust is any one fundamental
thing, but a constellation of attitudes and beliefs that we come to call trust. There
are alternative accounts of trust on the table and I am fine with them. As such, I
believe it fitting that this dissertation tackles the concept of affective trust using four
distinct resources. Given that trust is not a unified phenomenon, either cognitively
or behaviorally, it makes sense to account for it in different manners: literarily,
conceptually, politically, and observationally. This approach serves to articulate a
coherent argument for the manifestation of affective trust and identify its relevance
and traction in different sorts of domains.
In this first substantive chapter I explore the problem of trust through the lens of
Herman Melville’s The Confidence Man: His Masquerade. The novel serves as a point
of departure to problematize straight forward explanations of trust. Accounts of
trust in the economic literature, for instance, depict trust as a well-formed kind of
thing where principles construct thick beliefs of agents in light of relevant evidence.
I don’t think many of our intuitions run that way. This novel serves as a means
of exploring exceptional, but not extraordinary, manifestations of trust priming us
to think about the many affective and emotional considerations that attend to it.
Throughout, passengers are cheated, hoodwinked, and otherwise have the wool
pulled over their eyes. I choose to read the text as a mediation on the ways in
which trust breaks down, and the conditions under which it might possibly obtain.
The many tales of guile in the book serve as a contrast case which illustrates the
conditions under which trust is warranted. Further chapters impose more analytic
discipline upon my conceptual inquiry. For the moment, though, I turn to Melville
in order to illustrate various plausible scenarios in which trust is present, and to
help us think through generative “boundary cases” that can provide pushback
against stock accounts of trust.
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2.1 Theoretical and Practical Motivations for Locating Trust in Melville
The first reason for considering this novel is as a means of illustrating and narra-
tivizing the phenomenological concerns associated with trust, laying out stories and
episodes that allow us to imagine scenarios in which trust is apt to arise. It walks
us through a story, which can help check whether the concepts under consideration
travel well, whether they make sense in the context of other attendant circumstances
in the world. Of course, fiction can be written in such a way as to blunt this process,
but it commonly tries to capture some core verisimilitude. Naomi Arpaly, for in-
stance, points out the ways that characters in novels can present representative and
resonant accounts of distinctive psychologies (Arpaly (2003): 4). Fiction, similar
to other established qualitative methods, has the ability to conform to a greater or
lesser degree to the world as we take it to be.
While Melville’s novel neither spells out a coherent account of trust nor a well
specified conditional story for when it is justified, the book does motivate theorizing
that gets at each concern. Indeed, the novel proceeds by illustrating how difficult it
can be to justify our trust, identifying any number of circumstances in which the
conventionality of trust completely falls apart. For my purposes, however, it gives
both voice and structure to the worries surrounding the prospect of trusting. In so
doing, it highlights conditions that are inhospitable to trust, while also positing an
alternative or complementary context in which trust makes sense. While the novel
continually upsets the aspirations of its characters, it also casts a spotlight on the
way shifting expectations and fluid norms vitiate hopes of surety.
The second argument I want to make is that this novel is particularly well suited
to interrogate this kind of epistemic question. Beyond the treatment in the text,
the work is self-consciously a project of what James Johnson calls “model thinking”
(Johnson (2014)). There is a skeptical worry that novels are an ill-fitting resource
to mine evidence for social scientific concepts. After all, fiction is just the result
of one person’s imagination. Beyond narrativizing trust’s conceptual limitations,
literature can also serve as a site for its modeling. The Confidence Man puts pressure
on conceptual shortcomings in which we traffic, offering a train of scenarios which
subvert the grounds of trust in provocative ways. We might cast this as an effort to
explore the boundary conditions in which trust might obtain. Cast as such, the novel
serves as a model to assess the conceptual implications of trust. As James Johnson
points out, models work to set aside extraneous details and assist our thinking
by isolating conceptual relationships and identifying practical implications of the
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mechanisms under consideration (Johnson (2014)). This is true for mathematical
(e.g. Thomas Schelling and Kenneth Arrow) as well as non mathematical (e.g. John
Rawls and Michele Foucault) models. Novels are just another instance of modeling,
assisting our thinking by considering the conceptual implications of inputs on a set
of diverse actors. Novels aren’t science—neither are models for that matter—but
they can serve to provide us with greater epistemic traction on the world. That’s
how I intend to read The Confidence Man, in any event.
In addition to the two methodological motivations that underpin this chapter,
I pull out two important conceptual upshots of Melville’s meditation on trust.
The first is that trust can only exist in the presence of settled assumptions and
conventions. Throughout the novel characters are constantly having assumptions
altered or shifted, eviscerating the possibility of trust. Indeed the novel’s characters
are so mercurial that at one point the author himself emerges to respond to the
plausibility of these moves. The point here is that without some settled beliefs,
established through conventional practices, we have no firm ontological ground to
stand on, either as actors or readers. The second theme that I hope to draw from the
text is the role of charity in Melville’s trust. While clearly distinct from trust, charity,
as I understand it here, is a bridge that allows one to overcome an informational
deficit. By playing this out, similar to the conventional commitments of Melville,
we can illustrate the ways in which warm attitudes are instrumental in generating
trust.
2.2 Personalizing Trust and the Guinea’s Plea
To think through the puzzle of affective trust I first turn to the story of the unfor-
tunate Black man in chapter three of The Confidence Man, an episode which serves
to problematize simplistic reflections on trust. The novel is all about trust. This
might sound like a naive reduction of its terms, but I don’t think so. As I read it,
The Confidence Man is shot through with epistemic concerns of trust, and the story
of the disabled, free Black man highlights the concept’s slipperiness as well as any.
The episode, which begins the novel in earnest, is at once completely under-
standable and totally curious. It describes a “grotesque negro cripple” with a
pathetic disposition and ragged attire,“so cheerily endured, raising mirth in some
of that crowd, whose own purses, hearths, hearts, all their possessions, sound limbs
included, could not make gay” (Melville (1990): 15). Melville is not a racist, and
the portrayal of Der Black Guinea is likely a lampoon of racial mores of the period,
20
not an endorsement thereof. Whatever the implicit racial politics, the man appears
to be in a pitiful state. He is approached by another passenger who asks about
his circumstances. “ ‘And who is your master, Guinea?’ ‘Oh sar, I am der dog
widout massa.’ ‘A free dog, eh? Well, on your account, I’m sorry for that, Guinea.
Dogs without masters fare hard.’ ” The passenger isn’t likely wrong—antebellum
America was no utopia for Blacks, free or not. And the exchange serves to quickly
convey the Guinea’s utter desperation. Not only does he claim total poverty, but he
is also bereft of even the scraps of self-respect. If any man deserves charity, this one
does.
Though you might want to believe that a person in such pathetic circumstances
could only elicit compassion, the ship’s passengers don’t see fit to comply. He is
taken to be a “curious object,” and though most pay him little mind, a few toss him
some change. Then abruptly, and for no obvious reason, the poor man begins to
pitch his head back and open his mouth wide, “like an elephant for tossed apples.”
This does the trick. Now “as in appearance he seems a dog, so now in a merry
way, like a dog he began to be treated.” His performance moves people “at once to
diversion and charity” (Melville (1990): 16).
Passengers begin a penny-pitch game, “the cripple’s mouth being at once target
and purse” (Melville (1990): 16). So though their hearts might not be in the right
place, at least the effect of their actions is charitable, albeit perverse. During the
frivolity a misanthropic disabled man approaches and accuses the Guinea of being
a fraud, abusing the kind strangers of their generosity. This causes the spectators to
abruptly turn on the Guinea, demanding that he produce bona fides.
[F]inding themselves left sole judges in the case, [they] could not resist
the opportunity of acting the part: not because it is a human weakness
to take pleasure in sitting in judgment upon one in a box, as surely this
unfortunate negro now was, but that it strangely sharpens human per-
ceptions, when, instead of standing by and having their fellow-feelings
touched by the sight of an alleged culprit severely handled by some one
justiciary, a crowd suddenly come to be all justiciaries in the same case
themselves. (Melville (1990): 18)
While you might think that such enhanced scrutiny would have moved members
of the crowd to a sympathetic view of the Guinea, indeed it only elicited their
censoriousness.
The Guinea pleads for confidence; just ask his references, they’ll vouch for
him. The crowd, however, is still skeptical. How can all these vaguely described
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guarantors be tracked down anyway? A Methodist minister insists that people
invoke their charitable spirits. But the disabled curmudgeon won’t have anything
of it. “Charity is one thing, and truth is another” he snaps (Melville (1990): 20).
This pathetic scenario is not in any way rarified or implausible. Some pompous
jerk emerges from the crowd, souring everyone’s goodwill (er, fun), which presses
this self-righteous priest to intervene, who insists on serving a heaping ladle of
gospel to everyone. Meanwhile this poor, disadvantaged man is wailing for sympa-
thy, for trust. Amidst this chaos at least someone seems to have sense. A country
merchant, moved by the man’s plaintive cries, insists, “Yes, my poor fellow, I have
confidence in you” (ibid.). Reaching into his pocket he provides evidence of his
trust, giving over a full half dollar. The clergyman does eventually secure bona
fides for the beggar, though it’s of no consequence by then. He appears to have
disembarked somewhere in the interim.
The episode probes the personal demands of trust while also illustrating the
manner in which its experience varies across people. Literary critics commonly
lean on the good/evil binary in the text, identifying the confidence man as the
embodiment of the sinister, of which the Guinea is one of many forms he takes
(Bellis (1987): 549, Parker (1971): 293). This reading doesn’t come naturally to me,
but more importantly it distracts the interpretation from the practical matters at
hand: trust, confidence, treachery, guile. I set aside this traditional reading in order
to gain purchase on these epistemic and phenomenological considerations.
The Guinea is positively mournful for being accused of fraud. It is not just
a matter of being asked for verification, the man is distraught for failing to win
confidence just in virtue of his pleas. Besides the crotchety old man, the villain here
is the crowd. The narrator draws attention to the crowd’s mercurial and capricious
tendencies, switching almost arbitrarily from laconic and puerile mockery to high-
minded judgement. The text also points to the irony that the Guinea is being charged
by a man who is himself disabled—a point completely lost on the passengers.
As readers I imagine we are meant to sympathize with the savage circumstances
of the beggar. We are meant to believe him, and precisely in light of sentimental
considerations. Melville complicates this sense, however, by narrating events such
that we never really get good evidence one way or another. (Indeed if you take the
traditional line the Guinea is just one of the many instantiations of the Confidence
Man.) Further confusing matters, while the crowd mistrusts the Guinea upon
having their frivolity disrupted, it’s not clear that they actually trusted anything
about him to begin with. They didn’t obviously hold any firm beliefs regarding
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whether he was or wasn’t the person he presented himself to be. They weren’t
charitable in light of his poverty, they saw the ordeal as a circus act. They withdrew
a trust which they never extended in the first place.
It’s hard to identify with anyone’s conduct in all this, aside possibly from that of
the country merchant. His title points to a rural sensibility, laden with connotations
of the ordinary or common. The others, however, come off as somewhere between
irritating and callous. The minister can do little more than preach of the banal
value of charity. To this the misanthrope’s rejoinder is spot on (albeit completely
unfeeling): If what is in dispute is integrity, then shouldn’t truth matter? What’s
more, charity isn’t obviously the proper virtue to invoke here. If what the Guinea
demands, what anyone might, is that he be believed, he is asking not for generosity
but respect. And the crowd? A “flock of fools, under this captain of fools, in this
ship of fools” (Melville (1990): 21)!
In the end the most anyone can say for the disabled Black man is, “Yes, my
poor fellow I have confidence in you.” The country merchant’s sentiments are
personal and personalized. Trustworthiness is not imputed to the man himself
(the merchant does not say that the man is to be trusted in some extrinsic sense),
but a projection of the merchant’s own (possibly idiosyncratic) psychology. He is
moved by the Guinea’s pleas, and sympathizes with his predicament. But there is
no indication that there is but one one way of motivating trust, and no uniform set
of circumstances that call forth such a disposition. While some in the crowd were
less sympathetic to the man for his wailing, the merchant found himself moved.
Evidence does not explain the variation in their judgement. They were all privy to
the same information, and while one was stirred to confidence, the others instead
became capricious.
That is true for the characters of the novel. We as readers, however, do feel
sorry for the Guinea. Yes, he is downtrodden, and the crowd’s turn strikes us as
uncharitable. It is sorrowful that while the man pleads for their confidence they
insist upon guarantors. We recognize his demand to be trusted on his own terms.
The Guinea has no independent means of establishing his authenticity. He has
no documents, no SSD card, no references. And even if he did, they might be
fraudulent for all anyone knows. So how is he supposed to garner respect if he
can’t establish trust? (Or run this in reverse—how might he establish trust without
respect?)
Melville, assuming the role of the narrator, is frequently chatty, serving to
cleave apart the sentiments that we as readers are liable to elicit from those of
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the fictional passengers. When he comments, reflects, or belittles the behavior
of the characters it distances us from their immediate responses, magnifying the
divergence between our reactions and theirs. As readers I imagine we’re rather
judgy as a group, questioning the prudence of the characters performance. These
reactions are completely appropriate, but they oughtn’t serve to undermine the
experiences of the characters themselves. They are, Melville will remind us, the
ones who were actually party to the events, after all.
This episode illustrates trust’s affective valence and how it establishes beliefs
that outstrip the individuated information at hand. The merchant, for his part,
trusts the man even though he is presented with the same information as the other
passengers. The Guinea’s pleas induces sympathy and is meant to be directed
emotionally, demanding a kind of second personal respect from the passengers.
It plays out what a demand for trust looks like and the means by which it makes
moral demands. That being said, it is not obvious that readers are expected to
trust the man themselves. Pity, compassion, charity, sure, but there isn’t any good
indication that we as readers are expected to be moved to trust, to confide in the
man. Nevertheless, the story forces us to reflect on the sorts of things that just
do elicit our confidence, as well as the ways in which they operate inconsistently.
Indeed, I am more inclined to trust the passengers’ reflections than I am my own.
They, after all, were present in the moment, whereas I, in the position of reader, can
afford benevolent goodwill from the safe distance of my blue armchair.
2.3 Shifting Expectations Within The Confidence Man
The problem with simplistic accounts of trust is that they fail to capture the mean-
ingful details that we encounter in the world. Simplified models are important
for winnowing away distracting details, but gone too far and we are left with an
entirely sterilized representation. The above episode of the man begging for trust
shows aspects of trust that many of the accounts on offer miss. The narrative serves
first to check our intuitions by performing a story which resonates with the reader.
But it also introduces subtleties that test some of the beliefs we might have held.
You might have though that trust and distrust are complements of one another until
confronting these chapters, for instance.
This is just one of many instances illustrating how Melville’s The Confidence
Man serves as a proving ground for intuitions about trust, putting pressure on
conceptions of certainty and credulity. The novel revels in epistemic vertigo as
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it continually sows suspicion among both readers and characters. Its opening
sequence profiles a man boarding a large steamship called the Fidele (the “faithful”)
chugging down the Mississippi River on April 1st (in case the situational symbolism
isn’t otherwise obvious). As “suddenly as Manco Capac at the lake Titicaca, a man
in cream-colors” appears. “Though neither soiled nor slovenly, his cream-colored
suit had a tossed look, almost linty, as if, traveling night and day from some far
country beyond the prairies, he had long been without the solace of a bed” (Melville
(1990): 10). Nothing in this description gives reason to mistrust the man. Nothing
here indicates guile or dishonestly. And yet, the reader is liable to feel queazy and
suspicious. The novel is constantly interrogating how different kinds of information
alter our expectations and willingness to trust, from the very outset of the novel all
the way to its end.
I imagine that part of the discomfort comes from the peripatetic nature of
the character’s description. He comes out of nowhere and appears as if he has
come from anywhere. And though his suit is tidy, he appears worn, unsettled.
But what does this tell us? Were these observations to affect our credences of
the man’s rectitude, how ought they do so? What reliable inferences do these
descriptions allow us to make? Our skepticism is in some sense borne of the
absence of information, rather than any direct evidence of malice. A traveller is
only mistrusted given the expectation that most people are sedentary, for example.
(Though, of course, all the characters in the novel are travelers just in virtue of being
aboard the ship.) Notably, the ancient Greek norm of xenia—the unquestioning
hospitality of strangers—didn’t endorse this sort of wariness. Our ability to assess
trustworthiness, but also to feel that our trust is warranted, is contingent on such
background assumptions, of which we are intentionally deprived of here.
While characters are constantly frustrated in their attempts to trust well, the
novel points to the absence of these commonly held conventional assumptions as
one critical reason for this indeterminacy. “Upon a more attentive survey,” the
narrator remarks, passengers on the boat, “perceiving no badge of authority about
[the man in the cream colored suit], but rather something quite the contrary—he
being of an aspect so singularly innocent; an aspect too, which they took to be
somehow inappropriate to the time and place. . . ” (Melville (1990): 8). He lacked the
kind of conventional markers which commonly establish trust. Still, the passengers
looked to find some indication of the man’s rectitude. Frustrated by a lack of salient
evidence he appeared to them “somehow inappropriate to the time and place.”
Their mistrust does not directly result from the lack of individuated information
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about the man, but their inability to place him. It was not that he lacked credentials,
the reason given here is more ambiguous. He is just “somehow inappropriate.”
But the man is otherwise innocuous, peddling gospel pablum, rendering their
unease all the more curious. On a chalk board upon the Fidele the man in the cream-
colored suit, riffing off Corinthians, writes successively: “ ‘Charity suffereth long,
and is kind.’ ‘Charity endureth all things.’ ‘Charity believeth all things.’ ‘Charity
never faileth.’ ” Unsurprisingly, no one appears to be swayed by the stranger’s
ministry. Passengers just jeer and laugh at him. Even if he were the second coming
of the Lord and Savior, it wouldn’t matter to the passengers aboard the Fidele.
These high-minded instructions are juxtaposed with a sign exclaiming “NO
TRUST” above the barber’s door. The barber wants none of this fellowship or
charity, he just wants to be paid in exchange for his work, towing a cool rationalist
line all through the novel. His circumspection seems reasonable given the poor
assurances that people might offer him. But as assiduously as he might try, he still
cannot remain a bystander to the corruption he sees. When, towards the end of
the novel, the philanthropist digs at the barber for “contentedly deal[ing] in the
impostures you condemn” he responds weakly, “Ah, sir, I must live” (Melville
(1990): 274). The barber cannot be impartial to the tension between trust and
incredulity. While he doesn’t presume to outwit frauds, he elects to take so few
risks as to mitigate his exposure. He stands incredulous.
The novel is a steady march of episodes demonstrating the implausibility of
simplistic approaches to trust. The diversity of characters, contexts, and scenes
makes it impossible for the reader to gain much of an epistemic toe-hold, though
neither can we nor the characters just abstain from taking sides. Trust is necessary
component of the kind of exploration and experimentation that constructs a life
worth living. Don Herzog reads the novel, at least in part, is an illustration of
the intractability of the dilemma between blithe credulity and priggish skepticism
(Herzog (2008): 179). Yes, there is no safe harbor. Every sort of interaction entails
some modicum of risk, and you can’t just play it safe by waiting it out on the
epistemic sidelines. Yet as I read it, the novel also points at the reasons to or
grounds of trust by illustrating cases in which it fails to obtain.
Passengers on the Fidele ”not lacking from variety” come and go, their identities
impossible to keep track of. (Indeed Herzog notes that the novel leaves open the
question of whether there is one or many confidence men working the boat that day.)
Melville spends a full sentence (coextensive with a paragraph of his) listing just
some of the different peoples that embarked the ship’s during its journey. “Natives
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of all sorts, and foreigners; men of business and men of pleasure; parlor men and
backwoodsmen; farm-hunters and fame-hunters; heiress-hunters, gold-hunters,
buffalo-hunters, bee-hunters, happiness-hunters, truth-hunters,. . . ” (Melville (1990):
14). The Fidele was so busy that, indeed, no one knew whether the stranger in the
cream colored suit even remained on board. He doesn’t reappear in the story, so it
probably matters little anyway.
The contextual assumptions that the characters are working with are constantly
upset. The above passage illustrates the variety of people on the ship—different
cultures, proclivities, vocations, avocations. The man in the cream colored suit
scans dubious because he can’t be placed in a particular context, while the charity
the Guinea is shown abruptly ends when the situational norms are called into ques-
tion by some jackass. The novel repeatedly demonstrates that when conventional
expectations are upset, so is trust. A rather biting illustration of this point comes
from chapters 28–31 when two men meet and immediately become fast friends.
“You are a man after my own heart,”. . .
“Indeed” the other adds, ”our sentiments agree so, that were they written
in a book, whose was whose, few but the nicest critics might determine.”
“Since we are thus joined in mind,” said the first, ”why not be joined in
hand?”
“My hand is always at the service of virtue,” the second frankly extending
it to him as to virtue personified (Melville (1990): 189).
This effusive dialogue continues over a number of chapters, the two declaring
their abiding affection for the other. The conversation persists, as does their drink-
ing, until at the end of chapter thirty one of the men drops a bombshell: He’s broke
and in need of a loan. The title of the subsequent chapter cuts to the quick of things:
“A Metamorphosis More Surprising than any in Ovid” (Melville (1990): 214). The
other character stumbles, startled, unsure of how to proceed. He’s just spent three
chapters declaring his enduring devotion to this man. But surely this didn’t include
money. How can he revoke it so hastily?
The situation is quickly defused—jj ;) —the first man fesses up that he was just
pulling the leg of the second. The point is made, however. Friendships unravel
precipitously when they become commercialized in that way. Again, it is the abrupt
shift of contexts that unspools trust here. Charles Noble, the second man, thought
he was operating with one set of social norms, when his acquaintance swiftly
altered them. Trust vanished in the absence of contextual regularity. None of these
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stories are dispassionate, risk assessments, but demonstrate the entanglement of
the emotional considerations with circumstantial ones. Showing their tenuousness
and the ease with which they can be upset is what the novel traffics in.
While Melville doesn’t identify the epistemic foundations of trust—why these
sorts of conventions are the right kind of apparatus to construct trust—the novel
does direct our attention to the nature of a solution. Whatever trust is in the novel,
it does not correspond well to the understanding in the economic literature of
particular trust. Gary Lindberg, for instance, points out the lack of authority in
the novel, noting that we never hear from the captain and that with the diversity
of characters on the ship no social or cultural norms hold sway Lindberg (1982):
24, 45). The effect of this is to recognize the function of these social and literary
sign posts, and underscore the difficulty of coming to confident beliefs absent that.
The book serves as a model, a thought experiment of what happens if we reject
the authoritative norms that unite us, what we become if we are not a nation that
“holds these truths to be self-evident.” What we become as “interworking crewmen”
rather than “disjunctive passengers” (Tichi (1972): 647). Indeed I see the upshot of
the work as a faint call for transcendent unity rather than atomized self-reliance.
It is not just the scarcity of information that inhibits trust (though that clearly
plays a role), but the fluid and contested nature of characters’ overlapping norms—
the country merchant trusts even though his fellow passengers do not. Melville
experiments with the limits of trust by constantly changing context and under-
mining characters’ expectations. It is not that he denies that trust means anything,
rather his narrative is meant to demonstrate its instability. As Herzog points out,
the novel leads us to a sort of epistemic water’s edge—only so much skepticism is
possible before you have condemned yourself to the life of a hermit.
The roles and identities of the characters in the novel are so totally opaque as to
undermine any social convention which might support trust. And Melville even
writes in a way to obfuscate the interpretations of the reader. In these chapters
the names of the characters aren’t even identified until well into the story. Indeed
in chapter 28 the characters themselves say that “were [their words] written in a
book, whose was whose, few but the nicest critics might determine.” The irony is
not lost on the reader trying to make sense of the shell game cum novel. Which
is the confidence man and which is the dupe is often just as hard for the reader to
ascertain as for the characters themselves. This is a pattern throughout the novel,
one of obfuscation and shifting assumptions. From the passengers incredulity of the
“somehow inappropriate” manner of the man in the cream colored suit, to the abrupt
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change of the sentiments of the passengers towards the Guinea, the metamorphosis
of the friendship between Nobel and Goodman, all the way to the end when the
philanthropist beguiles the barber. Indeed the confidence man himself is constantly
shifting forms. Were he to operate under the same guise throughout he would be
easy to out. It is this lack of stability makes it impossible for trust to obtain.
2.4 Model Thinking and Melville’s Constructivist Ontology
The difficulty of establishing trust is one that Melville took personally. Others point
to his work Pierre as an indication that his ontological skepticism predates The
Confidence Man and his interest in “the great are of telling truth” (Kemper (1980): 23;
Lindberg (1982): 17). We can look back further, however, to his third novel from
1849, Mardi: And a Voyage Thither where he complains of being disbelieved in his
first two works. In the preface to that novel he wrote:
Not long ago, having published two narratives of voyages in the Pacific,
which, in many quarters, were received with incredulity, the thought
occurred to me, of indeed writing a romance of Polynesian adventure,
and publishing it as such; to see whether, the fiction might not, possibly,
be received for a verity: in some degree the reverse of my previous
experience (Mardi)
Already there he draws together concepts of trust and truth, while eliding the
distinction between fiction and fact. Those other two books were fact and everyone
took them to be fiction. If the truth is too fantastical, maybe fiction will appear more
trustworthy?
He doesn’t expressly say that Mardi is a fictional account, it is only implied. But
that he never comes out and says it serves to questions the efficacy of the dialectic.
It is as though to dwell on it is to miss the point of the project. To “be received for
a verity” is not to be thought of as somehow a fact of history, but “as real” in a
constructivist sense. The reality that concerns Melville is not the ontology, but the
veracity—whether it is taken “for a verity,” for a fact.
In chapters 14 and 33 of The Confidence Man finds Melville pursuing a similar
line of argument. At these moments the narrator as author emerges is if behind a
curtain to explain himself. In chapter 14, after a curious about-face by the country
merchant—the man so generous to the Guinea, who had up till now been so
trusting, suddenly blurts out his dismal appraisal of society in chapter thirteen—
Melville apologize for the novel’s fictionalized account human behavior. “To some,
29
it may raise a degree of surprise that one so full of confidence, as the merchant has
throughout shown himself, up to the moment of his late sudden impulsiveness,
should, in that instance, have betrayed such a depth of discontent. He may be
thought inconsistent, and even so he is. But for this, is the author to be blamed?”
(Melville (1990): 84). Are we to take the strange events narrated in fictional episodes
seriously? Absolutely, Melville argues. The world frequently exhibits anomalies,
if anything more often than does literature. “Fiction based on fact should never
be contradictory to it; and is it not a fact, that, in real life, a consistent character
is a rara avis?” (Melville (1990): 84). The rare bird becomes a case that literature
comes to manipulate and put pressure on, to test our intuitions about the world,
posing plausible boundary conditions, a form of literary simulation as it were.
If you’re incredulous because you think these are rare or remote cases, don’t be.
Remember, he points out, when naturalists brought back the duck-billed platypus
from Australia the zoological community thought it a fraud. Rare birds aren’t as
rare as you might think.
Later in chapter 33 Melville also makes an appearance, this time defending his
“sloppy” writing. He writes that he imagines readers clamoring that his characters
and costumes are just too fanciful. “How unreal all this is! Who did ever dress
or act like your cosmopolitan? And who, it might be returned, did ever dress or
act like harlequin?” (Melville (1990): 217). His answer is dismissive, though. Why
would you want literature to be as boring as real life? While the substance of the
response diverges from that in chapter 14, the impulse is the same: fiction is only
after a certain the kind of verisimilitude. The about-face of the merchant bears
resemblance to the kind of narrative or story that Melville is trying to tell. The
model attempts to capture human behavior, and so behavior must hue to that of
the world at large. The outrageous costumes and fanciful characters however, they
are not the point of the novel. Plus, fantasy is just fun, quit complaining.
In these moments Melville becomes explicit about engaging a kind of “model
thinking,” self-consciously manipulating the narrative to explore particular kinds
of dynamics. The model is true, he argues, insofar as it captures the salient aspects
of the world. It is up to the author to decide what to study and inspect. Melville
here explicitly steps out of the role of narrator to insist upon the efficacy of narrative
in modeling the world. It is a funny move, in some ways, as he would seem to have
sprung his own ontological trap. Inasmuch as the novel studies the archetype of the
confidence man, the author here is implicated by placing himself inside the story.
In so doing he accepts the epistemic worries that come along with manipulating
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and dissimulating confidence. His aim is not to avoid this controversy, but place
the project of fiction in the center of it. The move helps convey the disregard he has
for the empirical and his embrace of veritistic fiction.
The novel is constructed in such a way that it repels simple interpretations of
characters and their behavior. He creates this effect by failing to name characters,
depriving them of a history, and allowing them complete freedom to board and
disembark anonymously. He refuses to provide a social context or a shared set of
assumptions for the actors, making it impossible to freely trust anyone. When these
social expectations fray, the fabric of trust becomes rent beyond recognition. The
project, its method, composition, and narrative structure all point to the constructed
nature of truth.
Scholars argue that The Confidence Man is Melville’s both surly dismissal of his
contemporary critics who were bored by the defiantly proto-modernist turn to his
work and rejection of transcendentalists like Emerson who are primarily concerned
with an internalistic ontology. The standard line is that Melville is retreating to
an isolating and relativistic narrative hole (e.g. Tichi (1972), Lindberg (1982): 43,
Bellis (1987)). I don’t want to endorse that view, however. Rather I see Melville
stumping for a defiantly externalist and conventional approach to veracity. If, like
the passengers of the ship, like a community of readers that jump down Melville’s
throat for his literary imagination, we deprive literature of its conventional authority
we’re epistemically and ontologically sunk. We are then in the position of the
passengers of the Fidele, incapable of trusting the right people, and unable to
receive solace when betrayed. But if we subscribe to the constructivist model that
Melville lays out, a doctrine of charity, then we are in a position to ground our
beliefs.
The literary project of The Confidence Man examines the grounds of trust by
systematically altering the assumptions of both readers and characters. Internally,
the book deprives characters the ability to trust, or at least trust well, by constructing
a world which is devoid of social convention. Passengers of all sorts and kinds
come and go without notice. No one has a reputation and characters cannot agree
on which interpretative frames to impose on their interactions. Yes, the lack of
information mitigates the possibility of trust, but it is not only the informational
deficit we’re placed in. Rather the actors are deprived of conventional knowledge.
And what I take Melville to be saying in chapters 14 and 33 is that if we have a hope
for extracting meaning from the world, we are going to need to recruit the kind
of trust that comes from settled conventions, including those between reader and
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author, modeler and audience.
2.5 Charity
Conventional understandings are the cornerstone of Melville’s project, and by their
careful absence trust becomes a labored process throughout the novel. He does,
however, point to a second epistemic mechanism that brings about the possibility of
trust: charity. The leitmotif runs through the novel, from its beginning to end, with
characters making different claims to charity with more or less success. His point
here is not to advance an uncritical approach to the virtue of a charitable inclination.
Clearly people become vulnerable were they to always see the best in others. Rather
I believe that Melville’s point is to show that charity is a crucial element of trust
and social cohesion, even if it cannot be universally justified. To return to Herzog’s
interpretation, we can’t live in a world (or make sense of a novel, for that matter)
where we deprive ourselves of charity solely on account of skepticism.
The motif is presented in the first chapter with the arrival the man in the cream
colored suit admonishing the passengers aboard for charity to their blithe disregard.
Indeed while they ignore his message they’re skeptical of his person. They identify a
“singular innocence,” but also sense that he is otherwise “somehow inappropriate.”
The demand for charity comes to have the opposite of its intended effect. I imagine
the joke here is that a “singular innocence” can only evoke incredulity. No one
is that guileless, unless they aim to manipulate you somehow.1 Of course one
wonders what these Christian folk aboard the Fidele would have made of Jesus
Christ come to redeem the world. Herein lies the paradox of divinity: salvation can
never be conventional. Anyone that pure is either God’s only son, come to sacrifice
himself for man’s sins or a con. And though there has been but one Jesus and many
cons, Christianity must implore its members to endorse the virtue of charitable
credulity. Saint Paul insists on this when writing to the Corinthians (chapter 13),
the lines that the man in the cream suit alludes to, explaining that:
3 And though I bestow all my goods to feed the poor, and though I give
my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing.
4 Charity suffereth long, and is kind; charity envieth not; charity vaun-
teth not itself, is not puffed up,
5 Doth not behave itself unseemly, seeketh not her own, is not easily
1My mother has always harbored skepticism of people that smile too much. I’ve thought of it as
the inverse of “the lady doth protest too much, methinks” principle.
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provoked, thinketh no evil;
6 Rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth in the truth;
7 Beareth all things, believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all
things.
Christian virtue implores the faithful to be modest, credulous, and hopeful. Paul
instructs his audience to “believe all things” irrespective of the social or epistemic
vulnerability it produces. Faith requires that actors withhold judgement; that
Christians withhold judgement regarding what is possible in order to receive God’s
grace. Paul instructs the Corinthians to extend that charity in all their interactions
in order to open their hearts to God’s gifts—presumably Christ among them.
Run the Pauline dictum like this: if you want to be the kind of person that is
charitable, if you want to be a Christian, you ought to make yourself vulnerable
in the above mentioned ways. I take Melville to offer an extended meditation on
St. Paul’s remarks here. Is this actually an estimable heursitic? And even if so, do
we really want to be such suckers? Melville puts the question to the characters
on the boat. On a chalk board upon the Fidele the man in the cream-colored suit,
riffing off Corinthians, writes successively: “ ‘Charity suffereth long, and is kind.’
‘Charity endureth all things.’ ‘Charity believeth all things.’ ‘Charity never faileth.’ ”
Unsurprisingly, no one appears to be swayed by the stranger’s ministry, passengers
just jeer and laugh at him. Even if he were the second coming of the Lord and
Savior, it wouldn’t matter to these people.
This is not to say that Melville endorses divesting of our frontal lobes for some
Old Time Religion. The novel does illustrates the ways that naive trust can lead to
real unhappiness. But again, as Herzog points out, what choice do we have but, at
least in large part, to construct charitable communities in which trust is warranted?
The text itself is a study, tautly strung between the sentimentality of charity and
the unease of being swindled. As such there are no disastrous consequences to the
actions of the con man, nor is there a big reveal at the end. The confidence man
is less Satan than a trickster, an impish demon who delights in the confusion and
frustration of others. He doesn’t make off with more than a hundred dollars and
a swell new haircut, making it unlikely that profit is his game. The effect of the
narrative is to inquire what might justify charity rather than stake out one position
or other. By restricting the novel’s stage to one day on one ship, Melville reins in
worries of catastrophe, focusing rather on the ordinary consequences of a charitable
disposition.
While no one is brought to ruin because of charity, its manifestation becomes
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strained in a context without shared assumptions. The most anyone can say is
that they have an impulse to be charitable, not that charitable is warranted more
generally. The point here is that trust, and charity’s facilitation of trust, doesn’t
come about without some prior arrangement. Indeed the novel itself requires a
charitable reading, one in which we assume that the author, the source of authority,
is trying to tell us something rather than just mess with us for three hundred pages.
The author cum narrator is clearly in on the gag, being just one more instantiation
of the confidence man, though our confidence in him is well warranted. We are to
proceed as if the novel, the events, were true (Lindberg: 18). Melville cuts away all
the sources for authority aside from the conventional relationship of author and
reader and asks the us to be charitable.
Trust here leans on charity, at least minimally, finding warrant in conventional
expectations. The book begins with the man in the cream suit invoking Corinthians
and demanding charity and is followed by claims to charity made by and on behalf
of the Guinea. Chapter twenty eight begins with Frank Goodman exclaiming,
“charity, charity! . . . never a sound judgement without charity. When man judges
man, charity is less a bounty from our mercy than just allowance for the insensible
lee-way of human fallibility” (Melville (1990) 187). Charity is contrasted with the
maxim “NO TRUST” in both the beginning and end of the novel. The barber is
juxtaposed to the philanthropist (literally “lover of people”) Frank Goodman, who
advocates confidence and charity (no doubt because he stands to benefit). And even
the barber, at the end of the novel, is unable to hold fast to his dictum as he appears
to get duped by Goodman—charity’s Pyrrhic victory.
Trust is not altruistic in the way charity is, but it too involves an anticipation
that outstrips evidence. Trust moves one to make inferences, extrapolating from
the information one is acquainted with. These data might involve individuated
characteristics of a trustee or a general optimism one has gleaned of humanity.
Whatever the impetus, it is a first step, it is a “nice” game theoretic strategy, one
in which actors begin by assuming the best even though it makes them vulnerable.
Sure charity can be exploited, but trust requires some measure of charity and
conventionality in order to come about.
Admittedly, it is difficult to conceive of trust without charity. Paul’s charitable
doctrine, the need to maintain an unwavering commitment to openness, may be
a vulnerable norm open to the sorts of game theoretic “macho” strategies that
generally undermine cooperative communities (Bendor and Swistak (1997)). Con-
ditional on others being charitable, though, there is good reason to be charitable
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too. Cooperative communities are much more pleasant places to inhabit than those
teaming with defectors. Trust requires an expectation that outstrips evidence—this
is at least part of what Nicholas Luhmann described as trust in trust, I imagine
(Luhmann (1995)).
Affective trust, however, offers a natural way of speaking about such charity. As
I spell out in the next chapter, trust, as opposed to reliance, is best thought of as a
kind of expectation that outstrips evidence. It is not that trust is irrational, just that
it is not entirely so. As rational choice theory would cast trust, it is a credence p one
ought to hold such that pG > (1− r)L. Were I to borrow this model, I would argue
that the threshold for trust is rG > (1− p)L where r = p− e. That is, tracking the
experimental data on trust, there is some component of one’s inclination to trust, e,
which comes just in virtue of the affective nature of trust.2 e is the degree of charity
necessary to open up to others.
2.6 Conclusion
Melville’s The Confidence Man does an exquisite job of simulating the problems and
pitfalls of trust. The novel is, admittedly, a turgid read and can appear at times as if
the author is purposefully trying to confound or repel the reader. It is a narrative
in which trust is constantly undermined and the grounds for trust are called into
question as a matter of course. In so doing, however, it serves to interrogate the
conditions under which trust fails to obtain. It systematically explores how the
removal of particular social epistemic building blocks vitiates any hope of surety.
Instead of advocating for a completely skeptical or nihilistic position, I argue that
Melville uses this radical text to stump for a constructivist ontology. By structuring
the novel as a series of events which upset credulity by depriving characters (and
readers) of settled expectations, he comes to argue that the only way we can come
to trust is when we accept a kind of conventionally minded charity. The very same
kind of interpretive charity that Melville argues readers must bring to the text.
The novel serves as a site to motivate my account of affective trust, and prob-
lematize those of general and particular trust. Though my conception of trust is
more articulated than what Melville lays out in the novel, his work comes to illus-
trate the necessity and instrumentality of social conventions for trust, and the kind
of warmth and charity that it recruits. This work is a perfect vehicle to illustrate the
2As in Kosfeld et al. (2005) and McCabe et al. (2001), for instance, where humans trust others to a
greater degree than they do computers playing with the same set of strategies.
35
point I want to make. Melville self-consciously structures the novel to interrogate
the questions surrounding trust. The sequence of episodes vary character type and
circumstance to work through what the absence of settled social conventions does
to trust. Characters do come to place trust in others, but the trust is unstable, as in
the story of Francis Goodman and Charles Noble. The moment Goodman asks for
money the friendship is nearly ended. Besides varying the parameters of the novel,
he also inserts himself in choice moments to remind the reader that the project is
an exploration of the uses of fiction. Fiction is not false, he argues, but a means of
thinking through hard cases while at the same time imposing flourishes in order to
focus our attention. Melville himself is completely on board with interpreting the
project as one of “model thinking.” It serves to capture salient and relevant features
of our world to explore choice aspects of the world which we inhabit.
We are left with a distinct sense that social conventions and assumptions matter
for the viability of trust. I have argued that The Confidence Man is an inquiry of
the tensions between charity and skepticism in the absence of social conventions.
Melville admits the importance of charity, but does not provide an account of
when or why charity is reasonable (other than that the alternative is miserable).
When is charity, when is trust, appropriate however? In the following chapter I
explore the circumstances that warrant such charity. I go on to argue that trust is
needed precisely because there exist scenarios in which the incentive compatibility
of an interaction appears indeterminate and we need some epistemic mechanism to
direct our decisions. Trust is a hybridized moral attitude, turning both on emotional
and cognitive considerations. This just entails that trust consists of two epistemic




A General Framework for Affective Trust
ABSTRACT
The primary effect of this chapter is to conceptually cleave trust from
reliance. This entails formulating the distinction between the basic co-
operative expectations associated with reliance from thicker, emotional
considerations which I seek to identify with trust. Using a simple two-
by-two game theoretic framework, I argue that trust should be thought
endemic to circumstances in which an agent is otherwise agnostic as
to whether her partner will cooperate or not. That is, from where she
stands, the other has just as much reason to cooperate as not. In such
circumstances, I argue, trust is necessary to overcome uncertainty by
providing an affective inclination to trust and be trustworthy. Since the
nature of cooperation is fluid, social norms are required to create not
only contextually appropriate expectations regarding what constitutes
cooperation, but also the normative force to condition the attitudes that
accompany trust. Such an account explains the mechanisms that gener-
ate trust, as well as why such strong reactive attitudes come to be bound
up with it.
In this chapter in particular, and the dissertation more generally, I lay out
an account of trust that is both epistemically felicitous and empirically tractable.
Because I do not claim that affective trust is the definitive instantiation of trust I
don’t need to nail either. I readily acknowledge that other concepts of trust are
helpful descriptors which aid us in making sense of how people come to assume
risk. In the spirit of good modeling practices, however, I hope to do a better job
addressing both phenomenological and empirical considerations than accounts
currently on offer.
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What I do here is not completely novel. Indeed, as I argue in the coming chapter,
early modern political theorists voice concepts that are very similar to trust. Others
in the recent literature discuss the socially normative and emotional aspects of
trust (e.g. Morgan and Hunt (1994); Jones (1996); Pettit (1998); Uslaner (2002);
Rothstein (2005); Nannestad (2008)). But each tackles a different facet of what I am
calling affective trust, without unifying the concept as I do. Some run the socially
normative aspects of trust together with general trust, while others identify an
emotional valence, but don’t disentangle it from the general or particular. The
concept of affective trust I advance owes a great deal to Karen Jones’ account
in her article “Trust as an Affective Attitude” (Jones (1996)). And although she
outlines a trust that is both cognitive and emotional, she stops short of explaining
the conditions under which such trust is germane, thereby running it together with
the optimistic disposition of general trust. In this chapter I argue that affective trust
can be motivated by contextually appropriate social norms or institutional rules,
thereby fit for situations where actors have only a minimal amount of information.
Affective trust is an attitude expressed as a warm expectation that others will
act cooperatively. Philosophers have a great deal to say regarding what an attitude
is and how it is expressed. The kind of attitude I have in mind here is not so
deeply ensconced in the weeds, however. I mean something along the lines of
a positively valanced feeling or disposition. Confidence accompanies trust here,
conditioned not only by a credible expectation of cooperation, but also by empathic
and sentimental resources. Such trust is liable to generate warm fellow-feeling
upon faithful resolution, and reactive attitudes of resentment and betrayal if others
wantonly fall short. This dual character is a large part of trust’s curiousness. It is an
epistemic judgement that carries with it definitively normative, second-personal
characteristics.
I go on to claim that the normativity associated with trust appears warranted in
light of conventional practices. Conventions, such as social norms and institutional
rules, are apt by their construction to generate trust since they prompt both condi-
tional preferences to cooperate and widely held expectations that others will and
ought to comply. That is, you yourself have reason and inclination to act in some
conventional manner, conditional that some number of others are expected to do
the same. In this way, such norms elegantly track both the cognitive and emotive
facets of trust. Norms of fairness, generosity, hospitality, or group-solidarity, for
example, can all serve as reasons to warrant trust. Given this, one might also have a
second order reason to trust in light of a shared group identity. As members of the
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same community, I might feel disposed to trust you in virtue of our shared norms,
and failing to do so would implicitly call into question your membership. In this
way the second order norm builds off of a shared set of first order social norms.
I lean on conceptual apparatuses developed by David Lewis, Cristina Bicchieri,
Stephen Darwall, and Joshua Greene to explain the odd manifestations of trust.
It is an expectation, but also an attitude. It elicits reactive attitudes, but is not
itself a virtue. It is epistemic and also moral. I maintain that social norms can
make sense of a lot of this confusion. Conditional on a conventional practice that
is taken to be action guiding, one has reason to comply and expect that others do
too. This expectation will lead to second-personal, agent-relative, context specific
demands directed at others to comply too. Thus I come to believe that I should
R and that you will too. And if you don’t, I anticipate that you will acknowledge
responsibility. Two German Jews might well trust one another to show up to a
meeting promptly, while two Hungarian Jews would never think of making such
a demand. Conditional on the existence of a social norm, second-personal claims
are anticipated to obtain. Greene’s dual-systems approach to moral psychology
accounts for the cognitive aspects of these reactive attitudes much as Darwall (and
Strawson) account for the conceptual fitness of these features. This dissertation
comes to provide an epistemic account both of how and why trust manifests—and
feels—as it does.
I can, however, imagine a skeptical position that thinks that social norms have
nothing to do with trust. The argument might run that trust results from the
idiosyncratic preferences towards some, but not others, and that all the instances
of shared conventions motivating trust are just correlative, not causal. Indeed, I
can’t really identify a context in which no conventions are conceivably operative.
As such, all I can offer is a conceptually coherent account of why conventions are a
good candidate feature that generates trust and that identifies how the variation
of these norms affect how trust is elicited. But I can’t claim to have a knock-down
argument for such a skeptic.
3.1 Trust’s Illocutionary Effect
Any number of common examples might illustrate the puzzlement that motivates
the need for a concept like affective trust. CNN calls itself “The Most Trusted
Name in News” while Proctor and Gamble wanted you to know that “Cooks Who
Know Trust Crisco.” And though you might think Time-Warner is a glorified
39
infotainment brand and that Crisco (before it was reformulated) was legalized
poison, you intuitively understand what these slogans intend to express. My
favorite illocutionary use of trust (i.e. the speech act eliciting trust) is from the
Disney film Aladdin. After failing to impress his love interest, Princess Jasmine,
with a Broadway musical number, Aladdin slinks around back, sidles up next to her
bedroom window, and proposes that they go on a magic carpet ride together. “Do
you trust me?” he asks shyly. The movie doesn’t require a close reading to know
that everyone is meant think in unison: “Yes, trust him!” Sure, we in the audience
know he is a fraud, a liar, and a criminal, but I and the millions of others that come
to that scene want Jasmine to trust him. We know he’s a good guy, though if we
found out that our blind date were guilty of that degree of obfuscation we’d drop
them like a load. So why ought she trust him?
Beyond just rational, trust is also emotional and ethical here, along the lines of
Eugene Garver’s discussion of the phenomenon in For the Sake of Argument. More
than being trusted, we want to be identified as trustworthy, to be trusted because
of who we are, on our own terms. There is a second-personal authority to trust
in this way (Darwall (2009): 57). Garver claims that “I want to be trusted for non-
instrumental reasons. I want to be trusted because of my character, and not for
other, adventitious traits. I wanted to be accurately seen as trustworthy” (Garver
(2004): 135). Consider the Guinea’s mournful cry when the passengers of the Fidele
fail to take him at his word. The character is making the case for just this valence
to trust. And while there are important conceptual distinctions between “trust”
and “trustworthiness” (Pettit (1995); Hardin (1996), Jones (2001); Jones (2012)), the
demand “trust me!” posits the existence of a correspondence between the two. To
insist on being trustworthy in this way is to implicitly make a demand for trust
(Nannestad (2008): 415). Like Aladdin’s plea, Garver wants to elicit one’s trust just
in virtue of his agentic standing.
Indeed, the problem isn’t just epistemic as evidence does not necessarily salve
the problem. Garver points out that we are often not content to be relied upon
merely because of our credentials. We want to be trusted for intrinsic reasons, he
claims, rather than being patronized by an “I’ll take your word for it” (Garver (2004):
141). Cristina Bicchieri points to a similar feature of trust, noting the “personalizing”
rules with which it is associated lead, “a spouse [to] be very upset and offended if
he is not trusted (without good, explicit reasons by his partner)” (Bicchieri (2006):
77). Trust entails an expectation with attendant normative demands. You will likely
be met with either relief or indignation depending on whether you agree to trust or
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not. Were you to withhold your trust, I am liable to take it personally, rather than as
a quaint disagreement about some fact in the world. It reflects your estimation of
my person.
Affective trust, however, offers a natural way of speaking about such charity
that comes with taking people at their word. Psychology’s dual-systems theory
advocated by Joshua Greene, among others, advocates for thinking about moral
processes in terms of both the cognitive and emotive processes that they recruit.
To say that “trust is a belief” or “trust is a disposition” is in some very basic sense
missing the point. Trust is at first an experience which we as scholars and scientists
attempt to conceptually isolate. The experience of trust, I argue, results from the
near synchronicity of these dual-systems. Much of the time our rational belief that
one will act cooperatively and our emotional sense that they will align, but because
these systems are independent, they can also come apart. Moments such as those in
the trust game where players trust other humans to a greater degree than computers
(Kosfeld et al. (2005), McCabe et al. (2001)). And it is in these moments, where our
trust outstrips our evidence by some e, in which I am primarily interested.1
3.2 Strategic Indeterminacy and Affective Trust
Garver’s trust comes down to Aristotelean ethos, one’s character, and how the
standing one has motivates and grounds trust. But I want to interrogate how that
kind of personal trust can develop and be expressed even when those relationships
are looser, when we may not have the recourse to such intimate demands. Consider
Melville’s Guinea. He pleads for trust, the kind of personal trust that Garver
identifies, absent the conditions that would give him standing in light of particular
aspects of his character. I want to understand how trust comes about at distances
between the near and far, the particular and the general. I want to understand how
trust develops not with those with whom we are familiar or those whom we have
never imagined, but with those who are peripheral to our everyday activities. How
we come to trust those with whom we interact, even if only briefly.
1In the movie The Wrestler (2008), for instance, the main character is a professional wrestler who
has largely been absent from his daughter’s life. He seeks to make amends and plans to meet her for
a lunch. She resists though, explaining the extensive therapy that she had undergone to manage the
deep trauma he has caused her. She just isn’t willing to expose herself to any more disappointment.
He implores her to trust him and she concedes. Of course, incapacitated by a coke-induced tryst, he
misses lunch, and of course she is livid. What this episode illustrates, however, is the separability of
these systems. The daughter had a very low credence that her father would show, but still trusted
that he would. Although it is an unusual case, it’s illustrative of how the emotional and credential
aspects of trust are separable.
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Given the empirical evidence presented in the introductory chapter, we ought
to be searching for a state of mind that is a warm (Krueger et al. (2007)) expectation
(Berg et al. (1995)), given a certain amount of indeterminacy (Kosfeld et al. (2005)),
of cooperative behavior on the part of others (McCabe et al. (2001)), which is not just
altruistic (Tomlin (2006)) and elicits recrimination upon non-compliance (Krueger
et al. (2007)). With these desiderata in mind, I turn to a series of simple two-by-two
games to hone intuitions about the contexts apt to elicit affective trust. These sorts of
games have few parameters, which make them a parsimonious model to interrogate
our intuitions about trust. In each game there are only two actors, and each has two
possible actions in their choice set, A and B. For the moment assume that all the
normative value that might result from the outcomes is captured by the stipulated
payoffs.
3.2.1 Game #1
As a means of contrast, consider first a case that is not trust-apt. Here both players
receive a payoff of 1 independent of both their own action and the action of the
other player. There is neither a reason for or against A (or B, for that matter). Such
a landscape isn’t implausible or farfetched, it’s just not terribly probative. When I
go to Whole Foods and pick a bunch of asparagus I am agnostic regarding which
I pick. Moreover, the utility I get from my asparagus is independent of whether
you decided to come by earlier and pick your bunch. Whole Foods has plenty of
asparagus to go around, and each bunch is delicious. This first game is a fine model
for such an episode, but not an instance that recruits trust. Since the payoffs are
invariant to the choices either actor makes, the actions aren’t risky in any sense.
3.2.2 Game #2
In a second game we again have two players and two actions, though each has the
same dominant strategy. Each player gets a payoff of 1 for choosing action A and 0
for action B. This might qualify for trust were we to equate it with reliance as Jones
suggests (Jones (2001): 15918). Put like this:
Trust is an expectation that some means can faithfully obtain some
specific ends or set of ends.
This definition is compatible with James Coleman’s where expected gains exceed
expected losses (pG > (1− p)L). The means might be a tool or a person, and the
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end can be anything from soldering copper piping to picking up your dry cleaning.
An upshot here is that, were we able to identify values for p, G, and L, we would
have a normative theory of when to trust. This way of casting trust is not strategic,
however. Both players know that EU(i|A) > EU(i|B), and they needn’t solicit the
actions of the other in order to obtain their aims.
My payoff here is contingent only on the landscape (i.e. the correspondence
between action and outcome as a product of the terrain). In order not to make a
blunder I must know something about the world, but I needn’t know anything
about my partner. It is not a strategic environment, though, since an agent does
not require information about others to avoid erring. Take my Whole Foods case
from above. Now imagine that one of the bunches of asparagus is rotten. There
are plenty of others which are hearty and hale, it’s just this one that looks pathetic.
All you need to do is avoid this one bunch and, likewise, I ought to do the same.
But there is no material way in which your choice affects my utility. As such it
is difficult to see the conceptual purchase gained by identifying this scenario as
involving trust.
3.2.3 Game #3
The third game is one of straightforward coordination. Now the landscape is
strategic, with rationality dictating a mixed strategy to “solve” the game. Here
again both players have options A and B at hand, but their payoff is 1 conditional
on the other player choosing the same action. If we both A or both B we each get
a payoff of 1, but 0 otherwise. This arrangement is incredibly probative, having
received great attention from the likes of David Lewis and Thomas Schelling. The
payoffs are conditional for both players, which makes it a candidate to consider
trust. Each player is in some way concerned for the decision of the other. Moreover,
rationality doesn’t obviate the problem. One’s best response is to A or B with
probability 12 , which is a “no duh” result. If you and I planned to go for dinner, but
dead cell phone in hand, I forget whether we agreed on Sava’s or Seva’s, directing
me to choose Sava’s with p = 12 is unhelpful. Were I confronted with two such
options, I don’t need a Nash solution concept to tell me that I need to pick each
with probability one half. Choose between the two options; I got that part.
While this arrangement does look a whole lot more like trust than the previous
two games, it still lacks important features associated with trust. It does require
acceptance of risk and synchronizing behavior with others, but it doesn’t require
that the motive is in any way unselfish. Were this the paradigmatic case of trust we
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might run the definition this way:
Trust is an expectation that an agent will act coincidently to obtain some
ends or set of ends.
Both actors have reason to believe that the other will enable them to obtain some
constructive ends. Were one to believe that others are prone to cheat, lie, or steal we
wouldn’t call that expectation trust except in the loosest sense. (Indeed, if you can
be taken to reliably lie, the act ceases to have the same mendacity to it.) But while
the coordination game is a wonderful illustration of rationality’s water’s edge, it is
still not the best model for a trust-apt situation.
Insofar as others don’t have a plausible alternative strategy it isn’t obvious
that the actors are working together, i.e. “co-operating.” Conditional on my A-
ing, others would rather A too. Their decision is neither independently pro-social
nor altruistic, it is just utility maximizing. An iterated strategy of Win-Stay, Lose-
Random (WSLR), for instance, would allow actors to arrive at a stable equilibrium
without collaboration, since (A,A) and (B,B) are absorbing states.2 Because we want
the same outcome we needn’t appeal to another’s better nature to obtain the ends
we seek. While trust is sufficient to facilitate players converging to a coordinative
equilibrium, it is not necessary.
3.2.4 Games #4 & #5: Two Trust Games
Turning to a fourth variant of the games above, we can tweak the setup to further
identify the limits of rationality and ascertain the role of trust in obtaining estimable
outcomes. My motive is not to dump on rationality here, but to assess the what
sort of epistemic resources might come to bear where rationality ceases to be
meaningfully action-guiding. In this instantiation of the game one agent receives a
payoff of 1 for choosing A conditional on the other agent doing the same, and zero
otherwise. The second agent, however, receives a payoff of zero for any action she
might take. Again, keep in mind that the set up is a model of interaction and that
the payoffs are the result of the landscape, not the players themselves. The world,
rather than the players, generates the players’ asymmetric outcomes. Furthermore,
let’s assume that an agent’s moral utility is already “baked in” to the payoffs.
2Nowak and Sigmund (1993) discuss a strategy of Win-Stay Lose-Shift as a solution to the iterated
Prisoner’s Dilemma. That would not work here, since players would just continually switch back
and forth between sub-optimal outcomes. A strategy of Win-Stay, Lose-Random would work
without too much trouble, however. Here players initially adopt a strategy at random. If it is
successful they stay, and if not they select another at random. Such a strategy would likely converge
to an optimum in two turns.
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This set up of the game presents two Nash equilibria, (A,A) and (A,B). Since A
is weakly dominant for player one, she won’t select B. Player two, however, is indif-
ferent between A and B, and as we have specified things, she has no reason to select
one strategy over another. This is curious though. One option is clearly the right
one, since for no effort on his part, player two can effect a Pareto improvement on
the outcome. And while it is obvious to anyone outside the game, the constraints of
rationality do not provide the means for the players to identify such an equilibrium.
In such a case trust can provide the motivation necessary to rely on another, leading
one to expect that she will come through irrespective of her (apparent) rational
indeterminacy.
Altering things slightly, we can now configure a final game to have conditional
and asymmetric preferences for one of the actors. This time player one obtains
a payoff of 2 if both she and her partner select A, and 1 if both select B, but 0
otherwise. Player two, however, gets the fuzzy end of the lolly—she receives 0
no matter what she selects. Now player one has a set of conditional preferences
and options. In the previous version she was stuck playing A and just hoping
that her partner would cooperate. But now her choice is conditional on that of the
other, with a Paratian impulse towards (A, A). It is essentially the same problem as
above, with two Nash equilibria and no endogenous means of players one and two
coordinating. A random strategy in iterated play won’t resolve the matter either,
since player two can neither win nor lose; she is totally indifferent.3
This last configuration tracks a lot of our intuitions about the contexts which
recruit trust. In order for the one actor to confidently select A she must impute an a
priori inclination for cooperation on the part of the other. Whatever the motivation
that one projects on the other, it must be without respect to shallow self-interest. It
is these conundrums that elicit rhetorical moves such as “trust me” or “can I trust
you?” Importantly, that the same set up would track player one’s decision were she
merely to lack information about player two’s incentive structure. It might be, for
instance, that player two’s interests are indeed aligned with those of player one.
Were she to lack this information, however, it would appear to her as if this last game
framed her decision. Though it is rare that others are actually indifferent between
alternatives, we often lack insight regarding their true motives, making them seem
indifferent to us.
Trust is an attitude we affect under uncertainty to overcome such an epistemic
3A strategy of WSLR will lead players to happen on (A,A), but it is not an absorbing state, since
player two is liable to choose B in the next move with the same probability as A.
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conundrum. To say “I trust you” in the face of such indeterminacy indicates that
one believes that the means exist to move her partner to cooperate, either directly
(“I trust you to φ”) or implicitly (“I’m not worried. I trust her to φ.”). It both forges
and fastens relationships. This way of casting things leads me to define affective
trust as:
A warm expectation that an agent will act cooperatively to obtain some
ends or set of ends.
The warmth here tracks this faith under uncertainty. Even absent individuated in-
formation, the principle may still possess a positively valanced disposition towards
the agent. This kind of sentiment tracks the discussions of emotional valences from
psychology, while also recruiting Simon Blackburn’s notion of “concerns” (de Sousa
(2014); Blackburn (1998)). This language indicates an expectation that corresponds
to a positive feeling, akin to happiness or excitement, but also “enter our reasoning
[as] things we care about,” a language Blackburn uses to get away from flattened
understandings of want or desire (Blackburn (1998): 123). This choice of language
reflects trusts hybridized character, that it is both cognitive and emotional. Trust
doesn’t (usually) fly in the face of evidence, but it comes to secure expectations
under an amount of uncertainty. The emotional warmth that trust elicits comes to
make these decision feel secure. I haven’t yet justified this account, though. I’ve
only motivated the types of contexts in which it might be necessary to overcome a
rational indeterminacy.
The experience of trust comes in these moments of uncertainty when other’s
motives hang in the balance to offer an “attitude of optimism” in order to overcome
indecision (Jones (1996): 11). Once resolved to say that that one trusts the trustee
doesn’t indicate positive affect despite continual epistemic uncertainty, but that one
thats it to be the case that trust would be sufficient to warrant those expectations
again. This in part explains the odd elision of charity with trust throughout The
Confidence Man illustrates the tenuousness of trust in the novel. What I argue,
however is not that charity is a proxy for affective trust, rather it is a candidate
virtue to elicit confidence under uncertainty. Charity is both a means which inclines
a trustee to act cooperatively and a virtue which would facilitate a truster confiding
in a trustee. While Melville is more skeptical about the prospects for trust than am
I, we both configure the problem as turning on these sorts of cognitive resources
that construct cooperative attitudes in order to overcome epistemic indeterminacy.
Lastly, I think that this last configuration of trust conforms well to the Trust
Game from Berg et al (1995). Though Berg et al’s experiment is that of a dynamic
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and not a static game, it captures many of the same strategic considerations. Though
the game’s material incentives ought to incline player twos to defect, the experi-
mental results lead us to believe that they act under non-material considerations
as well. What’s more, player ones count on this, anticipating that, given a kind of
motivational indeterminacy, player twos are disposed to cooperating, thus demon-
strating trustworthy behavior. The fact that player ones transfer resources to player
twos indicate that player ones believe player twos to possess non-material, action-
guiding reasons. Importantly, however, though we as researchers can observe that
the modal players are disposed to cooperation, player ones are still acting under
uncertainty—from where they sit transferring resources feels risky. So even if the
game is really an assurance game, it appears to player ones as if it were of the form
of game #5. For this reason I will refer to both Berg et al’s “investment game” and
configuration #5 as the Trust Game.
3.3 Conventions and Norms
In the previous section I argued that trust is a candidate epistemic mechanism to
solve (apparent) one-sided coordination problems. Yet I only identify the land-
scape on which the problem sits, presenting trust as a possible solution. I don’t
explain how trust is fit for the task. Karen Jones has argued that emotional con-
siderations are sufficient to generate trust as a kind of optimism (Jones (1996)),
and the psychological research I point to in the introduction indicates that there is
good observational evidence to support this speculation. Empathy, for instance, is
another cognitive mechanism that has been shown to generate trust. But empathy
is not the best means to explain as trust is elicited in contexts where weaker ties are
in place or directed at individuals with whom one lacks a substantive history. As
such we must identify some other means by which the disposition of trust might be
activated. Since I want to explain trust in the liminal space between the particular
and the general, I don’t imagine that trusters naturally have access to these sorts of
resources. I instead turn to conventions and social norms in order to explain trust’s
“attitude of optimism.”
Reporting trust—“oh yeah, I trust Tom”—can convey either a maximal or a
minimal kind of confidence. Going back to the threshold model, such that some r
is sufficiently large to elicit trust, where r = p− e in the expression rG > (1− r)L,
and e can vary in size. e here might be at a maximum with my mom, where even
with very scant evidence, or evidence to the contrary (i.e. a low value for p), I will
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still trust her. Contrariwise, it might be at a minimum with my friend David who
asks to borrow my car. In both cases I can be said to trust, but the “amount” of
work trust is doing differs.4 Invoking the concept of trust makes most sense under
the kind of motivational indeterminacy of the Coordination or Trust Games (as
opposed to cases like the Prisoner’s Dilemma in which there is a clear motivational
impulse against cooperation). In these two contexts rational considerations fail
to identify a unique course of action. The Nash equilibrium identifies a dilemma
which requires additional machinery to resolve. In order to do so, actors must adopt
strategies that are conditional on the actions of the others that have somehow been
endowed with salience (Lewis 14).
3.3.1 Conventions
And this is why the technology of conventions is powerful. David Lewis remarks
that conventions are a means of solving coordination problems by establishing
“preeminently conspicuous analog[ies]” (Lewis (2002): 38). If some feature on
the terrain is easy to spot out—“focal” in the language of Thomas Schelling—
it gives a reason for everyone to act on it. For the moment we can black box
the process by which the “preeminent conspicuousness” is ascertained. Were
such an analogy to exist, though, it would serve as a means of converging on a
stable equilibrium. For instance, were we to meet in New York City, we might
think to do so atop the observation deck of the Empire State building, not because
we communicated, but because we both know it to be an iconic landmark. The
“focalness” or “preeminent conspicuousness” of the Empire State building is what
makes it a candidate solution to the problem, rather than its convenience or some
prior agreement. The reasonability of these solutions comes not because either of us
has a particular incentive which draws us to one outcome or the other, but because
of shared background information that directs us to converge on some solutions
with greater likelihood than others.5
Conventions, as Lewis casts them, are one way of generating focalness given
such a dilemma. There are two components to a convention which together give
actors independent reasons to converge on a particular outcome. First, conventions
entail that one has a conditional preference to abide by some rule R in context S,
4Oddly, trust here does more work in the minimal case than the maximal one. In the minimal
case I might not have not chosen to assign some task were it not for trust. In the maximal case,
however, the situation is likely overdefined. It is rare that trust actually leads me to act in ways I
wouldn’t have otherwise.
5In all honesty, I’d choose Fairway on seventy-fifth. Much more focal.
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given that sufficiently many others abide by R too. You need to know that, given
the compliance of at least some number of others, you will be better off acting on
R than ¬R. Second, there must exist common knowledge that R is the thing to do
in S. It is not a convention unless others are in on the rule and expect compliance
of one another. R is arbitrary in some deep sense, though. There will always exist
some competing R′ which would be just as suitable, in some sense.6 Whether being
on time entails being five minutes early, as the clock strikes, Michigan time (ten
minutes late), or a half hour late (what we colloquially referred to as “Jewish Time”
growing up) is perfectly arbitrary. But in case some number of people conform to R,
other members of P come to have a reason to do so too.
Despite this inherent arbitrariness, there is a kind of “oughtiness” to conven-
tional practices that Lewis elides. Failure to conform to these rules can elicit the
kinds of second-personal responses that Darwall and Strawson have in mind.
Though Lewis acknowledges that the violation of conventional practices will likely
elicit confusion and indignation, he still somewhat misses the reactive mark.
[I]f they see me fail to conform, not only have I gone against their expec-
tations; they will probably be in a position to infer that I have knowingly
acted contrary to my own preferences, and contrary to their preferences
and their reasonable expectations. They will be surprised, and they will
tend to explain my conduct discreditably. The poor opinions they form
of me, and their reproaches, punishment, and distrust are the unfavor-
able responses I have evoked by my failure to conform to the convention.
(Lewis (2002): 99)
Although conventions are a priori arbitrary, they are not toothless. As such, violating
a convention is likely to elicit recriminations or just plain bafflement according to
Lewis. Think about the reaction a woman in a crop top gets when she walks into
the Hasidic neighborhood of Borough Park. Or, for the sake of absurdity, a nudist
showing up to Sunday mass at St. Paul the Redeemer. Dress codes are certainly
conventional, but that doesn’t mean their violation won’t get people riled up.
3.3.2 Social Norms
To Lewis’ scaffolding Cristina Bicchieri adds normative joists, explaining the appar-
ent “oughtiness” of these rules. In addition to actors having beliefs and conditional
6Were R to be a priori distinctive, we should imagine that people could converge on the equilib-
rium without the conventional arrangement.
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preferences, they also assign normative weight to their expectations of others. Here
not only does i expect others to comply with R, she also believes that some p ⊆ P
expect her to do so and will likely blame her if she fails. Social norms are a type
of convention which entail normative expectations. These normative expectations
go beyond the descriptiveness of conventional rule following, imposing blame or
sanction in the event of noncompliance. This additional assumption seems a better
fit for the kind of case Lewis has in mind when someone drops the conventional
ball. It is not just that the other person chose not to R (which, because R is arbitrary,
they are well within their right to), but that we hold them accountable for not doing
so. And this can only happen in the presence of normative expectations (either with
or without the threat of sanction, Bicchieri (2006): 11).
Consider a social norm not to litter in the park. We have lots of spaces to litter.
In Ann Arbor these include a wealth of trash bins. Of course it is not called littering
when you dispose of trash in that way, but it is the same action. Parks are pristine
and not the place for litter. This rule is part of a social norm. I have a conditional
preference to litter in the trash and not in parks so long as a sufficient number
of others agree to do the same. If some number of people violate the norm, and
turn the park into a large waste basket, I have a conditional preference to drop my
trash there too rather than hold onto that dirty Kleenex. This norm entails both an
expectation and a conditional preference. I myself want to abstain from littering so
long as I expect you to do the same. But its salience, dictated by the existence of a
conditional preference, and normativity are instantiated by the fact that as members
of P we expect each other to comply, and will blame members otherwise.
The point here is not to explain the emergence of social norms, but to describe
Bicchieri’s incredibly elegant articulation of how coordination problems might be
solved. In the face of an otherwise indeterminate problem, Lewis explains that
conventions provide an intervention which is capable of overcoming confusion.
Conventions provide reasons for actors to coordinate. They embed both conditional
preferences and expectations of compliance, giving agents reasons to adopt R,
irrespective of whether they possess specific information about the compliance of
others. Bicchieri’s discussion of social norms adds social judgement and sanctions
to Lewis’ concept of convention in order to pull out a kind of normativity that is
conventionally circumscribed. Here not only do I have reason to R, but I anticipate
that others are under similar expectations to R as well, holding us both accountable
to keep up our end of the practice.
Bicchieri’s account begins to explains the outrage associated with violating
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social norms. Again, preferences against dropping trash or wearing crop tops are
arbitrary, but that doesn’t mean doing so won’t elicit indignation or rage. When
people come to develop contingent expectations, you are naturally inclined to feel
as if you are on the hook and answerable for not following through. That doesn’t
mean you must comply all things considered, it just entails that you are liable to
believe that you ought to or have reason to. And I think Lewis misunderstands
this point somewhat. He asserts that were I to violate a convention, even one as
innocuous as not knowing when to return a call, others “will probably be in a
position to infer that I have knowingly acted contrary to my own preferences.” But
that is not quite right. It is not that my failure here leads others think that I don’t
know what I want. They just think my wants no longer conform to theirs. In so
doing I actively disrespect them by flouting their aims and expectations. Violating
a norm might convey that “I am not the person others took me to be” but not that I
“acted contrary to my own preferences.”Others want me to adopt R because their
preference for the norm is conditional on me conforming. There is also a secondary
concern, that by flouting R I reduce the number of compliers in the population,
thereby undermining the convention’s efficacy. So while you’re liable to be upset
with me were I to ¬R, it is rash to think that just because I violated a convention
you are apt to think me some looney who doesn’t know what I want.
3.3.3 Trust in Light of Social Norms
The means by which social norms dissipate uncertainty make them a strong candi-
date mechanism to precipitate affective trust. To begin with note that coordinative
landscapes conform to the contours of both trust and social norms. Each comes
to resolve motivational uncertainty giving actors a reason to select one behavior
over others. Norms first do this by creating a conditional preference whereby actors
have reason to conform so long as others do too. So, for instance, at the University
of Michigan I have a conditional preference to arrive ten minutes after the specified
meeting time, conditional on you being ten minutes late too. Social norms identify
some rule or regularity as being a candidate expectation about which to trust an-
other. Norms give one reason to find one more salient, focal, or reasonable, than
others. Second, social norms generate expectations of others that are necessary for
trust. Not only does one have a conditional preference to R so long as others do,
but I also have reasons to expect that others will R. Third, social norms generate
higher-order beliefs about the normative expectations of others. For starters, the
trustee and I both believe that we will be held accountable were we to fail to R. This
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gives each of us reason to expect others to comply on pain of sanction or blame,
but it also constructs a context of warrant. Even if the trustee fails, my behavior is
understood to be proper. So even were one let down, one has still “done the right
thing” in being guided by and instantiating the norm to R. That sense of warrant,
both as a first and second order matter, provides one with the affective attitude
necessary for this brand of trust. The sense that this context or circumstance is
trust-apt.
As an example, let’s return to the social norm of punctuality. I agree to pick
Gretchen up in Munich and drive her to her flight. I’m late and she misses her
flight. She likely had an expectation that I would be punctual, and that her trust in
me was warranted. Moreover, when she complains to her friends regarding what
happened they are liable to be outraged that someone would flout such a widely
held norm. Were I, however, to agree to drive Amichai in Tel-Aviv and drive him
to the airport, but again show up late and he misses his flight, his friends are less
likely to be sympathetic. The norm of punctuality is not held as firmly by Israelis as
by Germans, and the latter’s trust is seen as less justified than the former’s.
This account offers distinct parallels with trust and provides the epistemic
bootstraps from which to generate expectations absent individuated information
about a trustee. While trust is a warm expectation of another’s cooperation, absent
deeper epistemic grounding all trust has to go on is vague optimism. There are lots
of circumstances in which such general optimism is perfectly prudent. We might
run optimism as a “nice” strategy in repeated play, for instance. Here goodwill
holds out the prospect of Paratian outcomes. But that way of running it sounds
a whole lot more like general trust than something context specific. Plus, as The
Confidence Man would appear to caution, such an optimistic disposition is not only
naive, but a recipe for a lot of disappointment. Social norms, by contrast, allow for
the bootstrapping of trust without the evidentiary agnosticism of straight optimism.
Embedded within contextual cues and activated by relevant scripts social norms
can, at a negligible cost, convey information about the normative environment.
3.4 Reactive Attitudes and Dual-Systems Theory
But why are social norms apt to generate trust as a warm sentiment, along with
associated reactive attitudes? I have so far argued that trust is both cognitive and
emotional in nature, consisting of both a conditional preference to act in some
specific way as well as an expectation that others will do so as well. Social norms
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are good candidates to generate affective trust since they identify some action as
salient or focal by generating conditional preferences and sowing expectations
that others are likely to comply too. By recruiting social sanction and blame they
render the behavior justified or warranted in some context. Moreover, were one
of us to fail—me in my willingness to trust, the agent in her commitment to be
trustworthy—social norms entail that we be held accountable, answerable for our
non-compliance.
What is curious about trust, though, is the recriminations that a failure to comply
brings about. I might well expect φ to be the case, and I might be very confident of
my belief, but when φ turns out to be false I’m apt to cautiously update—“oh well,” I
might mutter to myself as a lower by credence that φ. But that’s not true when I trust
someone. Were someone to squander my trust I am apt to feel anger, resentment,
or betrayal. None of these can simply be explained by either the existence of a
conditional preference or the expectation I had for the compliance of others.
In this way violations of social norms and trust appear similar. Both can leave
others feeling let down, doubting the foundations of their relationship, generating
“poor opinions they form of me, and their reproaches, punishment, and distrust
are the unfavorable responses I have evoked by my failure to conform to the
convention.” While others had taken me to be guided by particular considerations,
my actions confound that estimation, and not just regarding the matter at hand,
but more generally too. In the trust game, for instance, were player two to choose
B I would have reason to think that she lacks consideration for my person, for
what I want, as the slightest effort on her part would make me much better off.
Lewis himself identifies this by pointing to the bewilderment that ensues upon
a conventional violation—you’re apt to no longer know what to think of me. A
violation of trust feels much the same way. When one betrays you (rather than just
letting you down) you feel as if they have severed the relationship more general
instead of thinking “oh, I better not trust her with X anymore.” To be privy to
a convention, as to be privy to one’s trust, is to reveal something about your
commitments more broadly. In the case of a convention you are inclined to act in
concert with others, in light of a conditional preference for R. Failing to R indicates
both that you are disinclined to R and insulated from the recriminations of others.
By selecting R′ you invite the castigation of others.
There are two complementary explanations which account for trust’s associated
reactive attitudes. The first is a conceptual account which explains why such
attitudes are fitting for affective trust. The second is a psychological account that
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explains how reactive attitudes function to facilitate trust.
Stephen Darwall’s account of the second-personal standpoint helps explain
the nature of trust’s demands. Darwall argues that all the deontic machinery
necessary for moral relations is just inherent in the second-personal perspective.
If you are going to make such claims you can’t help but drag all these important
assumptions with you (Darwall (2009): 5). “A second-personal reason is one whose
validity depends on presupposed authority and accountability relations between
persons. . . ” (Darwall (2009): 8). The nature of these kinds of claims is that actors
take themselves to occupy a position of moral authority to make certain demands
of others. Trust is agent-relative and second personal in this way. Just as I don’t
implore arbitrary others to get off my toe, but the person standing thereupon, I
don’t demand trustworthiness of a third party, but the agent herself. The efficacy
of that claim is contingent upon her occupying a position in which she is apt to
respond and hold herself responsible.
Social norms give me reason to believe that others are responsive to such reasons.
Because they are germane in some broad context, they allow me to project that
others hold themselves accountable to these reasons. Were I to trust you to R, or
in virtue of such an expectation (say to do something that might follow from R), I
anticipate that by being a member of P you hold yourself to abide by R. Were I to
find that my trust was misplaced I could intelligibly ask you why you let me down.
Sure, you could say that you have no commitments to R and that you’ve thought
that R-ing was silly all along, but my willingness to trust initially proceeded from
a normative expectation that you would be responsive in this way. The had to be
something about your social standing or presentation that led me to believe that
you took yourself to be a member of p ⊆ P. Social norms don’t explain the basis of
obligation, but how the construction of a particular kind of convention might lead
one to feel as if they were under an obligation. Whether rightly or not, my reaction
will take on a second-personal character, deriving authority from the ubiquity of
the identified social norm. Darwall’s account, then, comes to explain why reactive
attitudes are a fitting response to the violation of trust stemming from a social norm.
There is still the puzzle of why trust assumes a coarse rather than continuous
mode of epistemic updating. Ordinarily we should update our beliefs continuously.
If someone were to let me down I might think that she is slightly less credible than I
had initially. But betrayal entails a more radical form of updating—if you cross me
I am liable to say something like “oh Bob, yeah, he’s untrustworthy.” I bin you in a
wholly distinct category. The reactive attitudes associated with trust and distrust
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lead one to update beliefs discretely rather than continuously. Furthermore, insofar
as trust is predicated upon social norms it is arbitrary. Why ought these sorts of
reactive attitudes and coarse updating be associated with arbitrary demands?
That psychologists and moral philosophers both have taken to thinking about
our moral sentiments as the product of a dual-system can explain this conundrum
(Greene et al. (2001), Greene and Haidt (2002), Kumar (2013), Copp (2001), Campell
(1998), Campell (2007b), Campell (2007a), Ridge (2006), Schroeder (2009)). Our
moral convictions and intuitions are constructed by both cognitive and emotional
neural apparatuses, with deontic judgements being more associated with emotional
evaluation and consequentialist judgements with cognitive assessments (Greene
et al. (2001), Greene (2007)). The cognitive side of trust is apt to evaluate the
reliability of the expectation. So if my expectation were upset I would merely
update my credences. But this is not all there is to trust. The denontic valence to
trust is liable to get me yelling obscenities when I’m betrayed. This is the emotional
response.
Greene argues that these attitudes and associated emotionally charged updating
is compatible with evolutionary accounts of altruistic punishment (Gintis et al.
(2003)). Given the frailty of cooperative societies and their susceptibility to invasion
by vicious strategies (Bendor and Swistak (1997)), such radical updating is one
plausible respond to such a threat. In the face of possible exploitation of cooperative
norms, people are inclined to react harshly to the undermining of goodwill. It’s
a means of insulating cooperation from exploitation. On the point Greene writes,
“Why should our adaptive moral behavior be driven by moral emotions as opposed
to something else, such as moral reasoning? The answer, I believe, is that emotions
are very reliable, quick, and efficient responses to re-occurring situations, whereas
reasoning is unreliable, slow, and inefficient in such contexts” (Greene (2007)). This
radical form of updating, where the truster’s reactive attitudes are liable to assess an
agent as either trustworthy or not absent middle ground, is completely consistent
with the all the evidence Greene points to here. The dual nature of trust, being
both cognitive and emotional, explains why trust is apt to elicit reactive attitudes.
Being shown to flout one’s trust, as to flout a social norm, is to show oneself as a
non-cooperator, as an outsider.
Affective trust, I argue, is an actor’s warm expectation that others will behave
cooperatively. This process is apt for coordinative contexts in which actors have a
dearth of information and must elicit a disposition of optimism. But what comes to
warrant such a disposition? Jones argues that emotions are frequently instrumental
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in inclining us towards actions, but that can’t explain how we come up skeptical so
often. What might explain trusting strangers in Ghana but not in Turkey?
This is why I choose the nomenclature of affect to describe trust. What I have
in mind is the experience of trust, the warmth generated in delegation and the
bitterness elicited upon betrayal. Trust is closely associated with reactive attitudes
which direct blame and demand responsibility when violated. Social norms explain
what comes to justify trust. These norms create conditional preferences as well
as expectations regarding the conduct of others. Moreover, they warrant trust by
ceding normative expectations within some relevant population. These onlookers
give approbation to those that conform, and blame to those that flout. These
normative expectations provide the foundation for warrant, for even if one’s trust
is betrayed while following a norm, others will acknowledge the rightness of the
behavior nonetheless. Such social norms recruit emotional machinery that lead
trust to manifest as hybridized. As such, updating occurs coarsely and reactive
attitudes are triggered when one’s expectations fail to be met, in contrast to others
sorts of epistemic failures which lack these sorts of recriminations.
The fullness of my account now described, I want to offer a final definition of
trust as:
A warm expectation, with corresponding reactive attitudes, that an
agent will act cooperatively to obtain some ends or set of ends, apt to
arise in light of an identified social norm.
I don’t believe that affective trust necessarily comes about as a response to such
regularities, but they are apt to give rise to such confidence. While Karen Jones also
identifies trust as an affective attitude, with both rational and emotional correlates,
the account I provide goes further to identify how contextual cues work in tandem
with social expectations to motivate trust and its associated attitudes. I explain
affective trust as more than an idiosyncratic disposition towards a person one
knows well (Jones uses the example Othello and Iago as one of misplaced trust),
moving into the domain of the social and political. Beyond general or particular
optimism, affective trust can be generated by widely disseminated norms which
don’t require individuated information.
3.5 Group Identity as a Social Norm
My account of affective trust conforms nicely with extant epistemological thinking
both in the domain of the personal and the social. Affective trust makes sense both
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as a kind of belief that an individual might hold, but also as a social phenomenon
couched in a wider context of conventional expectations. This framework also
works well within the political literature of new institutionalism. Elinor Ostrom
offers a capacious understanding of an institution as “the prescriptions that humans
use to organize all forms of repetitive and structured interactions” which include
everything from the family to Congress to intramural sports leagues (Ostrom
(2008): 3). Such research specifies the rules which structure social and political
interactions, providing the building blocks to construct broader theory regarding
human behavior. The nature of trust and the structure of social norms are a perfect
candidate site and mechanism to add to this existing theory. While there have been
critiques of new institutionalism which argue that institutions are ineffective at
disciplining actions in contexts where actors are in conflict (Diermeier and Krehbiel
(2003): 140), I sidestep these worries by casting the problem of trust as coordinative
rather than conflictive. Trust is prudent when the context is cooperative rather than
competitive. Institutions qua norms can come to explain how might converge on
some equilibria over others, rather than outright altering actor’s basic incentives.
Institutional rules can be more complex than simple social norms, though their
effect is the same. Traffic rules are a favorite example here. They act as a means
of coordinating the flow of vehicular traffic, consisting of a bundle of coherent
rules. The rules of “right on red” and “right of way”—where drivers that meet
simultaneously at a stop give priority to the driver to their right—conform to our
system in North America where we drive on the right side of the road. They would
not work in Commonwealth countries that drive on the left. Traffic regulations
as a whole constitute an institution in Ostrom’s sense, governing conduct in this
complex interactive domain.
At times we might think that these institutions serve as a bundled social norm.
Instead of some group of people adopting a single rule R, we might think that R is
constituted by some number of other rules {r1, r2, . . . , rn}. The more coherent these
rules are, the tighter the analogy between social norms and institutions. Like in the
traffic case, it makes sense to say that all these rules that pertain to driving on the
right side of the road are indeed part of the same meta-rule. If groups and group
identity function in this way then there is reason to think that affective trust may be
motivated by group identities much the same as it is by social norms.
The largest lapse in the history of British intelligence came because Kim Philby
was trusted just in virtue of his membership in British high society. The willingness
of M.I.6 to trust Philby had nothing to do with the presence of a particular shared
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social norm. Rather Philby, who turned out to be the West’s largest intelligence
liability during the Cold War, was trusted because he was an Eton boy. He was
connected in the right ways, he went to the right schools, and his parents held
the right sort of company. Rather than use relevant information about Philby’s
political commitments to vet him for clandestine service, these social markers were
used as proxies to vet him. We can view this as affective trust of the second kind,
where one’s group identity generates a second order reason to trust. It is the kind of
reason one might point to by saying “I knew his people” (New Yorker: 70). Being a
member of the club is sufficient to warrant trust. But it is also the kind of betrayal
that will devastate a community.
Michael Chwe makes a similar point in Jane Austen, Game Theorist regarding
how we trust people in light of extrinsic rather that intrinsic facts (2013). He writes,
As is true for all social roles, the person who is ‘it’ is defined by a social
process. A ‘police officer’ is a person who has gone through specific
training, has passed certain specific tests, and is employed by a certain
organization. This is a social process, and no person is inherently a
police officer, just as no person is inherently ‘it.’ In a very small village, I
might know the history and experiences of every single individual, and
know that a person is a police officer in the same way that I know who
‘it’ is when playing tag. [But is this not the case in larger societies.] Thus
a police officer wears a uniform, and even though we all know that a
person becomes a police officer through a lengthy social process, in a
given situation it is convenient to think that a person is a police officer
because she wears a uniform. . . The uniform makes the police officer’s
identity literal (Chwe (2013): 217-8).
I take this to be saying that we have confidence in the uniform itself, not (necessarily)
in what the uniform is supposed to signify. When you are stopped by the police
you obey because you trust the uniform, though you know little about the woman
herself or even whether the uniform is authentic or not. You could schlep down to
HQ to verify them, but you won’t. You just trust them.
As Chwe points out, our social expectations are tacit in smaller communities,
and often become explicit in larger ones. While in my own home I know to wash
my hands before I prepare food, restaurants have helpful signs explicitly reminding
staff to do the same (which double to let patrons know that this is indeed the
expectation). Most often we carry on just fine without interrogating the validity
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of these beliefs, because in the main they aren’t disputed. When they do become
contested, however, it is difficult to provide firm grounds for their justification.
These instances of trust, however, do not appear to be warranted by such higher-
order social norms that regulate behavior or social identity. The officer’s uniform
doesn’t convey a norm of fairness on its own, but a convention that people have
come to rely on people in that uniform to serve a role, and we then come to trust
that role.
These institutions are collections of norms, in a way. They are interlocking rules
that govern various domains of social and political life. We look to uniforms, bona
fides, and group identities to convey this sort of information regarding the rules by
which people operate. These institutional distinctions come to carry the force of a
norm themselves—they are just a kind of meta-norm that constructs a conditional
preference on some set of dimensions {r1, r2, . . . , rn} as well as beliefs of compliance
and the normative expectations of others. Violating a group norm can elicit the
same kind of opprobrium as does violating a social norm. In this way a bundle of
rules can explain affective trust on this higher order of abstraction. Research has
shown that trust and group identity are closely associated (Kosfeld et al. (2005)), but
recruiting Bicchieri’s apparatus of social norms provides one kind of mechanistic
account for how trust is conditioned. Here, for instance, Philby is trusted in virtue of
his membership in British society. Membership entails adopting R ∈ {r1, r2, . . . , rn},
and violation on any one dimension would constitute a violation of R. There exists
the expectation that he and everyone arounds him conforms to R, and, the kicker,
to assert otherwise is itself a violation of R. Thus no one would condemn the
person that hired him. Such a hiring process was completely conventional. Philby’s
ultimate betrayal (which wasn’t so much ultimate as persistent) came to shock and
disgust all those around him. As his protege Nicholas Elliot describes, they all felt
violated.
Group identity can in this way can function as a meta-norm, where the dimen-
sions are entangled. Being a member of a community entitles one to trust in virtue
of these shared expectations, and violation of one norm undermines (at least to
some degree) one’s commitment to all others. Likewise, refusing to trust someone
in such a context is akin to questioning their status as a group member. If being a
member of a particular group entails commitment to R, then withholding trust indi-
cates lack of confidence on some dimension {r1, r2, . . . , rn}. But trust here works
the same way as it does with regards to social norms. Conditional preferences
and normative expectations ground affective trust, and render a kind of hurt and
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betrayal if misplaced. With very little information, then, one can come to have
warrant to trust.
3.6 Discussion
This chapter provides a conceptual account of affective trust, outlining the circum-
stances that require it, the mechanisms that generate it, and the underlying reasons
for the peculiar kind of epistemic updating and reactive attitudes that it entails.
Trust consists of both an expectation and a sentiment, coming with a belief about
another’s behavior as well as an empathic warmth that arises when one can confide
in another. The flip side, of course, is that when trust is betrayed one is likely to ex-
perience any number of reactive attitudes—rage, disappointment, resentment—that
normal expectations don’t.
I have argued that these attitudes, both empathic and reactive, are a result of
social norms that condition trust. Environments in which there exists motivational
uncertainty, or one perceives there to be uncertainty, require additional epistemic
machinery to resolve. While classic coordination games are one example of such
a landscape, I claim that it is not a perfect candidate to elicit trust since positive
feedback alone can generate convergence absent “co-operation.” In the Trust Game,
I argue, players are apt to be agnostic about the motivations of others and thereby
require trust in order to converge on a Pareto equilibrium. Social norms provide
the additional information that inclines one to trust.
Social norms resolve indeterminacy by creating conditional preferences as well
as first and second order expectations—that others will conform to the rule and
those around will expect all parties to conform—that create a context of justification.
For some community, in some area of practice, trust is warranted in virtue of a
social norm. In this way the expectation associated with trust is coupled with the
deontic normative characteristics associated with praise and blame, and reactive
attitudes more generally. This further explains why trust updates coarsely. When
let down, one is apt to distrust the person much more than were other sorts of
expectations to be upset in light of the normative nature of the expectation.
What sets trust apart from other attitudes, such as expectation and confidence,
is an associated normative expectation. One feels as if trust is the appropriate
response to the context. The expectation and sentiment dispose us to believe
that these features come together in a hybrid package, even though the two are
eminently separable. In this way trust behaves much like a virtue, conforming
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well to recent literature describing hybrid moral sentiments more generally (Kumar
(2013), Copp (2001), Campell (1998), Campell (2007b), Campell (2007a), Ridge
(2006), Schroeder (2009)). As Peter Railton quoting Jonathan Haidt points out,
the cognitive/non-cognitive binary of moral psychology has broken down, as we
have come to realize that our attitudes are frequently composites of both. Given
that “social psychologists have increasingly embraced a version of the ‘affective
primacy’ principle” we have good evidence to cast trust as an affectively motivated
expectation (Railton (2012): 38). Cognitively it would make little sense were it only
one or the other.
Social norms provide the context to make second-personal demands, as Stephen
Darwall casts them. Social norms operate broadly over some context leading
one to believe that some rule is normative, and that expectations in light of the
rule are similarly warranted. Were that trust upset, one would have reason to
direct agent-relative claims at the trustee, which presume that he seems himself
as answerable (given the ubiquity of the specified norm). Reactive attitudes are a
natural response to such a violation. Moreover, we can explain the coarse nature of
epistemic updating in light of betrayal as a result of trust’s dual-system. As Joshua
Greene points out, the cognitive response to trust’s failure results from the system’s
emotional contingency.
I imagine this is why trust has been such a confusing topic for so long. It’s just
hard to put your finger on what it effects or why it’s useful. As an expectation
and affective disposition it is easy to feel as if you’ve been let down or cheated in
the Trust Game even though the other player never bared an a priori obligation to
reciprocate. Trust responds to a sense of warrant making it appear justified (thereby
implicitly positing a duty to be trustworthy on the other side of things). The appar-
ent coincidence of normative and expectational aspects of trust likely contributes
to its broad appeal to the literatures of politics, marketing and management. It
generates a wrong headed interpretation which casts trust as both virtuous and
explanatory. It is not at all surprising that trust positively correlates with brand
assessment and consumer behavior, for instance, though the literature is entirely
confused regarding whether trust is the result of good marketing or the cause of
consumer habits (e.g. Morgan and Hunt (1994); Mayer et al. (1995); Sirdeshmukh
et al. (2002), which between them have over 25,000 citations). In politics too, schol-
ars cast trust as normative absent good arguments (e.g. Fukuyama (1996); Inglehart
(1999)). As I see it trust isn’t the cause of legitimacy, but a byproduct of many of the
same processes that generate legitimacy such as low divisiveness and shared social
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conventions. It’s a normative canary in the coal mine, of sorts.
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CHAPTER IV
The Political Theory of Affective Trust
ABSTRACT
This chapter looks at the political valence of affective trust. While I have
explored the affective and epistemic dimensions of trust, I haven’t yet
considered its political upshot. In this chapter I locate affective trust
politically in the writings of Smith, Machiavelli, and Hobbes. I begin by
framing the discussion with the recent efforts of political theorists to rein-
troduce sentimental considerations into politics. The aim of sentimental
political theory, like my own, is not to displace traditional democratic
theory, but to offer a complementary and compatible avenue of research
to explain the motivations and dispositions of political actors. With an
eye for motivational theory, I then locate affective trust in the writings
of Smith and Machiavelli to explore its cohesive potential for politics.
I move from these constructions of trust to that of Hobbes’s notion of
faith. While Hobbes builds the concept of faith in similar terms to those
of Smith and Machiavelli, I show how the concept serves a foundational
role in his social contract theory. My account reveals Hobbes’ project to
be far more pragmatic than commonly understood, building legitimacy
by co-opting faith in existing social and political institutions. My aim
here is not to argue that affective trust is constitutive of politics as a
matter of fact, but to identify the latent political properties of affective
trust.
I have argued until now that affective trust is conditioned by social norms and
institutional practices. One elicits trust not only in light of individuated information
about a trustee or one’s basic predilection to do so, but also due to identifiable norms
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in the environment, which serve to generate and warrant contextual expectations.
These norms motivate warmth towards other rule followers and associated reactive
attitudes towards rule breakers. Although trust appears to be necessary for social
order as Melville’s The Confidence Man repeatedly illustrates—without it we are
resigned to loneliness and reel from epistemic vertigo—the process of generating
trust can easily be disrupted in the absence of common or clear norms.
The attention I’ve given to an affective element of politics does not come in a
vacuum. Political theory of late has endeavored to put passion back in politics.
Bolstered by an attentive eye to empirical research in social psychology, theorists
have attempted to understand how sentimentality fits into normative political
life (Walzer (2006); Krause (2008); Kingston and Ferry (2008); Allen (2009); White
(2009); Frazer (2010); Macedo and Macedo (2009); Morrell (2010); Nussbaum (2013)).
Sharon Krause in her book Civil Passions lays the project out well. She pushes back
against a mode of theorizing in which “there is no right combination of reason
and passion. . . The only way to achieve good deliberation, in other words, is to
excise passions from the deliberative process entirely” (Krause (2008): 2). To be
sure, this is a caricature of positions like those of John Rawls and Jurgen Habermas
(Frazer (2010): 178), but it is a sensible one. Her point here is not to say that these
considerations have been completely excluded, but to show how they have been
tactically omitted from the dominant discourse. Democratic theorists are want to
reflect on the formal rules that guide democracy, while ignoring the human elements
of its subject. People can be thought to have well ordered preferences, sure, but
they also exhibit sympathy, rage, and hubris. By reintroducing passion into politics,
these projects aim to better understand political motivations. Attitudes, emotions,
sentiments, and dispositions all provide reasons to act and motivate conduct. A
tighter account of these affective states can assist in better identifying both the
means and ends of politics.
The upshot of such sentimental political theory is admittedly circumscribed
within modest boundaries. Idiosyncratic feelings clearly can never offer a full and
comprehensive justification for politics. And Krause’s work, again exemplary, does
not seek to reconfigure politics, but argues that affective judgement can still provide
the kind of impartiality that we demand of political judgements. Kingston and
Ferry (2008), for their part, list a set of considerations that they believe sentimental
political theory can inform. They seek to, in their words, rethink public and private
considerations, grasp the effect these attitudes have for our broader commitments,
identify different normative outcomes for politics, and gain a more tractable set of
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models with which to interpret politics (Kingston and Ferry (2008): 11). Aims such
as these are apt for the tools of sentimental theory.
Theorists can, however, get excited and overstretch these commitments. Danielle
Allen’s moving work, Talking to Strangers, for instance, commits such an error. The
book seeks to articulate “forms of citizenship that, when coupled with liberal
institutions” can dissolve distrust between individuals and divergent groups in our
society (Allen (2009): xx). The thrust of the work claims that “ordinary practice of
friendship provides all citizens with knowledge that can be carried into the political
realm to good effect,” thereby bolstering the trust necessary for citizenship (Allen
(2009): xxi). This, however, assumes a kind of atomized, particular trust, one which
builds broad social confidence though person-to-person contact. As I have argued,
however, that kind of social trust is likely generated by contextually embedded
norms and institutions, rather than weak Granovetter ties of the friendship that
Allen describes. Assuming, as Allen has, that trust is the input rather than the
outcome inverts the causal arrow. There just isn’t good evidence to think that
particular trust is up to the task of affecting social change (see for instance Gubler
(2011)). Her theory can’t carry its evidentiary weight. In a telling moment of the
theory’s tenuousness, Allen begins the epilogue by pointing to an ideal example
of such friendly engagement. “[I]f the experience of the most powerful citizen in
the United States is any guide, talking to strangers is empowering; the president
is among the few citizens for whom the polity holds no intimidating strangers”
(Allen (2009): 161). One can’t help but chuckle at this line, however. In point of
fact the President is among the most vulnerable and guarded citizens, singularly
unfree to engage in spontaneous garrulousness. Her example actually illustrates
just how much violence and control are necessary for even the most casual of
political encounters, rather than friendship’s conciliatory potential.
While acknowledging the limitations of affective trust, I seek to illustrate and
explain its political properties in this chapter. The account of affective trust comes
to embrace the impulse of theorists such as Krause, Frazer, and Kingston and Ferry.
Trust, like other attitudinal states, is effective in generating kinds of political solidar-
ity and continuity. Though it is not sufficient to constitute politics more broadly, it
does describe a part of the dynamics of political cohesiveness. Consider for instance
the missionary whom I referred to in the introduction, the one who trusts Albanians
more than the Welsh, despite his cultural affinity with Anglophone culture. What
are the contextual grounds for his trust (and mistrust)? If we think that trust bridges
uncertainty—bringing people together who might not have otherwise associated—
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the answer to this question will necessarily have political implications. While the
bonds of trust are certainly a far cry from those of citizenship, both effect many of
the same aspects of solidarity. Trust serves as an adhesive to bind people together
and construct communal solidarity.
Particular trust affords no such political analogy, since all expectations are
individualized and atomistic. General trust, however, does afford many of these
political trappings. Generalized trust serves an important role in bringing people
together, making political communities feel more coherent. Work by Inglehart and
Uslaner, for example, identifies and explains how trust in strangers produces more
amicable modes of citizenship. The ability to trust arbitrary others instantiates a
firmer sense of social belonging, intensifying the bonds of citizenship. While this
trust takes an unspecified object, it still produces confident expectations that others
will act cooperatively. This belief leads people to see themselves as members of the
same collective project, broadly speaking.
Affective trust has a different political role to play, however. It does not construct
political affinities on the broadest level, but instead invites solidarity among people
in some circumscribed context. Within our communities, neighborhoods, and
schools, affective trust facilitates a feeling of collectivism by keying into extant
social norms. While I don’t mean to wax overly Bowling Alone, Putnam’s notion that
overlapping civil associations produce political harmony is the same impulse that
leads me to think that affective trust possesses a political valence. Affective trust
creates expectations that obtain in some domain and do so for contextually relevant
reasons. Shared norms motivate expectations, inclining us to feel that another agent
is trustworthy. We might ask two sorts of questions about the political valence of
this kind of trust. First, we might want to know how trust affects greater solidarity,
and what properties of norms have the capacity to generate political affinities. A
second line of questions might ask whom these norms apply to and how these rules
shape the stickiness of trust. After all, these norms don’t obtain for just anyone, but
only those members of some group P (again borrowing Bicchieri’s notation) who
take them to be authoritative. Who is a member of P and what its boundaries are
are precisely political considerations. Trust both facilitates interactions as well as
rendering a warm sense of solidarity with others—both those who are a part of p
and P. The specificity and constraints of such norms and regularities mark political
membership as well as a kind of consent that places one within a community.
In this chapter I interrogate the first set of considerations by exploring the
texts of Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Smith, leaving the second set for the following
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chapter. Though I want to be upfront about the fact that none of these thinkers
motivates trust using social norms as I have, each does carve out the conceptual
space necessary for affective trust, addressing its political implications in the process.
Rather than focusing on their empirical claims, I turn to their writings to mine latent
political possibilities of affective trust. While all three argue for a prominent role
for affective trust and its correspondence to religious faith, I single out Hobbes for
special consideration. As I read him, Hobbes locates affective trust cum faith at
the heart of his political project. Contrary to the standard reading of Leviathan, I
argue that such faith is foundational to Hobbes’ social contract theory. While both
Smith and Machiavelli conceive of affective trust in political terms, Hobbes makes
the most forceful argument for the ways in which it is (or holds the possibility of
being) constitutive of political order. This inquiry provides me with the opportunity
of contributing to sentimental political theory by further articulating the political
implications of a well defined affective phenomena. I turn to these resources with
an eye to, as Michael Frazer puts it, “suggest[ing] an impassioned rather than a
dispassionate politics, politics in which a diverse citizenry strives to spur itself
continually onward. . . ” (Frazer (2010): 14).
4.1 The Moral Epistemology Fellow Feeling
Smith’s opening of The Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS) highlights its positive
rather than normative ambitions. The project here is not to unify social and moral
psychology, but to get our dissonant motives on the table. Expect Smith to have
many different reflections on trust rather than a single coherent account.
How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some
principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and
render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from
it except the pleasure of seeing it. Of this kind is pity or compassion, the
emotion which we feel for the misery of others, when we either see it, or
are made to conceive it in a very lively manner. (Smith (1982): 9)
Smith, by noting that there exist “principles in [people’s] nature, which interest
[them] in the fortune of others,” sets the stage for a naturalistic ethics, insofar as
we are, he claims, just hard-wired to be other-regarding. Though these do not
paper over humanity’s selfish tendencies, they do provide an endogenous means of
resisting mere egoism.
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Beginning the work by identifying the pro-social mechanism of empathy1 comes
to end-around a kind of Hobbesian worry that, absent compulsion, people can
do nothing but compete. Sure, we also have selfish impulses, but Smith here
contends that we are also endowed with cognitive faculties which bring us to
care about others and construct social order. Without this capacity, since “we
have no immediate experience of what other men feel, we can form no idea of
the manner in which they are affected, . . . Though our brother is upon the rack,
as long as we ourselves are at our ease, our senses will never inform us of what
he suffers.” It is only “by conceiving what we ourselves should feel in the like
situation” that we can come to relate to another’s experience (ibid.: 9). Empathy is
the means of internalizing the pain and pleasure of others, making it possible for us
to incorporate their interests in our own. The moral response which assigns praise
and blame is facilitated by the empathic capacity to see and feel the world from
others’ perspectives (Smith (1982): 317). This capacity allows us to do more than
acknowledge another person’s suffering. It brings us to feel what others do, “by
representing to us what would be our own, if we were in his case” (Smith (1982):
9). This capacity to experience the sensations of others involves not only cognitive
simulation, but the ability to experience their pain and pleasure.2
What’s nifty about Smith’s account for my purposes is not just its naturalistic
and positivist thrust, but the collocation of moral sentiments and social cohesion.
Smith’s arguably more famous work, The Wealth of Nations, is concerned with
people’s economic motivations and the ways in which these tendencies produce and
reproduce social patterns. He doesn’t abandon those insights in TMS. But beyond
material incentives, Smith argues that emotional and sentimental considerations are
indeed just as motivationally salient. “What reward is most proper for promoting
the practice of truth, justice, and humanity? The confidence, the esteem, and love of
those we live with. Humanity does not desire to be great, but to be beloved. It is not
in being rich that truth and justice would rejoice, but in being trusted and believed,
recompenses which those virtues must almost always acquire” (Smith (1982): 166).
Sure, market forces can incentivize estimable conduct, but Smith doesn’t believe
that that is a sufficient psychological explanation for much of human behavior. This
complementary account rests with the desire to be admired and relied on by others.
1Though Smith refers to this perspective taking as ‘sympathy,’ Darwall recasts it as ‘empathy.’
For the purposes of this paper I borrow Darwall’s terminology (Darwall (1998)).
2This actually occurs through neurological apparatuses such as mirror neurons, for instance (see
§1.5.1).
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For Smith, our normative reactions are contingent on our empathic responses.
To approve or disapprove of behavior recruits our empathic capacity in order to
identify the degree of fellow feeling we share in the instance. He writes, “to approve
or disapprove, therefore, of the opinions of others is acknowledged, by every body,
to mean no more than to observe their agreement or disagreement with our own.
. . . A little attention, however, will convince us that . . . our approbation is ultimately
founded upon a sympathy or correspondence of this kind” (Smith (1982): 17).
The empathic mechanism is triggered by other’s expressions, but the force of one’s
reaction is mediated by the perceived social distance. The more we share in common
with another, the greater our inclination to approve of their action. The process
of empathizing, according to Smith, corresponds in part to how a person believes
she would behave in like circumstances. To approve is to agree with the response
and to blame is to disagree. To wit, the process of Smithian empathy is compatible
with Darwall’s account of second-personal moral claim-making. Moral demands
are made with regard to one’s ability to effect a response (i.e. responsibility) from
another, rather than pointing towards a third-party or other external standard.
Empathy is a candidate mechanism to make such a claim. Second-personal claims
are directed as to assume the other’s responsiveness and responsibility—when I
say “step off my toe” I take you to be responsive to that claim. Empathy is a means
by which one might come to infer the existence of such extant moral and personal
agreement.
Smith’s interest in the psychological correlates of moral attitudes provides a
political argument for the relevance of these attitudes to political theory. Empathy,
Smith tells us, motivates and gives us reason to take action “in proportion to the
vivacity or dulness of the conception” we have of the experiences of others (Smith
(1982): 9). Our moral sense is modified by the degree of social commonality that
we share with others, whereby, “a certain reserve is necessary when we talk of our
own friends, our own studies, our own professions. All these are objects which
we cannot expect should interest our companions in the same degree in which
they interest us” (Smith (1982): 33). Here as above, Smith notes that people are
apt to regulate their empathic responses in accord with the social distance they
feel with others. However, Smith thinks that empathy is not only conditioned by
social dynamics, but also feeds back to generate greater cohesion. The sentiments of
selfishness and empathy, he writes, “. . . have such correspondence with one another,
as is sufficient for the harmony of society” (Smith (1982): 22). This is a wonderfully
succinct presentation of his two major projects. While Wealth of Nations emphasizes
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the individualistic motives, TMS points to other-regarding inclinations, the concert
of which can explain social dynamics according to Smith. And inasmuch as we
think of political space as a collective domain with moral ambitions, the account of
TMS can help us understand the synthesis of social and moral schema. I don’t want
to oversell the point here—there is plenty of excellent discussion regarding both the
uses and limitations of empathy (Morrell (2010), Valentino et al. (2014))—but only to
identify how empathy’s role in drawing people closer together, as well as pushing
them apart, is political in kind. Empathy acts as soft political force, regulating local
dynamics upon the larger landscape of the state.
But how can a moral system, which hangs so precariously on the idiosyncratic
attitudes of individuals, produce social harmony? Indeed, social forces often lead
our attitudes to manifest haphazardly, generating approval of some conduct (“he’s
so bold!”) but disapproval of others (“she so bossy!”). It would appear to be a ripe
mechanism for social polarization rather than harmony. Like extends fellow feeling
to like, and blame towards dissimilar others. Smith’s description of the impartial
spectator comes to mitigate this worry. This impartial spectator “allows no word,
no gesture, to escape it beyond what this more equitable sentiment would dictate;
which never, even in thought, attempts any greater vengeance, nor desires to inflict
any greater punishment, than what every indifferent person would rejoice to see
executed” (Smith (1982): 24). When considering our actions, we naturally reflect
on what we believe an arbitrary and impartial judge would endorse. This impulse
holds the possibility of moving beyond our own idiosyncratic dispositions to assess
the conduct of others by reflecting on more generally held considerations. That is
not to say that one’s impartial spectator is indeed “impartial,” but that it purports
to be, or feels as if it were. We believe that moral judgements ought to be impartial,
even though the prospect is faint. Smith acknowledges this in writing of distinct
impartial spectators (in the plural), since we are inevitably going to have divergent
opinions regarding what counts as “impartial” (Smith (1982): 69). This impulse
certainly has the potential to cement existing social or political divisions, though
it will more commonly move people to form judgements that are cooler and more
dispassionate.
4.2 The Collocation of Trust, Social Order, and Faith
Trust, for Smith, is the reflexive analogue of empathy. While empathy is the capacity
to identify with others, trust is evidence that others identify with us. Absent trust,
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we might well worry that our moral intuitions are just in our head, completely
distinct from those of others. In describing the nature of epistemic uncertainty he
notes that
a wise man may suffer great pain from the serious imputation of a crime
which he never committed.. . . What the peculiar constitution of his own
mind may or may not admit of, is, perhaps, more or less a matter of
doubt to every man. The trust and good opinion of his friends and
neighbours, tends more than any thing to relieve him from this most
disagreeable doubt; their distrust and unfavourable opinion to increase
it.” (Smith (1982): 122)
Yes, trust is an affective means of conveying one’s approval and good opinion. But
it is also a token of another’s sympathies, coming to allay the worries of a lonely
and “peculiar [moral] constitution.” Trust indicates a shared moral calculus, that
others sufficiently esteem one’s judgement as to assume (contextually variable)
cooperation. Smith’s conception of trust here describes an affective and moral
identification with others, a second personal reaction that confers approbation or
opprobrium in response to shared social and moral resonance. Conforming to
the way I describe affective trust, Smith’s deployment here is not foremost about
individuated information about others conditioning these expectations. Rather, we
form these beliefs in light of the similarity we feel with others, a similarity which is
expressly empathic and socially constituted. It is an affective rendering of trust that
comes about in light of social practices and regularities. Just as empathy turns on
social distance “in proportion to the vivacity or dulness of the conception” we have
of the experiences of others and is also “sufficient for the harmony of society,” trust
too feeds back to generate greater social and political order.
While I am primarily concerned with the way theorists have reflected on this
brand of trust in a decidedly political manner, it is instructive to point the corre-
spondence between their discussions of trust and my own. In the passages above
on duty and on virtue, Smith clearly identifies trust as a brand of affect, directed at
those we have reason to identify with or feel for. His concept of trust foregrounds
the affective and socially contingent aspects of trust, while softening the focus on
the credential features. What is interesting to Smith about trust is not primarily its
credential component, but the impulse that elicits it. He writes that “[w]e trust the
man who seems willing to trust us. We see clearly, we think, the road by which he
means to conduct us, and we abandon ourselves with pleasure to his guidance and
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direction” (Smith (1982): 337). Trust here is expressed both as an expectation and a
sentimental disposition towards others to whom we relate. Rather than employing
attendant individuated facts to generate our expectations, our sympathies lead us
to believe that we understand “the road by which [another] means to conduct us.”
Though the affective aspects of our theories align well, his does not map perfectly
onto the discussion of affective trust I offer in the last chapter. Empathic tendencies
appear to underpin Smith’s account, while social norms do the work for mine.
Smith understands interpersonal similarities to drive such epistemic bonds, where
we come to trust those who favor us or to whom we look up to, my account relies
on a more pedestrian mechanism of social norms that posit nth-order expectations
regarding how others act. I don’t reject Smith’s insight, it is just not directly a part
of the theory I offer. Contrast his remarks, however, with the concept of particular
trust. Smith’s view is much closer to mine than Coleman’s, certainly. Smith is not so
concerned with what evidence we have, as how we interpret it. And while Hardin’s
approach does include encapsulated interests, Smith remarks that we can have such
trust precisely at the moment we’re sure we’re goners.
Indeed trust is at times inversely correlated with positive expectations of out-
comes. “Good soldiers, who both love and trust their general, frequently march
with more gaiety and alacrity to the forlorn station, from which they never expect
to return, than they would to one where there was neither difficulty nor danger”
(Smith (1982): 236). Trust is grouped with love here, producing greater fellow-
feeling for the general, despite the bleak outlook, pointing to an affective valence
to trust that outstrips expectations regarding outcomes. Because of one’s trust
in his commander he is liable to obey her, precisely because of the dire prospects.
Though it might seem that this falls in the category of particular trust—maybe trust
is especially activated by the prospect of calamity, calling for a more stoic leader—it
doesn’t have the attendant trappings. It is not contingent on individuated expecta-
tions, and there is no expectation of a persisting relationship, as per Hardin. Rather
there seems to be a shared set of values that leads one to stake a warm confidence
in the commander. Soldiers trust the competence of the general as a function of
the severity or gravity of the mission. It’s not that the soldiers are irrational, but
that the disposition to trust turns not on the probability of victory, but the authority
imputed to the general.
Machiavelli also conceives of trust in similar terms as Smith, arguing for its
political role in fortifying and generating esprit de corps. “The things that make [an
army] confident are: that it be armed and ordered well, that [its members] know
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one another. Nor can this confidence or this order arise except in soldiers who have
been born and lived together. . . Such things, well observed, are the great cause that
the army trusts and, by trusting, wins” (Machiavelli (1996): 285). As in Smith, trust
for Machiavelli is initially the result and not the cause of a well regulated army.
Strong fellow feeling and discipline ground trust and incline forces to be victorious.
But rather than the individuated expectations driving trust, Machiavelli posits that
camaraderie generates trust which, in turn, enhances the likelihood of victory. Trust
here is socially constructed, a function of the military culture and the relationship
between soldiers. While trust is initially the result of unit cohesion, it may come to
be the cause after some time. As in Smith, trust’s political role results of positive
feedback on agents’ mutual confidence. The men experience fellow feelings, which
leads to trust that then strengthens the order of the company.
Machiavelli argues that trust cannot be coerced, but must be earned over time
by individuals firmly planted within the confines of the state—exiles, for instance,
lack the standing to be relied upon (§2.31). These observations lead Machiavelli
to make the conceptual move to run faith together with trust. After identifying
the efficacy of trust among soldiers he notes that “the Romans used to make their
armies pick up confidence by way of religion. . . ” (Machiavelli (1996): 285). Religion
is a powerful social force which can be employed to reify the state, since according
to Machiavelli,
every religion has the foundation of its life on some principle order of
its own.. . . for they easily believed that the god who could predict your
future good or your future ill for you could also grant it to you.. . . Thus,
princes of a republic or of a kingdom should maintain the foundations
of the religion they hold; and if this is done, it will be an easy thing for
them to maintain their republic religious and, in consequence, good and
united. (Machiavelli (1996): 37)
Religion is itself an order that lends itself both to the creation of political institutions
as well as the conditioning of trust among its members. Machiavelli understands
that trust affects unit cohesion, but he also identifies how faith can be deployed to
bring about the same end. Faith results from extant social order and can be manipu-
lated to strengthen the ends of the state and the expectations that its members hold.
The reason he provides is that “for they easily believed that the god who could
predict your future good or your future ill for you could also grant it to you.” This
is a common (or natural) conflation between the power of a god and its normative
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force. This order is useful not only in constructing political institutions, but also in
its ability to generate a common identity among citizens, thereby generating further
bonds of trust.
Indeed, this elision of faith and trust is resonant in both the writings of Machi-
avelli and Smith. Machiavelli’s Discourses on Livy employs the terms trust (confidare,
confidarsi) and faith (fede) with a fair amount of conceptual overlap.3 The title of
§1.59 asks “which confederation or other league can be more trusted. . . ” while the
chapter discusses “which faith is more stable. . . that of a republic or that of a prince”
(Machiavelli (1996): 119, emphasis added). Elsewhere he writes that faith (not trust)
may be withdrawn from an individual who has let down a republic in the past
(§1.53.1). Machiavelli just doesn’t distinguish too finely between the two terms. And
I believe for good reason. Like Smith, Machiavelli understands trust to be socially
constructed in the manner close to that I have in mind. Money cannot buy trust nor
can violence enforce it (§2.10.1, §1.59.1). Trust can, however, be conditioned in light
of historical considerations and alter the way we receive that history (§1.5.1, p139).
These indications also lead me to believe that trust is affective in kind here, though
the evidence for this is weaker.
Smith too sees such a disposition to bow to authority as a natural one, remarking
that the “magnanimous resignation to the will of the great Director of the universe,
[does not] seem in any respect beyond the reach of human nature” although he
ultimately couches the impulse in moral rather than expressly political terms (Smith
(1982): 236). While moral sensibilities are shaped by a learned association between
actions and outcomes, there are moments which lead one to concede powerless to
right all the wrongs encountered, Smith tells us.
When we thus despair of finding any force upon earth which can check
the triumph of injustice, we naturally appeal to heaven, and hope, that
the great Author of our nature will himself execute hereafter, what all
the principles which he has given us for the direction of our conduct,
prompt us to attempt even here; that he will complete the plan which he
himself has thus taught us to begin; and will, in a life to come, render
to every one according to the works which he has performed in this
world. And thus we are led to the belief of a future state, not only by the
weaknesses, by the hopes and fears of human nature, but by the noblest
and best principles which belong to it, by the love of virtue, and by the
3In lieu of a keyword searchable Latin text, I rely on Harvey Mansfield and Nathan Tarcov’s
index and translation to keep score.
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abhorrence of vice and injustice. (Smith (1982): 169)
The idea of God comes to right this moral hiccup in the world. Though humans
lack the power to correct the world’s inequities, we come to project a belief in an
omnipotent being capable of doing so. Insofar as our ethical dictates are coextensive
with what we imagine an all powerful being desires, “they necessarily acquire a
new sacredness from this consideration” (Smith (1982): 170). God serves the role of
ideal impartial spectator. Though the argument is distinct from that of Machiavelli,
they share an impulse to explain the efficacy of religion, and faith more specifically,
by gesturing towards an inclination to do a kind of social induction. In both cases
the divine serves to provide greater coherence to an otherwise fractured moral and
social world. Don’t think that Smith drank the Kool-Aid, however. He goes on to
nod and wink to his skepticism of organized religion.4 Rather than endorsing such
a position, he merely explains how the notion of God might elicit trust qua faith.
For both Smith and Machiavelli religion acts as a means of conditioning our
dispositions, generating greater social coherence and constructing trust. While
acknowledging the contested status of religion, both identify the means by which
it can sow social harmony. Machiavelli goes so far as to advise that, “princes of
a republic or of a kingdom should maintain the foundations of the religion they
hold; and if this is done, it will be an easy thing for them to maintain their republic
religious and, in consequence, good and united” (Machiavelli (1996): 37). What’s
more, a consonance emerges between the trust one shows in others and the faith
one has in a god. Faith in God engenders a belief that lacks direct evidence, similar
to the kind of expectation produced by affective trust. The intersection between
these two mechanisms serves to direct attention towards religious communities as
generative sites to consider the political upshot of affective ties.
My point here is not to argue that trust is either necessary or sufficient to generate
a politics, but that it is instrumental in furthering political cohesion. It can emerge
in light of fellow feeling and be accentuated by social order, as in the case of religion.
In this way, trust brings people together by affective means. Trust is neither the first
step in the process of building social solidarity nor the last. Instead it is a means
of bringing agents in the same affective neighborhood closer together. And while
4I can’t help but quote Smith’s rant here: “And wherever the natural principles of religion are
not corrupted by the factious and party zeal of some worthless cabal; wherever the first duty which
it requires, is to fulfil all the obligations of morality; wherever men are not taught to regard frivolous
observances, as more immediate duties of religion, than acts of justice and beneficence; and to
imagine, that by sacrifices, and ceremonies, and vain supplications, they can bargain with the Deity
for fraud, and perfidy, and violence, the world undoubtedly judges right in this respect, and justly
places a double confidence in the rectitude of the religious man’s behaviour” (Smith (1982): 170).
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we know that these bonds can generate further social solidarity, it is also possible
for trust to push people apart. Feeling solidarity with one group may cause one to
diminish trust in another, for instance. The point, rather, is to identify the political
properties of trust.
4.3 Hobbes’ Political Faith
The collocation of trust and social solidarity is made by both Smith and Machiavelli—
the ability for trust to bring greater coherence to extant social order—but neither
employ trust as centrally to their politics as does Hobbes. The particulars of my
interpretation here is novel. Hobbes is commonly read as an analytic project convinc-
ing the reader to embrace a coherent political project embodied by the Leviathan.
Parts three and four, by contrast, are read as somewhat antiquated, taking aim at
particular early modern religious commitments that contemporary readers lack.
Reading through the introductions of the popular editions of the work gives one
the sense that prominent scholars don’t really know what to make of Hobbes’ re-
ligious project. C.B. Macpherson barely makes mention of parts three and four
in his description of the project in his introduction, while Tuck and Peters note
the importance that religion plays in the work, though they don’t explain how its
substance might alter our understanding of the text (Hobbes et al. (1962); Hobbes
and Macpherson (1968); Hobbes and Tuck (1991)). Curley is most attentive to the
issue, explaining how Hobbes nests Christianity under the dominion of the secular
commonwealth (Hobbes (1994)). Yet even he doesn’t go so far as to reinterpret
the political machinery of the first half in light of the substance of the back half.
In direct contrast to these treatments I argue that the latter parts are not merely
complementary to the project of the former, but come to fundamentally modify how
the covenant in parts one and two is read. Although Hobbes’ work in the back half
of the book is largely a studied doctrinal argument for the proper understanding
of Christianity’s demands on its adherents, it also serves as a site to explore and
co-opt more conventional features of politics. Contrary to Macpherson’s reading,
for instance, Hobbes’ theory does not proceed from collectively emerging from
our respective armchairs to acknowledge the validity of his well specified argu-
ments. Rather conventional practices and civic institutions bolster these analytic
arguments in order to produce his more comprehensive political vision. It is these
considerations which the latter parts come to integrate into the project of Leviathan.
Hobbes outlines the contours of his major claim of the latter half of the work at
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the beginning of chapter 35, writing:
The kingdom of God in the writings of divines, and specially in sermons
and treatises of devotion, is taken most commonly for eternal felicity,
after this life, in the highest heaven, which they also call the kingdom
of glory; and sometimes for (the earnest of that felicity) sanctification,
which they term the kingdom of grace; but never for the monarchy, that
is to say, the sovereign power of God over any subjects acquired by
their own consent, which is the proper signification of kingdom. To the
contrary, I find the Kingdom of God to signify, in most places of Scripture,
a kingdom so properly named, constituted by the voted of the people of
Israel in peculiar manner, wherein they chose God for their king by
covenant made with him, upon God’s promising them the possession of
the land of Canaan. . . (Hobbes (1994): 271-2)
Hobbes’s project here offers a reading of the Bible which runs it together with his
secular politics. “The kingdom of God” he writes is “is taken most commonly for
eternal felicity, after this life, in the highest heaven.” His move, however, is to strip
the metaphysics from this interpretation in order to demonstrate the compatibility
of the biblical politics with his own. Indeed Hobbes argues that worries of consent
run throughout the Bible, motivating the Decalogue (Hobbes (1994): 223) and
grounding the need for repeated covenants (Hobbes (1994): chpt 45). The kingdom
of heaven isn’t imposed upon the faithful, but accepted volitionally, as specified in
part two. And though his definition of consent is unusual (see Hobbes’ explanation
of “voluntary”, Hobbes (1994): 112), it still serves to motivate the need for an
epistemic valence to politics. Subjects must come to acknowledge the legitimacy of
their political regime.
Prima facia, “the kingdom of Christ is not of this world; therefore, neither can
his ministers (unless they be kings) require obedience in his name” (Hobbes (1994):
336). Lacking this direct transmission of authority from Christ (e.g. Hobbes (1994):
358) it cannot generate authority since it is “only upon certainty or probability
of arguments drawn from reason or from something men believe already” from
which authority can come (Hobbes (1994): 337). This inability to martial appropriate
evidence entails that Christ’s Church alone cannot generate voluntary consent, since
it fails to bring about the appropriate state of mind to yield authority (e.g. Hobbes
(1994): 367).5 Here’s the hitch however: “the office of Christ’s ministers in this
5Consent for Hobbes notion of consent diverges from its more common understanding of what
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world is to make men believe and have faith in Christ; but faith has no relation to,
nor dependence at all upon compulsion or commandment” (Hobbes (1994): 337).
This entails that Christ’s ministers, those that claim to be his representatives, have
no inherent political power, since they lack the authority to compel the faith they
demand, “for God accepteth not a forced, but a willing obedience” (Hobbes (1994):
388).
4.3.1 Hobbes’ Construction of Faith
Hobbes considers the rightful authority of the Christian church in part three of
Leviathan using language that has been crafted in part one specifically in order to
insure the soundness of his political project. Although the integrity of the Hobbesian
political project is largely premised on the coherence of his lexicon, he indicates that
there are also other avenues to establish certainty. Alternatively then,
When a man’s Discourse beginneth not at Definitions, it beginneth
either at some other contemplation of his own, and then it is still called
Opinion; Or it beginneth at some saying of another, of whose ability to
know the truth, and of whose honesty in not deceiving, he doubteth
not;. . . (Hobbes (1994): 36).
If we are not able to work from settled definitions, then we must rely on either our
own intuitions or on the pronouncements of others—we may either trust ourselves
or trust others.
. . . and then the Discourse is not so much concerning the Thing, as the
Person; And the Resolution is called BELEEFE, and FAITH: Faith, In the
man; Beleefe, both Of the man, and Of the truth of what he sayes. So
then in Beleefe are two opinions; one of the saying of the man; the other
of his vertue. To Have Faith In, or Trust To, or Beleeve A Man, signifie
the same thing; namely, an opinion of the veracity of the man (Hobbes
(1994): 36).
Observation can provide evidence for one’s beliefs, but so can other people. Since
we don’t always have access to analytic truths or empirical facts, we must rely on
one wants, all things considered. In context it is a state of mind that acknowledges some state of
affairs or set of constraints. Curley, for instance, notes that Hobbes’ deliberately defines “voluntary”
such that every action one takes is to be considered voluntary, even if compelled (Hobbes (1994):
xvi, 112). Given Hobbes’ epistemology, reason and observed evidence have privileged strength to
generate such consent, entailing that the commonwealth and not the church is in a ready position to
facilitate legitimate authority by way of the consent of the governed.
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the word of others. We can render beliefs in light of evidence, but we can also hold
them in light of what others say or take to be true. Hobbes doesn’t expand upon his
epistemic account of faith here, leaving open what it means to believe a proposition
in light of “the veracity of the man.” So what does give a person standing to provide
such a reason to believe?
While Hobbes’ notion of trust is contrary to my own, his construction of faith
shares a great deal with affective trust as I have described it. Hobbes’ trust runs
along the lines of reliance, as Karen Jones understands it, as when a charge is
given to a delegate (Hobbes (1994):119-120). Trust here is related to expectations of
outcomes in light of individuated evidence, rather than a judgement with reference
to social norms (Hobbes (1994): 52, 60, 84, 89). Particular trust turns on strong
assumptions that are too specific to ground anything as broad as a general political
project.
Religious convictions, as cast in chapter seven, seem to be primarily driven by
faith in persons rather than trust in evidence. Hobbes maintains that while religious
dogma claims veracity for its teachings, yet, “whatsoever we believe upon no other
reason than what is drawn from authority of men only and their writings, whether
they be sent from God or not, is faith in men only” (emphasis added, Hobbes (1994):
37). Lacking direct access to God’s pronouncements, we are left to have faith in His
messengers. It follows, then, that our “faith in supernatural law” must pertain to the
messenger of that law, rather than the rectitude of the law itself (ibid.: 187). Hobbes’
point in all this is to ultimately run civil and religious authority together, as he
plainly argues for at the start of chapter thirty five. By weakening the credences we
have in religious figures, he strengthens our deference to civil authority figures. But
still worried of inspired zealots who act without regard for civil authority, Hobbes
also reconceptualized a notion of faith by rebuffing the claim that it is endowed by
means of inspiration. He does this by offering a radical gloss on Paul’s teaching
that “faith comes by hearing,” (Romans 10:17) that is,
hearing by those accidents which. . . are all contrived by God Almighty,
and yet are not supernatural but only. . . unobservable. Faith and sanctity
are, indeed, not very frequent, but yet they are not miracles, but brought to
pass by education, discipline, correction, and other natural ways, by which God
worketh them in his elect at such time as he thinketh fit (emphasis added,
Hobbes (1994): 213).
Faith is not supernaturally endowed, he claims, but results from hearing Christ’s
message from within one’s community.
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This turn at once diffuses the authority of religious figures while also pointing
towards the power of learned social knowledge. Faith is explicitly cast as socially
constructed, echoing my account of affective trust. What it is “to have faith in,
or to trust to, or belief in a man” corresponds to the same state of belief which
regards “an opinion of the veracity of the man” (Hobbes (1994): 132). According to
Hobbes here, faith is an expectation that develops from social conditioning. Faith
emerges because one’s friends, colleagues, and peers give one warrant to have
faith as well—this social conditioning warrants one’s confidence. “Whereby it is
evident, that the ordinary cause of believing that the Scriptures are the word of
God, is the same with the cause of the believing of all other Articles of our Faith,
namely, the Hearing of those that are by the Law allowed and appointed to Teach
us, as our Parents in their Houses, and our Pastors in the Churches” (Hobbes (1994):
401). In this same way religious faith is bestowed by hearing—one comes to accept
Christ through one’s family, Church attendance, summer potlucks, summer camps,
and religious education. Faith becomes warranted in a community of believers.
I concede, however, that Hobbes isn’t going full blown Bowling Alone here. Part
of the efficacy of the faith imparted doubtless comes from “those that are by the
Law allowed and appointed to Teach us,” as directed by the sovereign. But in the
main, Hobbes seeks to harmonize the disperate commitments of the members of
the state. Indeed, some members of the commonwealth may possess a peculiar
conception of faith or may lack belief altogether. To this worry Hobbes notes that
even the Bible teaches that faith is a gift of God (Hobbes (1994): 338), bestowed
unto those fortunate to be taught the Word by members of the Church—the extant
community of Christians. Faith is not earned but selectively parceled out. This
deployment of faith serves at least two of Hobbes’ aims. It comes to argue not
only that Christians ought to acknowledge the authority of the state, but also that
Christians must tolerate non-Christians, for they can neither be blamed nor coerced
into accepting Christ as their savior—faith is a gift, after all.
4.3.2 Faith and the Covenant
Reconceptualizing faith in terms of learned social expectations allows Hobbes to
mitigate the divide between the foundations of religious and political legitimacy.
He begins the last chapter of part three by underscoring the perniciousness of
the conflict between politics and religion. “The most frequent pretext of sedition
and civil war, in Christian commonwealths, hath a long time proceeded from a
difficulty. . . of obeying at once both God and man, then when their commands
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are one contrary to the other” (Hobbes (1994): 398). In order to address political
anarchy Hobbes must manipulate a notion of faith to dissolve the conflict that most
frequently leads to political paralysis. We all know the punch line, of course. By
writing that, “All that is necessary to salvation is contained in two virtues: faith
in Christ, and obedience to laws” (Hobbes (1994): 398), he effectively flattens the
possible sites for conflict. Obedience to God’s laws becomes coextensive with
obedience to the sovereign. Hobbes stresses the nature of the knowledge we have
of scripture. “It is manifest, therefore, that Christian men do not know, but only
believe that Scripture is the word of God” (Hobbes (1994): 401). The authority of
the Bible is therefore not the domain of knowledge, but faith—trust in a person, as
Hobbes explains (Hobbes (1994): 36). In so doing, faith moves from a public claim
to a private or idiosyncratic one. Since we do not have direct access the Bible’s
message, we are left to take it on faith, as it were.
Annette Baier comes closest to acknowledging the contribution of Hobbesian
faith to political theory.
Faith, Hobbes tells us ‘is in the man, Beleefe both of the man and of the
truth of what he says.’ It is faith in its Hobbesian sense, in men, not
merely belief in the truth of what they say which I shall argue is the only
“substance” of the hoped-for cooperation which avoids futility and self
destructiveness of its alternatives. (Baier (1980): 134)
Her aim here is to construct an argument for “secular faith” which is “faith in the
human community and its evolving procedures” and is constituted through, “a
community of just persons” (Baier (1980): 133). Baier wants to argue that political
membership must be anchored by a faith in each other, as moral agents who strive
for harmonious living.
As the just man now, in an unjust world, has no certainty, only faith and
hope, that there really can and will be a just society of the living, so, in
any apparently attained just society, that is in one with just institutions,
its members will rely on the faith and hope that they could if necessary
act for a mere idea, and so that they really qualify for membership. A
new variant of Hobbesian faith in man will be needed. Both in the
absence and in the presence of an actual just society, then, the just will
live by faith. (Baier (1980): 148)
It is true that for Hobbes faith does not directly regard belief in the justness of
others, but his schema is largely similar to that Baier has in mind. Hobbesian faith
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already serves, not only generate political justification through membership in
common institutions, but also to construct the foundation of the political order.
What Baier picks up (without even knowing it, possibly) is the conceptual drift
that Hobbes employs to move faith from a belief in individuals, to that same
instantiation of belief, now in light of institutional practices. Hobbes’s faith is
actually more ambitious than what Baier proposes as it encompasses both citizens
and the institutional milieu they inhabit.
Faith is an expectation in people rendered in light of social practices according to
Hobbes. It is not simply an expectation of outcomes, but of the rectitude of others,
warranted due to education, political institutions, and social conditioning. Faith is
contextually variant like affective trust—a “gift of God”—insofar as it is a function
of social context.6 Hobbes’ epistemology makes way for a form of trust which is not
individuated as is particular trust. Such trust is a learned expectation throughout
one’s life, causing one to trust in some more and less in others, in some contexts
and not others.
Yet this construction is not that of a social norm in Lewis or Bicchieri’s sense.
Hobbes makes no reference to nth-order beliefs, though it is not far off to say that he
is working with conditional preferences all the way down the line. Moreover, it is
not clear what role sentiment plays in this notion of faith. His account is particularly
interesting for the ways it straddles the different approaches to trust on offer. At first
it might seem like Hobbes’ faith is contextually grounded, thereby indicating greater
similarity with affective than general trust. His project is ultimately totalizing,
however, so ultimately “those that are by the Law allowed and appointed to Teach
us” are those authorized directly by the sovereign (Hobbes (1994): 401). In practice,
then, I might imagine Hobbes to be totally agnostic between the two approaches.
If the Leviathan’s sovereignty becomes uniformly effective, trust will de facto
become context-invariant. Because of this total authority, such faith provides an
overriding reason to trust particular people too. Hobbes just doesn’t think even
fools might be persuaded to break their commitments. Still, his attention to the
way in which expectations can be endowed in people, and the mechanistic process
6An interesting sidebar to this discussion is the debate regarding whether Hobbes’ epistemology
is subjectivist or projectivisit. If Hobbes is a subjectivist is might be the case that faith is merely
the imputation of trust given an apparent background, but that the whole account is internal to
me—you merely appear to me as trustworthy. Stephen Darwall, however, argues that Hobbes is a
projectivist entailing that one would project trustworthiness on to another given one’s contextual
background. Upon this telling, Hobbes would endorse an account of trust that is assigned to the
person, that is I perceive her to actually be trustworthy. This squares better with my account that
attempts to construct affective trust as constituted by the outside world (Darwall (2000)).
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that he identifies as generating those expectations, leads me to believe that he
would endorse the efficacy of an affective account of trust outside the domain of
the Hobbesian commonwealth.
Indeed, in most respects we don’t read Hobbes because we want a “how to”
manual for constructing authoritarian regimes, but because of the insight he offers
regarding the ways a political puzzle might potentially fit together. As such, his
attention to the epistemic contours of faith provides a crucial intervention in the
reading of Leviathan. It’s not a secret that Hobbes spends half the work undertaking
a gloss of a Christian politics, but it is hard to see what a contemporary reader ought
to make of such an exercise. Placing faith in this relief, it becomes evident how
integral the latter half is to the former. That is, the analytic and religio-social projects
are hard-wired together. Hobbes argues that the sovereignty of God is passed from
Moses to Christ to the Apostles. Transmission is done through covenanting, first
through the covenant at Sinai, then Christ as the Angel of the Covenant, and finally
through the covenant of baptism (Hobbes (1994): 259, 269, 273). The covenant is
the process by which God generates voluntary consent, “for God accepteth not a
forced, but a willing obedience” (Hobbes (1994): 388). This process of covenanting,
between the members of the Church of Christ and God is the same as that in the
secular commonwealth, though, as Hobbes says “the church, if it be one person, is
the same thing with a commonwealth of Christians, called a commonwealth because
it consisteth of men united in one person, their sovereign; and a church, because it
consisteth in Christian men united in one Christian sovereign” (Hobbes (1994): 260).
Any political body comprised of Christians that is united under one sovereign is
itself a church.7
Hobbes’ political covenant, the one on full display in chapter seventeen, is
never intended to be taken as a purely ideal construct. Even in part one, keeping
the covenant is referred to as “keeping of a promise, or faith” and violating the
covenant a “violation of faith” (Hobbes (1994): 260). The covenant is an agreement
to execute an action at the moment in expectation of cooperation at some later
time. By assuming an imagined position in which everyone set down her arms
on the condition others set down theirs the covenant in chapter seventeen works
magically to effect a social contract to which all people consent. While no moment
of covenanting ever transpired, we might all imagine sitting around on our hands
7Compare, for purposes of illustration, the portrait of the sovereign on the title page of the Head
Edition of Leviathan with Galatians 3:28, “There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor
free man, there is neither male nor female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus.”
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waiting for the last person to agree to the terms of the covenant (and abstaining
from a breach as not to violate faith). But to assume that position, to read the remedy
in that way, completely obscures the full effect of the Hobbesian project here. As I
have explained it, abiding by the terms of the covenant comes to be an act of faith.
The trust on which we rely, the faith that we have in others, can seem ethereal
in the abstract, though it abounds in practice. Christians, devout in their zeal,
experience faith every day of their lives. Their status in the Church of Christ is
justified in that faith. And it is that faith that generates their consent to God’s rule
in “willing obedience.” But faith is a gift. It is not an a priori truth of the world,
but constructed socially, institutionally, and eventually politically. It comes through
hearing and moving through an extant social space. What Hobbes reveals in part
three is that the commonwealth is held together in part by faith. It is not enough for
citizens to imagine themselves armchair philosophers, acknowledging the analytic
truth of Hobbes’ meticulously crafted syllogism in parts one and two. In order
for politics to cohere, citizens must have faith. Faith in each other and faith in the
sovereign. Faith that others will keep to the covenant, and faith that they are being
lead by an ambassador of God. Faith acts as a social-epistemic means of generating
consent to the power of the state, deploying Christian faith to incorporate believers
and unbelievers alike.
This can help explain the confusion arising from Hobbes’ use of “covenant”
rather than “contract” to describe the foundational political bond. Curley, for one,
struggles to explain why Hobbes employs a device that entails non-simultaneous
execution, wondering aloud if the Fool is indeed foolish (Hobbes (1994): xxvi). But
if the bond is imagined, why not contract to authorize and give up one’s right of
governing at the moment all others do too? I argue that Hobbes deploys the concept
of covenant in order to co-opt Christian commitments in service of the state, and to
seed that same zeal among all its subjects towards political ends.
But this also explains why Hobbes waits until the end of part three to tout the
political efficacy of faith. Rather than a pious embrace of metaphysics, faith provides
order to society by producing common, contextually held terms of justification.
Much like accounts of Smith and Machiavelli above, Hobbes argues that social
cohesion generates faith, which then feeds back to produce greater social and
political cohesion. In an ironic twist, it turns out that Hobbes’ project bootstraps
preexisting institutions to effect his renewed project of “let us make man” (Hobbes
(1994): 4). Literarily, Hobbes could not have introduced these arguments at the
start of the work, since the reader lacks the necessary argument to buy into the
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commitments of Hobbesian civil faith at that point. It is only after after establishing
the analytic arguments that he can address Christian opposition, reconceptualizing
faith in the process.
While Machiavelli sees that faith can be manipulated in the service of political
order, Hobbes goes further, running faith directly into the ordering of politics. The
same impulse that motivates reliance on God now moves people to construct the
political order. At once he defangs Christian zealotry, indicating that “to believe
that Jesus is the Christ is faith sufficient to the obtaining of life [everlasting]” (Hobbes
(1994): 404), and also diverts that faith towards the ends of political consent. Insofar
as the commonwealth is the Church, faith in Christ is consent of the governed.
Hobbes and Baier remind us that faith communities, either religious or secular
in kind, are useful sites to study trust. Religious societies excel at constructing
a context that allows members to “hear” in Hobbes’ sense. They present both
formal and informal institutions that require great commitment of their members,
shaping and constraining the practices which emerge from the community. Mormon
missionaries commonly attend church weekly as children, attend seminary classes
during release time in high school, and are taught scripture through weekly readings
in their homes with family. This is the faith to which Hobbes refers, the faith in God
which appears simply obvious in the presence of such interlocking civil institutions.
Faith in these communities is not reserved just for God, but religious and lay leaders
alike. The structure of the religious communities constrains and constructs the trust
they exhibit, justifying these communities and the actions of their members (Hobbes
(1994): 408). In undermining Christian objections of persecution with an account of
faith through grace, Hobbes demonstrates the latent political potential of faith as a
means of endogenously generating social solidarity.
4.4 Conclusion
Affective trust is a particular example of the kind of sentimental feature that the-
orists of sentimental politics argue ought to be reintroduced to political theory.
And consistent with this trove of theory that has been examined in roughly the
last decade, I don’t argue that affective trust is either necessary or sufficient to
constructing a political order. Rather I want to identify its political potential.
Beginning with Smith, I note that empathy and trust work in tandem, allowing
us to explore the epistemic contours of the social world. Empathy brings us outside
ourselves, allowing us to feel and care for others. Trust indicates reciprocity, that
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others take us to share their moral and ethical commitments. This mode of trust
generates expectations of others in virtue of considerations that outstrip the evi-
dence at hand. Machiavelli and Smith both maintain that we come to trust leaders,
and ultimately God, because of the way social order directs us to. In the case of
God, Smith thinks that we are lead to believe in the necessity of justice, though we
come to acknowledge that we lack the ability to effect such order ourselves. We thus
posit a perfect impartial spectator that comes to reconcile these disparities. Trust
in our leaders and faith in God are generated by the same set of impulses. They
are constructed to fill social and ethical lacunae that we have been conditioned to
anticipate.
While Machiavelli acknowledges the role of faith in generating greater political
solidarity, Hobbes advocates for more ambitious possibilities. Part three of Leviathan
comes to run his political project together with Christianity. He argues that the
church is a Christian commonwealth with the earthly sovereign as God’s messenger.
In so doing, Hobbes inserts faith directly into the center of his political project.
Faith serves both as the means of consenting to the authority of God and binding
citizens to the state. At once he argues for a minimal and maximal role for faith in
politics. Minimally, faith requires nothing more of Christians than to acknowledge
that Christ is the messenger of God. These commitments direct them to take on
no further actions on behalf of their faith. Maximally however, faith is revealed
to entail those commitments that we take, and expectations we maintain, which
result from the coherence of the extant civil institutions—the rules and beliefs we
come to adopt in light of instruction we receive at home, in school, and in church.
According to Hobbes, these expectations are not ancillary, but lie at the core of his
social contract theory.
Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Smith all provide lenses through which we can iden-
tify the political upshots of affective trust as a mechanism to generate civil solidarity.
While none construct the concept precisely as I do, their considerations are genera-
tive of the kind of political role affective trust might occupy. None of the theorists
identify social norms as I have to motivate their accounts of trust and faith. But they
provide facets of the concept I argue for, which help to locate affective trust in the
tradition of political theory. My primary argument in this chapter is that affective
trust—a warm expectation that others will act cooperatively in light of extant social
norms or institutional rules—carries many of the political properties that motivate
political cohesion. Each of the theorists I have considered identify a generative
feedback process by which extant social order yields greater camaraderie by way of
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the affective bonds of trust. In the following chapter I examine how the cohesive
properties of trust manifest in the world by reflecting a series of semi-structured
interviews that I conducted with Christian missionaries.
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CHAPTER V
Affective Trust in the Field: Missionaries’ Faith
ABSTRACT
In this chapter I explore an illustrative case study that sheds light on
the manifestation of affective trust in the world. I report on my con-
versations with Christian missionaries of varying denominational back-
grounds to better understand how it is that they came to trust others
while working abroad. Though this meditation does not claim to vali-
date the theory, it does seek to illustrate the role that institutions and
particularly social norms play in the formation of trust. It serves as
a means of establishing the theory’s plausibility, demonstrating that
the account I sketch out resonates with the experiences of others who
have occupied situations of uncertainty, while also laying out potential
avenues to further test the theory empirically. I find that missionaries
can come to selectively trust others in these uncertain situations, and
that they do so in light of socially normative cultural cues. I conclude by
remarking on the parallels between the faith missionaries place in God
and the trust they come to have in others.
Juan Rogel, a Jesuit missionary from Spain sent a dispatch to the Holy See regarding
his work in La Florida in 1568. “I never saw the vice of theft and if they [the native
Americans] do anything bad it’s because the Spaniards taught them such. They do
no evil to those who do good to them. I feel secure among them” (Cushner (2006):
45). Rogel was serving as part of a Spanish delegation of missionaries, ostensibly
deployed to acculturate the population of the New World to their aspiring Spanish
hegemons. That is not how he saw himself, however. He considered himself a
spiritual messenger sent to spread the word of Christ, conquistadors be damned.
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He felt more at ease with the unconverted than with the brutish Christian soldiers
providing his security. And this despite that, not two years earlier, one of his fellow
churchmen along with five escorts were killed upon coming ashore to ask directions
(Cushner (2006): 32). Rogel realized it was rough neighborhood, but it didn’t seem
to shake him. His disposition is curious. What can explain why Rogel trusts the
presumptive out-group more than members of his nominal in-group?
It is easy to write off the religiously pious like Rogel as simple or half-witted. A
common trope is expressed in some of Machiavelli’s writings, for instance. While in
the last chapter I showed that he finds utility in religious faith, he clearly expresses
a skeptical voice too. He famously advocates that a prince feign piety to inspire
his (gullible) subjects (Machiavelli (1998): 70). And he continues to mock religion
in his play Mandragola where the wily protagonist conspires to hook-up with a
married Lucrezia by deploying a phony priest to dupe her, her mother, and her
husband—the pious come off just as gullible as they are earnest.
As a practical matter, however, it’s just not possible to defend the naive portrait
of the pious as particularly dull or irrational. And though one might be inclined
to argue that religion is just beyond the ken of academic study for such reasons,
there is a growing interest in the systematic study of political religion which resists
precisely this contention. For one, there is considerable work showing that religion
is just an ordinary domain of social and political life. The existing scholarship
has identified the ways that costly barriers to entry diminish the rate of attrition
(Iannaccone (1988), Grzymala-Busse (2012a)) while religious competition leads
to enfranchising marginal political groups (Grzymala-Busse (2013), Trejo (2009),
Woodberry (2012), Smith (2011)). Highlighting its importance, scholars such as
Anna Grzymala-Busse and Anthony Gill gleefully point out that the tale of a world
hurdling towards a secular consensus is laughably wrong (Grzymala-Busse (2012b),
Gill (2001)). The efficacy of the political voice of American Evangelical Christians,
the emergence of radical Islamic resistance movements across the Middle East, and
the recent political struggle of the Ichwan (Muslim Brotherhood) and Muhammad
Morsi in Egypt are all reminders that Locke’s Letter did not decisively disentangle
religion and politics. The study of political religion focuses on how religions, like
other social movements, impose doctrinal and ritual rules on their members, which
structure the routines of its members, as does any institution. Of course, neither
of these observations is terribly new. As I argued in the previous chapter, both
Machiavelli and Hobbes were already attentive to the ways that religion itself serves
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as a (often competing) site of politics.1
As such, the experiences of the missionaries with whom I spoke can offer us
portrayals of a ubiquitous epistemic feature of affective trust, albeit elicited under
unusual circumstances. And though I don’t go so far as to argue that this study
validates the theory I offer, it does bring the claims I make into focus. Only a suitable
contrast case could hope demonstrate the theory’s validity. Instead, this case study
looks to a particular group of individuals to explore and portray how they report
their experiences of trust. I have spoken with twenty six Christian missionaries
from the United States who have served on mission abroad. The impulse for this
was two-fold. First, I was interested in examining a group of individuals who
were motivated to trust others whom they did not previously know, absent the
background information that one might normally take for granted. Particular trust
argues that trust entails expectations derived in light of individuated information.
But the absence of such contextual familiarity in this case makes it harder to sustain
that account. I view this sample as paradigmatic. The cultural shock that these
individuals experience upon going abroad can help to better identify the role that
social norms play in the construction of our beliefs under ordinary circumstances.
My argument is that we commonly look to such norms to generate trust, it’s just
more easily observed among missionaries that serve abroad who lack access to
ordinary background information. Second, I had intended to account for the ways
in which the institutional rules of varying Christian denominations conditioned
people’s trust in different manners. My hope was to tell a decisively institutional
story for the generation of trust by explaining how the variation of religious doctrine
and practice altered the manner and means by which one comes to trust.
While I continued to gather reports from Christian missionaries, I found that it
was not possible to pursue the second avenue of inquiry here. For one, the prospect
of identifying and isolating the precise determinants of one’s religious affiliation
that affect the propensity to trust became daunting. Any sample, particularly those
of small-N, exhibit such heterogeneity as to make it extremely difficult to know that
the dimensions I might identify are the truly salient ones. The larger impediment,
however, was the doctrinal similarity among subjects and the role differentiation
between denominations. Catholic missionaries whom I met had spent decades
abroad as nuns in an orphanage or nurses in hospital. While their roles were
1Indeed even Machiavelli nods to the savvy of religious actors when, at the end of Mandragola,
Sostrata, Lucrezia’s mother, thinks out loud and, giving a nod and a wink to being in on the gag,
asks “Who wouldn’t be happy [with the play’s resolution]?” (Machiavelli (1981): 54).
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religiously informed, their primary responsibility was to serve in a professional
capacity. Evangelical missionaries, in contrast, are more loosely coordinated than
either Catholics or Mormons. YWAM, or Youth With a Mission, sends tens of
thousands of volunteers abroad as community builders (e.g. teaching English,
irrigation, or farming, all on an ad hoc basis). Mormons hew the closest to the naive
take on a missionary’s role. They go out in the field for either 18 months or two
years and knock on doors (otherwise known as “tracting”) spreading what they
believe to be the gospel of Jesus Christ. Clearly a nun who has served 40 years as a
physician in Central Africa will have very different reflections of trusting “foreign”
strangers than will a 21 year old Mormon woman sent to the Philippines for a year
and a half.
An equally flummoxing problem turned out to be the doctrinal similarity among
the missionaries with whom I spoke. Though we oughtn’t expect totally uniform
practice in any religion, we do observe strong regularities among religious denomi-
nations that can inform our understanding of members’ behaviors and attitudes. To
this end the Pew “U.S. Religious Landscape Survey” of 2008 provides systematic
data on the regularities that exist in these communities. Using a representative
sample of 35,000 Americans, the study probes how different religious denomina-
tions practice in distinctive ways. Remaining agnostic whether regularity in the
data marks sectarian orthodoxy, I identified roughly two dozen dimensions on
which Catholics, Evangelical Protestants, and Mormons systematically diverged.
These dimensions mainly fell into two categories: belief in an active or a passive
God, and high versus low social closure, that is whether denominational members
frequently associate with non-members.2 In practice I could not find divergence
between missionaries’ responses to these prompts.
For eighteen of twenty six participants I asked specific questions regarding
their theology and social practices, which I drew from the 2008 Pew study. I
was interested in ascertaining the diversity of doxa and praxis among my sample,
but for better or worse, there was nearly no variation. This was in part because
the sample was small, but in part because those who go on mission are all high-
commitment community members. I spoke to no one who went on mission after
only recently joining their respective church. Nearly everyone exhibited a high
degree of theological similarity and social closure. All but three of the interviewees
2“[Social] closure refers to processes of drawing boundaries, constructing identities, and building
communities in order to monopolize scarce resources for one’s own group, thereby excluding others
from using them” (Mackert (2012)).
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attend church every week, and have done so for much of their lives. All but one still
identified with the movements with which they went on mission, and all expressed
a belief in God with high certainty and pray at least daily, most so frequently they
could not specify a number. Even the most heterodox member of my sample, the
one individual with whom I spoke that no longer affiliates with an organized church,
is still a devout theist. On the cultural end, their responses were largely consistent
too. Thirteen of eighteen did not participate in church clubs, and the sample was
nearly split regarding whether they would send their children to public or private
schools. No one responded strongly to the question, with many indicating that it
would turn on the quality of the available education. The sample just didn’t elicit
the variation necessary to construct the kind of inquiry I had intended.
Instead the account I provide offers three means of building out the theory of
affective trust. The first substantive contribution of this chapter is to demonstrate
the plausibility of affective trust’s empirical validity. It’s a bad habit of theorists to
author accounts of some concept, be it justice or love, without exploring whether
the descriptive properties are borne out in the world. We likely all possess some
coherent but idiosyncratic notions, which ultimately fail to generalize because
others don’t experience the world as we do or attendant facts in the world make
the claims unlikely or even impossible (Wiens (2015)). By examining the reports of
Christian missionaries I hope to demonstrate that there is at least plausible evidence
that the theory I offer is empirically valid.
The second purpose of this chapter is to illustrate the properties of affective
trust as it appears in the world. While conceptual work can articulate a set of clear
distinctions between categories, it is then useful to point to phenomenon in the
world to identify its observed correlates. To say that affective trust is distinguished
from particular trust due to the role social norms play in motivating the attitude is
meaningful, but ultimately unhelpful if we don’t know how to identify the attitude
as people discuss it or how to point to a particular practice as a social norm. Indeed
the undertaking is not a straightforward one. Experimental settings are ideal for
artificially manipulating the intended intervention, such as a social norm, but the
results lack external validity. Observational settings are more challenging, though
clearly important as ultimately all our social scientific theories are borne out in vivo.
In this chapter I seek to point to specific aspects of the participants’ responses in
order to identify how my theory corresponds to our observations of the world.
The final contribution of the chapter is to suggest testable means by which this
research might be advanced. Reflecting on observational data such as these can
92
provide suggestions of what to look for when pursuing causal empirical research.
One of the important observational upshots of these interviews, for instance, is
that the boundaries of affective trust are not clean. While I argue that affective
trust is a distinct attitude, I never claim that it must operate apart from particular
or general trust. Indeed, frequently the mechanisms that bring about trust occur
simultaneously—one might possess a high degree of general trust, but also have
context specific information about a particular individual, both necessary but nei-
ther sufficient to bring about trust in that specific case. Here too the individuals
with whom I spoke possess a high degree of general trust, though their work is also
facilitated by affective trust. Using this case study of semi-structured interviews
allows me to identify candidate markers that we might interrogate further to dis-
tinguish affective trust from complementary accounts, while being mindful of the
ways in which the concepts inevitably overlap.
In analyzing more than two dozen semi-structured interviews I point to the
importance of identifiable and resonant social norms in generating affective trust. I
point to the ways in which trust is (and is not) effective in forging bonds between
otherwise loosely affiliated individuals, shedding light on the kind of work we
might hope trust to accomplish. These accounts indicate the plausibility of the
theory I offer, illustrate its purchase, and identify potential future avenues of inquiry.
So while I cannot validate the theory using these tools, I can place substantive
observational meat on the theoretical bones laid out in previous chapters.
5.1 Trusting Under Uncertainty
I have so far argued that affective trust is a warm expectation that others will act
cooperatively, informed by social norms. In this way, even though one might not
know anything of a potential trustee (i.e. lacking relevant information about her
appropriateness or capacity for some task) one might still trust her. This can be
explained by the identification of social norms that create environments in which
actors can be anticipated to have similar preferences. A norm conveys the existence
of a contingent preference that one act in accord with some rule, so long as some
minimum number of others do as well. In this way, not only might I expect others
have reason to conform to the rule, but indeed that they prefer to do so. Thus for a
particular set of possible actions one might take in a situation, a norm gives priority
to some over others.
The identification of a norm seeds both a conditional preference to act in accord
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with the rule and an expectation about another’s willingness to conform. A norm
for generosity, say, conveys something about her willingness to sacrifice for the
sake of Paretian considerations. As I argue in chapter two, this process generates
not only expectations, but emotional dispositions that lead one to feel warmth to
those who conform to the norms one does, and indignation upon violation. As
a higher order matter, one also expects that other members of P will hold each
to the norm, entailing that both conducting oneself in accord with the norm, and
one’s expectations deriving from that conduct, are broadly socially justified. (So
even if one were stiffed, others could still be anticipated to think that acting in
accord with the rule was “the right thing to have done.”) This sense of warrant
leads one to render second-personal claims as well as reactive attitudes when
another disappoints. Knowing that a norm exists in a context doesn’t just provide
you with an expectation regarding the comportment of others, it also gives you an
independent reason to conform to that norm. That’s what is meant by a “conditional”
preference. Conditional on everyone else not littering in the park, for example, you
yourself prefer not to litter as well.
To show the plausibility of my theory, I want to identify each of the eight






• in light of extant social norms,
• while violation of the expectation
• is apt to elicit reactive attitudes
This proves to be difficult in practice. While one or another element might not be
evident in a particular interaction, the theory posits that each is present, though pos-
sibly unobservable. Though the missionaries with whom I spoke were exceedingly
thoughtful and reflective about their time abroad, their responses were not crafted
to conform to my theory. They often discuss trust, but without reference to a specific
act, or they identified the salience of social or cultural norms, but did not explicitly
associate those practices with their attitude of trust. My task is to synthesize their
reports and identify the degree to which these accounts conform to my theory,
though there is no uniform procedure for doing so. I should add, however, that this
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messiness muddies the plausibility of competing accounts as well. Insofar as all
the candidate theories on the table entail an expectation of the actions of others, for
instance, the difficulty of identifying these associations is just as much a problem for
my theory as for others. As I have noted above, however, I hope that the regularities
of the account I provide in this chapter indicate the plausibility of the theory, while
problematizing the tractability of competing theories in information-scarce contexts.
As I write above, I chose to speak with Christian missionaries because of the
vulnerability that they assume for the sake of religion. Trust in a very broad sense
is an expectation that others will act cooperatively, that others can be relied upon
without harm coming to the truster. Missionaries, by virtue of their roles, are
forced to trust those around them. Unlike most interactions however, they lack
many of the common cooperation-inducing devices that might typically explain
such behavior (e.g. Henrich and Henrich (2007), chapters 6 and 7). While in the
prior chapter I moved to distinguish affective from general trust, here I primarily
move to distinguish it from particular trust. General trust is meant to explain an
aggregate phenomenon, the default level at which people are willing to rely on
others. As I have noted, it does not explain within case variation. General trust
doesn’t explain why a person’s trust varies between distinct contexts, as in the
reports of missionaries I discuss. At issue in this chapter is whether affective trust
can explain behavior that particular trust cannot. Particular trust entails that there
exists individuated information about a trustee that would lead one to trust her.
Aside from her personal proclivities, for fidelity say, there might be reputational
costs or sanctioning mechanisms that would lead one to believe that she is more
likely to cooperate than not. By selecting a context in which subjects lack access
to such devices—reputations don’t matter to missionaries who change their stake
every two to four months—I hope to isolate the affective and socially normative
aspect of trust from its individuated elements.
At this point I want to call out a nettlesome and confusing strategy employed
by rational choice theorists who argue for particular trust. While I claim that social
norms produce affective trust, competing advocates might argue that social norms
are merely informational signals that are broadcast over some context Q, and thus
affective trust just a special case of their theory. And, they might add, while it
may seem like there are no reputational costs to norm violators, indeed there may
exist audience costs for those who exploit missionaries. Aside from the implausible
task of digesting all relevant situational information, these moves are old saws
and mostly irritating because they are thrown around so casually. Don Herzog, for
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instance, has written convincingly that you can’t have a good theory that does all
its work post hoc (Herzog (2000)). In the sample arguments above that would entail
describing exactly what those costs look like on a case by case basis. Such theory
argues that people are rational, but the post facto work just generates rationality by
construction. Unless advocates of particular trust can articulate the informational
fungibility between social norms and individuated information, the burden remains
on them to claim that social norms are just another kind of information.
This objection is in addition to the worry I outline in the introduction that
particular trust lacks clear observational support. Indeed, were particular trust
the primary explanation for the phenomenon of context-variable trust one should
imagine it to be far more fluid than it is. A knife-edged model like Coleman’s would
indicate that we ought to observe trust being extended and withdrawn as swiftly
as the sun might dart between the clouds. My account of affective trust explains
why trust should be as stable as it is within a given context. With those chalk lines
drawn, I will contrast my view of affective trust to that of particular trust in the
discussion of my analysis of the data (section 5.3.4) to better mark the distinctions
between the theories. My aim here is to track how the eight criteria listed above
come to favor my account of over competing proposals.
5.2 Case Selection and Procedure
Using snowball sampling, I reached out to a group of more than two dozen Ameri-
can Christian missionaries who worked abroad. Though in some sense all motivated
by the verse from Matthew (28:19-20) which admonishes Christians to evangelize,
each has a distinct reflection on their work abroad, and each came to elicit trust
differently. I elected to study missionaries that served abroad in order to understand
how one might form relationships and trust, absent a deep personal or cultural
knowledge. So while these U.S. Christians were very familiar with cultural rules
in the States, I hoped to better understand how they elicited trust when they were
without such contextual knowledge. As mentioned above, I understand their experi-
ences of trust to be common to everyday life. I primarily selected the case because I
believe affective trust to be especially identifiable under these circumstances. Every
missionary with whom I spoke talked of distinctions between the communities in
which they worked and those they were familiar with back home. Most worked
in non-OECD countries, though others worked with immigrant communities in
Western Europe. Ironically (though not entirely unexpectedly) missionaries who
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worked with white populations in OECD contexts had some of the most difficult
time developing relationships with those to whom they sought to reach out.
5.2.1 The Worry of Cultural Imperialism
Their stories were not of those of The Poisonwood Bible. They don’t see themselves as
going abroad to civilize the local population. Though there are doubtless imperialist
concerns that underlie the practice of missionizing in lower income areas of the
world, the men and women who go abroad see themselves as being sensitive to
the culture they join. LT, an evangelical missionary in Turkey, was particularly
keen on serving God in pursuit of cultural exchange. She noted that culture plays
a large part in one’s faith and, as a result, a church in one part of the world will
likely look very different than that in another. While she was interested in traveling
to experience and observe different cultures, she was also mindful to avoid the
paternalism that could result from such tourism. While LT spoke to this most
directly, others described the comfort they felt while abroad and indicated their
identification with the local communities. Multiple times I heard that missionaries
were complemented by being told “you are more like us than American.” Indeed,
this sensibility is not unexpected given that the ethos of unity with co-religionists
(or potential co-religionists) is deeply ingrained in Christianity going back at least
as far as the Pauline dictum from Galatians (3:28): There is neither Jew nor Gentile,
neither slave nor free, nor is there male and female, for you are all one in Christ
Jesus.
My study is neither meant to endorse nor inoculate missionary practice from
such real criticisms. Instead my accounts of earnest missionaries seek to convey
the honesty of their encounters. The people with whom I spoke were thoughtful,
kind, dedicated, and devout. They did not view their service abroad as a means of
enriching themselves or subverting the cultural values of vulnerable populations.
Indeed, they sought to build relationships with others across a wide swath of cul-
tural, ethnic, and racial backgrounds in order to help people self-actualize (as they
understood it). While they all believed that people would be better for accepting
Christ in their lives and being baptized in their particular church, many were frank
that this was not their primary objective. For starters, few of them were successful
at baptizing large numbers of non-Christians. Five to ten families in the course of a
Mormon mission would have been a huge success—out of the possibly hundreds
of people with whom they would interact. Many see their work as primarily one of
grassroots education.
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A secondary goal of mission is doubtless to instill religious conviction in the
individual through the practice of preaching. I asked RH, a Mormon missionary,
whether she thought mission served to do more good for the missionary or the
missionized. She responded that both aspects were a part of the service, though
she still believed the evangelical aspect of her work to be primary. That being said,
she did not think that most of her engagement would directly bring people to be
baptized in the LDS Church. Instead much of what she and her colleagues would
do was in pursuit of a cultural exchange, where she might teach and be taught
about God.
I spoke with another Evangelical man who echoed some of these sentiments.
TR went to Jarabacoa in the Dominican Republic and remained there for twelve
years; five of his six children were born in the DR. He told me that he was not
initially accepted by the local community, and that at first he did not preach either.
He saw his mission as one of building relationships with the local community and
spreading the light of Christ. He had an animal bank where locals could borrow
livestock and a garden that produced food. Eventually people came up to his wife
and him asking why they were in Jarabacoa that would spark longer conversations.
He saw himself as a model that one might look to in order to live a Christian life.
Eventually 20% of the town of 500 “became Christians” (a term Evangelicals often
use to describe one accepting a Protestant theology), he told me. (Though I was
not clear what marked the transition to becoming Christian or how the figure was
determined.) He thought that one didn’t need to preach in order to evangelize.
Living in “a way that is inclusive” is enough to successfully spread the gospel.
Contrary to RH, TR was apparently successful at winning converts for his faith.
Both their methods, however, were similar. Build relationships, start conversations,
and eventually people will be drawn in. Their reports were typical of others who
described the experience as one of planting seeds that would later flower with the
intervention of others.
Maybe it is a bit nefarious and underhanded. You come to an impoverished
community as a (comparably) wealth American and wait for people to come over
to you and ask questions. If you’re patient enough you don’t need to preach on the
street corners. The unconverted will come to you. That is doubtlessly true in some
sense. The worry, however, does not obviate the question of how these missionaries
are able to open themselves up to the risks they encountered and how that openness
varied across contexts.
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5.2.2 Method of Contact and Interview Techniques
I reached out to each contact over email asking for a phone conversation that I
indicated would last between an hour and an hour and a half. My response rate
was roughly 80%. I spoke with six evangelical missionaries, nineteen Mormon
missionaries (one who no longer identifies with the church), and one Catholic. With
each call I would begin by introducing myself and my project. I said that I was a
Ph.D. candidate at the University of Michigan writing my dissertation on distinct
understandings of trust. I mentioned that while it might be easy to understand why
one would trust a third party vendor on Amazon.com in virtue of the numerous
formal and informal guarantees the site makes, it is less obvious why we trust
people we only know peripherally, where such institutional recourses are harder to
identify. I had reached out to them, I remarked, in order to identify and understand
how they developed trust with people whom they worked.
The interviews consisted of a formal survey and a semi-structured interview. I
began by asking questions from the survey and then moved on to the interview.
While as a noted above, the results of the survey regarding belief and practice
were not illuminating, there did exist greater heterogeneity on the matter of trust.
While thirteen of twenty3 answered that you can trust most people (when asked
the canonical trust question from the General Social Survey), all but two said that
most people were trustworthy, that is that most people are themselves disposed to
act cooperatively (one of whom said that it depends). There was no indication that
theology, cultural background, or denominational affiliation affected the expression
of general trust in my sample, though they were a comparably trusting group to
begin with (since, by way of contrast, only about one third of Americans answer
affirmatively to whether they trust most people).
After completing the formal survey I moved on to conduct a semi-structured
interview, recommended for process tracing (George and Bennett (2005)), which
conforms to my effort to assess the theory’s plausibility. I began by asking for
their religious experiences growing up, and how it was that they decided to go on
mission. Our conversations proceeded chronologically, for the most part, beginning
from their experiences as young children, through adolescence and ultimately
their late teens and early twenties, when each had made the decision to serve
abroad. This decision looked different for Mormons than it did for the Evangelicals
3The additional two were those whom I asked the question to during the interview rather than in
the survey portion.
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I spoke with.4 Mormons, particularly those who are disposed to go on mission,
are embedded in communities in which doing so is a social norm. While it is not a
requirement, it is strongly encouraged for men and admirable for women. I was
told by a number of Mormons that roughly three in four men go on mission and
one in four women. Not every Mormon subject was set on serving prior to their
subsequent decision—RH, for instance, told me that she had intended on continuing
studies towards a career in medicine until very shortly before she decided instead
to go on mission—but all had been affiliated with communities in which this was
the norm.5 In contrast, though two of the evangelicals I spoke with went abroad
to fulfill a college requirement, the other four were clearly acting “over and above”
what was expected of them. They felt a call to serve abroad, but each (serving with
YWAM) remarked that the context in which they worked was previously unfamiliar
to them.
Following a discussion of the path these individuals took to go on mission, I
proceeded to ask about their experience abroad. In the cases of Mormons these
followed a clear trajectory. Following an online application, missionaries receive
what is known as their “call” from the Church, which they believe to be a prophetic
message where God reveals where he wishes them to serve. The call comes a few
months before the beginning of service, at which time they go off to a Missionary
Training Center (MTC for short, often the one in Provo, UT). After a period of six
to nine weeks, depending on the difficulty of the language in which they were
instructed, they would depart to their destinations. Men would spend a total of
twenty four month on mission, while women spend eighteen months. Upon arrival
they are paired with a senior companion who serves as their trainer, instructing
them on tactics and logistics. Mormons are commonly known for tracting, but that
is not effective in all regions, and actually against the law in some (e.g. France).
Alternatively, Mormon missionaries will engage people in a public space, such as
a park or a square, or will use member referrals to find potential investigators.6
Missionaries will also occasionally make contact with individuals or families who
have distanced themselves from the Church for one reason or another. Local
churches keep detailed records of affiliated members and investigators, so it is
straightforward to contact those that have been absent for a time. Missions are
4Because of the formalization and duration of Catholic missions, only one member of my sample
was Catholic.
5Where pm ∈ P is the 3/4 of men that go on mission and pw ∈ P is the 1/4 of women that go on
mission.
6The term Mormons used to identify those who sought to learn more about LDS Christianity.
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broken up into zones of roughly ten to twenty missionaries, and zones are broken
into districts of four to eight missionaries. The size of the districts varies widely
from a few blocks in a dense city, to a few miles across in rural areas. Mormon
missionaries will move zones four or five times during their service.
Missionaries with YWAM with whom I spoke had very different experiences.
Each decided for their own reasons that they would serve on mission abroad,
and did not hew to a particular course. Each operated like a YWAM franchise,
clearing their stake with the central offices, but proceeding as they saw fit. TR,
for instance, began his work in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, but later
decided to move to Jarabacoa. There he built a house and a small farm. When
he first arrived he endeavored to build relationships with the local community.
(The term “relationship” is one that came up frequently in my conversations with
YWAMers, both with respect to their bonds with others as well as God. They would,
for instance, distinguish between those who had a “relationship” with Christ and
those who were merely “religious,” that is they identified with the faith, without
making a costly commitment.) Another missionary, KN, served on a medical boat
for a number of years, delivering medical aid to the DR. He then set up a mission in
Santo Domingo, and would also travel to North African refugee camps on occasion
to preach the gospel. JH, however, has spent more than two decades in a school he
started in Namibia, evangelizing through community service. These experiences
diverge distinctly from the comparably brief experiences of Mormons with whom I
spoke.
After hearing how they came to serve, I asked them to walk me through the
events of their mission. I wanted them to reconstruct their experiences and emotions
from their time abroad. I asked what a common day might look like, and prompted
them to guide me through the landscape that they encountered. What did the town
look like? Where did people congregate? How close were residences to one another?
How many hours of the day would they spend in conversation with others? I found
that these questions moved interviewees to better remember their past. Rather than
providing me with their reflections and narrativization of their experiences, they
were able to recall specific details and feelings they had had while abroad.
After this conversation, I would probe on matters of trust directly. I inquired
whether they had felt vulnerable or exposed on mission and discussed the pre-
cautions they took to protect themselves and avoid harm. Upon discussing their
expectations and tolerances (which were rather risk accepting), I would focus the
discussion on the concept of trust for which I advocate. Not wanting to bias re-
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sponses, I held off offering my own account until late in the interview, at which
point I would say that I had argued for a distinction between trust and reliance—
reliance being the simple expectation that others would not cause them hard, while
trust is a warm emotional expectation coupled with reliance—and ask if it made
sense and tracked their experiences abroad. While many had stories that were evi-
dence of trust, only a handful had stories which allowed them to reflect on both the
forging and the rupturing of the attitude. By progressively focusing on the concept
of affective trust I had in mind I hoped to understand the manifestation of trust
without unduly distorting the sample’s responses. At the end of the conversation I
would thank participants and ask if there were others whom they knew that I might
contact as well.
5.3 Mission and Risk Acceptance
People want to adhere to a fine epistemic line when it comes to trust. While most
respondents did not want to be baselessly mistrustful, they also didn’t want to
appear naive. You can see this in the divergence in their responses to questions
relating to trust—their comparable skepticism given beliefs of others’ general trust-
worthiness. This population was especially sensitive to this tension. They had all
put themselves in a compromised situation where they knew little to nothing about
the communities in which they were operating. To admit that they did not trust
the people whom they were evangelizing would impugn their belief in God and
his plan for them. I was repeatedly told by missionaries that they felt especially
protected by God while on mission. If God had sent them on mission, he would
protect them in the process. That being the case, all those to whom I spoke insisted
that they were not naive about the risks that were posed. They all took some precau-
tions in order to mitigate those risks, following the dictum that God protects those
who protect themselves. In an effort to illustrate the elements of the theory I offer,
this section relates the risks, confidence, and reactive attitudes of the missionaries
with whom I spoke.
5.3.1 Risks
The risks of serving on mission, particularly in more remote locations of the world,
were real. Though the vast majority of people are not hostile, missionaries occupied
contexts in which poor state capacity made crime and violence more probable, while
poor resources for the disabled put a number of people at risk with individuals
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who were mentally ill. Those I spoke to wanted to protect themselves from these
sorts of dangers, but did not want to appear mistrustful more generally. It was their
responsibility to be forthcoming and engaging with investigators and potential
converts. In unpacking this paradox, people commonly pointed to social norms
and institutions, feelings of solidarity, and reliance on God as the means of securing
them from harm.
When speaking to RW, a Mormon missionary who served in Albania and Wales
between 1997-1999, you sense the incongruity of the risks and the rewards. He
received his mission call when he was 18 years old and arrived in Albania at the
beginning of 1997. This was a moment of severe political turmoil for Albania. The
country was repressive, and fall of the Soviet Union destabilized the country’s
already weak political regime. The government of the newly liberalized economy
endorsed financial products that were pyramid schemes. Large losses resulted when
these products were ultimately devalued, exacerbating political dissatisfaction. By
March of 1997 a civil war broke out which lasted ten days, and a new regime was
installed.
Even though the Mormon missionaries were not targets of violence, they were at
risk of being injured during the rioting and were asked by the U.S. State Department
to evacuate. The missionaries in the country left by military helicopter to Italy. After
only three weeks on the ground RW was reassigned to Wales for six months until the
violence abated. Even upon returning to Albania there were still sporadic incidents
of violence, though. He witnessed a man gunned down by a machine gun mounted
to the back of Volvo while out training a newly minted missionary, just three days
on the ground. There were areas you could just tell were bad, he said, but there
were things he was willing to do in order to reach out to contacts that he would
never do under normal circumstances. “Man, I would never to that [stuff] now.”
RH told me another story that speaks to the risks that missionaries assume.
Upon arriving in rural Brazil she found her senior companion to be a bit irreverent,
uninterested in following the directions they had been given with terrible precision,
aggravating RH’s ability to adapt to her new environment. After a few days in her
new station, she and her companion were approached by a man who presented
himself as a Universalist minister. He offered to guide them around, and serve as
a cultural interpreter showing them the layout of the town as well as explaining
common voodoo rituals. He would find the women between their meetings and
ask them questions, which they found to be welcome distractions.
Soon after, however, he showed up at their door asking about contemporary
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prophecy (a sort of dog whistle for Mormon missionaries). It was already irregular
to be approached at their home (on their day off, their “p-day” or preparation day,
no less), but even more so because they lived behind two locked gates. He asked if
he might be a prophet and told RH that he could name her siblings. Her companion
came out to see what the stir was and, herself checked out and unexcited at the
prospect of a new baptism, told the man he had to leave. Subsequently they found
him waiting for them right as they left their apartment in the morning. He knew
their schedule.
RH does not remember being particularly alarmed by these events, however.
Her companion appeared to be unmoved and RH was still acclimating to the new
environment, so she didn’t really have a good sense of what constituted the new
normal. This, even after he slipped a note in their door with a letter addressing her
companion’s siblings by name. Then, one day, upon returning to their apartment
they found the mail and been piled in a neat stack with a house key lying atop. At
that point both women freaked out and wrote their parents who promptly contacted
the mission office. The two were relocated within days. RH later learned that the
man had found the names of her companion’s siblings by reading letters sent by
her family that had been thrown in the trash. They had a bone fide stalker.
Some of the risks they faced were more intentional. KN who missionized in
refugee camps in North Africa indicated that he could have been attacked for
proselytizing Muslims. KN is a clearly a gritty and strong willed fellow to begin
with. Almost as an afterthought, he mentioned that while in the DR he and his
family were taken hostage on another occasion during a bank robbery as well
as burgled five times. His circumstances were undoubtedly extreme, but other
missionaries who served in favelas of South America noted the generally high levels
of crime that surrounded them regularly. There were more pedestrian concerns, like
the time CO was almost gored by a buffalo, but others were also attacked by the
mentally ill or just placed in compromised situations with members of the opposite
sex.
But perhaps the most indicative story for my purposes was that of KW and
EO, companions on the same island in the Philippines. On KW’s last day she was
distraught at having to leave. She absolutely loved the Philippines and had come
to particularly love this community. Before she left she went around to everyone
she knew to wish them goodbye, insuring them that she would return. That night
she and EO stayed up late into the night talking, waking early the next morning
to depart to their new respective zones. As they looked around the apartment,
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however, they saw that things were amiss—they couldn’t locate their belongings.
Sometime between 3 and 6 in the morning someone had pried their way into their
apartment with a crow bar and robbed them, leaving only the equivalent of $10 so
they could make their way. KW was shaken by this. How could someone have done
this to her? What if they have woken, what would the burglars have been willing
to do them? Though these weren’t common occurrences, the violence missionaries
opened themselves up to was real, and their risks were elevated by being foreign to
the communities in which they operated.
5.3.2 Confidence and Pro-Sociality
In the face of the risks that these missionaries bore, they repeatedly justified their
confidence in two ways: God and culture. In at least nine of the twenty six inter-
views I conducted, unprompted, respondents identified God as a prime source for
their confidence in others. Though they knew that there was the chance that harm
could befall them, they remarked that they would receive protection from God or
that the spiritual nature of their work would protect them from harm.
This protection subjects reported evidences the power that faith has in their
lives, though it doesn’t obviate the puzzle of where trust comes from. As more than
one person identified, the confidence that God gave them allowed them to rely on
others—to anticipate that they would be spared from harm—but did not effect trust
as I understand it, as characterized by warm feelings towards others. Their holy
mission gave them confidence to do their work, but doesn’t explain the emotional
relationships that they could develop with others. More concretely, though, even
though the missionaries are firm believers in God, they were quick to concede that
harm could befall them. This kind of general trust that they felt God endowed them
doesn’t explain the variation in their experience of trust, however. KW, for instance,
explicitly remarked that she felt as in a protective bubble, as God was protecting
her. After discussing the break in, however she pivoted slightly noting that as a
result of the incident she became more street smart and didn’t relax as much as she
had, even though she still believed that God was protecting her.
The process of acclimating to life as a missionary was not easy for KW. She
hated the MTC and her mother was horribly upset to be without her. And though
she had studied anthropology in university and was excited to go abroad and
learn a new culture, she found it difficult to connect with people initially. Her
companion was Filipina, but quiet, which inhibited KW from expressing herself. It
was also hard for her to be at ease while trying to sell religion to others, it didn’t
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feel natural. She felt like she wasn’t herself anymore. KW decided she would just
start talking to strangers on jitneys and not worry about whether she stayed on
message. It was at that point that she began to warm to the culture. She had done
extensive backpacking but she remarked that there was no better way of learning a
culture and getting to know people than through missionary work. People were
extremely friendly to her and one another (an observation reiterated by two others
I spoke with who served in the Philippines) and over time she came to absorb the
culture. One funny story she told (apropos of Henrich et al. (2001)) was that a U.S.
companion yelled at her for repeatedly eating her food from the fridge. It took
KW a moment to figure out what rule she had broken, only to realize that she had
imbibed the local norm of sharing, one decidedly un-American. Over time, she
remarked, she had absorbed the country’s collectivist culture. One of the more
memorable conversations she had was with an older fellow who remarked “Your
companion is very white. . . she’s not Filipino like us.”
The consistency with which subjects discussed culture and the ways in which
pro-social norms led them to generate fellow feelings resonates with the account
of affective trust I’ve outlined. Nineteen of twenty six missionaries whom I inter-
views explicitly noted a correspondence between cultural norms and the trust they
experienced while abroad. Consider hospitality, a norm which the missionaries
whom I spoke to repeatedly identified when discussing their trust in members of
local communities. Hospitality entails that people open up their homes to others,
showing them grace and kindness in their personal domain, while potentially open-
ing themselves up to exploitation. Though it is not inherently a fault of Americans
that we are, by and large, an individualistic culture, other less atomistic cultures
commonly have norms that entail that people share their resources with others. In
these cultures it is more than an expectation that one is hospitable, it is commonly
understood that one ought to do so. The social norm provides a reason for people
to comply as well as an expectation that people will, as a matter of fact. Observing
such a norm might well generate a disposition of confidence towards a person, that
they warrant our confidence, that they deserve it.
RW’s life was physically in danger in Albania in a way that he just wasn’t in
Wales. As he told me, Wales was “safe as can be.” Yet he felt a warmth and trust
of Albanians that he didn’t of the Welsh. The norms of hospitality disposed him
towards those that opened up their homes to him. It wasn’t just that his mission
was easier, it was that he enjoyed the environment more, he felt a warmth towards
the people. His preference for one region over the other doesn’t directly speak to
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the role of his belief in divine protection either. RW made clear that he believed
that the help of Jesus Christ and the divine facilitated all his work. But this doesn’t
account for the change in his disposition between Wales and Albania. I want to
identify this social norm of hospitality as one which motivated his affective trust,
beyond mere reliance.
The presence of such norms were repeatedly identified as a motivation for one’s
trust. KB noted many of the warm tendencies of people in the Philippines. The
people were always smiling and would immediately approach when greeted. LT,
an Evangelical missionary who had served in both Ghana and Turkey, pointed out
similar cultural markers. She remarked feeling safer in Ghana than Turkey, noting
that Ghanaians smiled more and had a generally friendly disposition. If someone
stole in Ghana people in the vicinity would shout “thief!” until the perpetrator
was apprehended. She felt this trust of the population in Ghana despite militias
demanding taxes at checkpoints and stories of her orphanage falling victim to
armed robbery. Nonetheless she felt safer there than in downtown Chicago.
KB was totally comfortable in the Philippines. Indeed, she came to find it easier
for her to express herself in Tagalong than English, remarking that language has
facilitated her ability to convey emotion. There people’s friendliness spilled over
into their hospitality. She would frequently be greeted by strangers; “Come eat with
us, come eat with us!” they would shout. Ultimately she found it more difficult
to depart than it had been to leave for mission. Back in the U.S. she found people
much colder and more reserved. She came to be incredibly fond of jitneys there.
People would pass money forward to pay for the fare, a norm KB felt would never
be in place in the States because “people would steal your money.”
Another Mormon woman KH, served in the south of France. Initially she was
disappointed to have been called to a region with which she was familiar. Her
mother had served on mission there, while her father was a missionary Belgium. He
ultimately became a professor of medieval history and the family made numerous
trips to France when she was young. Though she admitted a bad attitude when she
began, she slowly warmed to her task. Native French people were not generally
receptive to her message, but after time she found refugees and immigrants from
Western and Northern Africa to be very warm to her.
She acknowledged that over time you become conditioned to seek out immi-
grants, a point which another missionary who worked in France, TC, also men-
tioned. She would make a beeline to them when on the street and they were
commonly willing to engage. And though in principle Mormons are not supposed
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to preach to Muslims due to overarching political sensitivities, she found that in
practice they were very eager to talk. She recounted that Muslim men would often
speak with her and her companions, not because they were interested in being
baptized, but because they wanted to engage in interfaith dialogue and explain
their commitments to her. She identified with many of these immigrants as both
foreigners and people of faith, in contrast to the mostly secular French population
she encountered.
Her stories speak to a slightly different role for social norms in the process of
generating trust. While she did not directly identify a specific norm that might re-
cruit an affective response, the commonality she felt with them produced a warmth
and trust of the members of these immigrant communities. The commonality she
identified with the population facilitated her trust and ability to effectively work
with those groups, reminiscent of Smith’s remark regarding the relationship be-
tween piety and trust. Notably, she did not claim to be successful at baptizing
members of these communities. Instead she was just pleased to engage in substan-
tive conversations about her deep commitments. In fact the only time she did feel
unsafe was when invited over to the house of an ethnic Frenchman who appeared
not to respect her need to return before curfew. Nothing came of it, but she and her
companion were concerned when his hospitality encroached on their commitments.
JH, an Evangelical missionary with YWAM, has worked in Namibia for more
than two decades operating a school and teaching pottery. His friends, who were
few, tended to be American ex-pats or English speakers from other African countries.
He lamented a sense of alienation resulting from his poor command of Afrikaans
and other African languages—he remarked that English is only the third language
spoken by black Africans—and a legacy of Apartheid. It was obvious that this really
hurt him. He had worked tirelessly to better the lives of people in Namibia and
while they were very thankful for his efforts, they were not friendly towards him.
After twenty-five years living abroad he still has more friends in the States than in
Africa.
RH felt a similar alienation from people in Brazil, despite an excellent command
of Portuguese. Of all the missionaries I spoke with she was the most self-critical and
direct about the difficulty she faced opening up to people. When she was moved to
the poorer suburban areas of Rio de Janeiro, for instance, she mentioned that while
she spoke perfect Portuguese, she had a difficult time understanding the people she
encountered. While she cared deeply for the people, she talked about the difficulty
she had opening up and trusting people more substantively. This came into focus
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when she mentioned that she was once told, “You’ve mastered being a missionary,
your grammar is perfect, but no one would ever mistake you for a Brazilian because
you are too cold.”
Or EO, for another, KW’s companion in the Philippines the night their apartment
was broken into. While KW was ebullient about the local culture, EO felt more
distant. She remarked that there was a lot she could not related to in the culture
and identified the difficulty building relationships with people. Indeed, she didn’t
mention the culture’s warmth or pro-social norms during our conversation. Trust
for her was endowed in God and in her companions with whom she felt 100%
confident. The absence of identified pro-social norms and culture was as distinctive
in the interviews I conducted as their report. Those who were unable to identify
with such norms had a more difficult time trusting others.
Not all the missionaries with whom I spoke indicated that culture or norms
were a means to developing trust. TC, a Mormon fellow who recently returned
from Ecuador, believes that God performs miracles in order to protect missionaries.
“Trust is a two way street,” he said, “and only by trusting God can you trust others.”
There are certainly missionaries that articulate their trust as a manifestation of their
belief in God, but most of those with whom I spoke also pointed towards social
norms and culture as an important feature upon which their trust rested. Moreover,
what TC discussed with me is more closely related to reliance than trust. He never
identified the warm sentiments attending to affective trust as facilitating his work
during our conversation.
5.3.3 Reactive Attitudes
While rupturing expectations and betrayal is not a common occurrence, the sense of
betrayal or let down marks the decidedly emotional and second-personal aspects of
affective trust. One of JH’s only peers in Namibia was PB, an ex-pat from Zambia.
They bonded in many respects over their status as foreigners and their common
language (which just as a practical matter makes it easy to exchange feelings and
ideas). PB had known JH for fifteen years and his wife had worked at JH’s school
for eight. One day PB told JH that he needed to talk, and resigned from the school.
JH was stunned and hurt, why hadn’t PB told him sooner? Why had he withheld
his plans? PB went on to start a school only a few miles away. JH was hurt by this,
and upset at PB for not being upfront with him. He was deserted by one of his only
close coworkers.
As discussed above, those who had a more difficult time accessing the local
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culture’s norms had a more difficult time trusting others. In JH’s case, this drew
him near to PB, who ultimately left him, and in some ways revealed himself to have
never been a confidant to begin with. PB hadn’t approached JH earlier because he
had thought it would have been disrespectful. While JH thought them to be equals,
PB instead noted that a cultural hierarchy persisted. RH, by contrast, lacked these
attitudes towards her stalker. I repeatedly circled back to inquire how that initial
experience—a complete breakdown in institutional communication coupled with a
direct invasion of her space and security—shaped the rest of her mission. Yet she
responded that it didn’t really change how she interacted with people subsequently.
She was a dedicated missionary who relied on all sorts of people around her, but she
lacked a sympathy for the culture, which inhibited her ability to trust or, relatedly,
feel the kind of second-personal condemnation upon being intruded. The act was
criminal rather than personal for her.
This outcome divergence—the feeling of emotional rupture when one experi-
enced shared norms, but none otherwise—was marked in the experience of the
two companions, EO and KW when their apartment was broken into that night in
the Philippines. As I wrote above, EO had told me that she didn’t recall trusting
everyone on mission, and that she struggled building relationships across the local
culture. Despite having experience doing humanitarian work in China and Peru
previously, it was difficult for her to navigate the culture as a personal matter. KW,
by contrast, felt that these were her people and that the Philippines was where she
belonged and even considered moving there at one point. Their reactions to the
robbery also diverged markedly. EO recalled not being too angry or bitter about the
events. She thought of the robbery as an ordinary crime and it didn’t seem to affect
the rest of her service. KW, however, was devastated. The burglary affected how
she carried herself on mission following the event. These were people with whom
she felt a close connection, and was shaken afterward. She tried to circumscribe
the event by saying that she thought she knew who the culprit was—a man only
loosely affiliated with the community—but she could not lose the worry that it may
have been someone else, someone that was directly party to these shared norms
she had come to identify with. “It felt like trust had been broken” she told me. KW
clearly imbibed the social and cultural norms in a way that EO never felt like she
had. KW was eager to adopt norms of generosity, fairness, and etiquette.7 Adopting
7She relayed a story about a time she wanted food at a street vendor, who had just sold his last
item to this other woman. The woman turned to KW and asked if she’s like to finish the half eaten
food. KW shrugged and said, yeah, why not?!
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those norms generated certain expectations and trust of others, which outstripped
common ethics. When her apartment was broken into she felt a rupture in that trust
in way EO didn’t, herself lacking identification with those norms.
5.3.4 Discussion
These experiences I document conform in many ways to the theory I offer for
affective trust. Missionaries abroad were able to form warm expectations of others
in light of norms they identify in the culture. The narratives I provide in the previous
section both illustrate the contours of the theory as well as indicate its plausibility.
Though these missionaries had comparably high levels of general trust to begin
with, their ability to open up to the local communities in which they operated was
not uniform, indicating another mechanism at work. There are risks involved in
going abroad and embedding oneself in a foreign community, but each person I
spoke with relished their decision.
Were this a story of particular trust I would have anticipated hearing stories
of information gathering about specific people. Before missionaries would enter
others’ homes they might ask around about those individuals, or progressively
build their risk exposure to others. And even if that sequence were not to obtain
in every circumstance, that would have been the trend—more information would
generate greater trust. I did, however, observe a tendency for individuals to elicit
greater trust as a function of the social and cultural norms they identified. Feelings
of normative camaraderie allowed people to open themselves up and experience
solidarity that the could not otherwise. Furthermore, people reported an emotional
component to the trust they experienced that outstripped the information they had.
While in some cases these feelings were particular in kind, such as GG’s trust for a
woman (who never baptized) that named her son for his companion or AG’s trust
in an elderly man who led a simple life on the outskirts of the village in which
she worked, in many other cases the trust people described was not directed at
particular individuals, but germane to a particular context. Their trust did not
appear and vanish on a dime, but was enduring. Once a community or a person
gained trust it was difficult to lose. When that trust was violated, as in JH or
KW’s case, they had hard feelings, which outstripped the violation entailed by the
breach itself. Both phrased the experience in second-personal terms, in fact—how
could s/he do this to me? Note, finally, how deeply embedded these norms of
generosity were in the context KW occupied. Even the thief could not bring her or
himself to abscond without leaving the housemates something to get by (500 pesos,
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approximately $10).
Returning to the eight conditions I identified in section 5.1, collectively these
cases demonstrate people’s warm expectations that others will act cooperatively,
and that those expectations are at least in part a result of identified social norms
in context. In the handful of cases where people who experienced affective trust
reported that their expectations had been violated, they felt hurt and upset with the
violator.
Though these accounts are not sufficient to sustain my account against all
competing proposals, they do conform well with the theory I offer. In the cases I
described, it is clear that general trust is at play motivating individuals to place
themselves in unfamiliar contexts, while particular trust explains how they build
relationships with particular others that progress over time. Returning to Uslaner’s
three vectors of trust, affective trust seeks to explain the second dimension, trust
in familiar but not intimate contacts (coreligionists rather than family and friends).
Persons such as coworkers (as with JH’s PB), companions, or community members
(as with KW) all fall squarely in Uslaner’s second category of trust. In these contexts
affective trust indicates how affective attitudes bound up with social norms and
institutional values can bridge uncertainty, and allow people to open up to others.
The interviews I conducted indicate the plausibility of the account of trust I offer.
In the presence of pro-social norms such as hospitality (e.g. RW) or generosity (e.g.
KW) people extended warm expectations towards members of local communities
that they will be treated well. Absent the identification of or with those norms,
people were less likely to trust others in this way. And when I heard those expecta-
tions were violated, people felt hurt and articulated second-personal demands for
responsiveness. Instead of particular trust’s demand that these expectations must
be well defined for agents, tasks, and contexts, I find (like Farrell and Knight) these
expectations were for categories of agents, tasks, and contexts.
Moving forward I would like to see these conjectures tested for communities
that have experienced shock of some kind. RW remarked that after returning from
Wales it was difficult to solicit people’s trust again, having left in their time of need.
While my project focuses on the trust of the missionaries rather than the trust of
the people they reach out to, it would be instructive to understand how others
serving at the time or in similar situations of political unrest experience trust and
rupture. This work allows for empiricists to compare Mormon missionaries who
serve abroad for a couple of years with Peace Corps volunteers, to better understand
the underlying interactions between general, affective, and particular trust across
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comparable dimensions (e.g. age, duration, education).
5.4 Faith in Others
Although I have been discussing the way affective trust motivates individuals to
open up to others in their communities, as I noted, the most common discussion
of trust I had with the sample regarded the trust that people had in God and came
to have in their companions. Without prompting, nine of eighteen respondents
remarked that they trusted in God, while ten of eighteen remarked trusting in their
companions or faith communities abroad. Since the missionaries moved around
every three to four months companions came and went. Indeed HN noted that
this churn made if difficult for her to build trust with local populations, despite
her being a true extrovert. Even though companions would frequently relocate, I
would commonly hear how deep their friendship and trust of their companions
were, both those from the U.S. and abroad. While there is a particularity to these
relationships, the shared norms of mission and their faith in God intensified their
bonds, even though their time together was short.
The experience of these missionaries is, in no small part, constructing faith
communities. Yes, I mean that as a term of jargon, they are going out and persuading
people to adopt their faith and enlarge their religious communities. But more
specifically I have in mind a confluence of the faith that they experience in God and
the affective trust they show towards others. These missionaries believe that God
protects them from harm, but they also experience a personal relationship entailed
by that belief. Every subject I asked indicated that they believe in a personal god,
one who intervenes in their daily lives. I don’t understand faith in terms of Clegg’s
notion of belief without doubt (Clegg (1979)), but in the way Baier and Hobbes
do, as socially warranted belief (Baier (1980)). Each one of these missionaries was
raised in a church. Their upbringings involved regular church attendance, boy
scouts, seminary during release time from school, weekly family home evening
and Bible study, summer camps, often times faith-based university study. Their
whole lives have been constructed around their faith, and in turn their faith in God
becomes completely justified in context. They experience warm expectations of him.
This expression of faith is what I have in mind in the dissertation’s title—affective
trust generates more than expectations of others but constructs faith in others. That
is, the nature of the affective trust we are justified in experience is constituted by
the social norms that one has access to in context, those rules that she can reliably
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adopt, and anticipate that others will as well. And this also goes some distance
to explain why Juan Rogel trusted the indigenous population of La Florida more
than the Spanish troops. Members of local tribes demonstrated cooperative norms
that the Spanish army flouted with acts of theft (according to Rogel). As a pacific
missionary, intent on spreading the Word of Christ to the New World, the norms
of the local population were far more compatible with his own that those of his
commanders.
* * *
These data are first and foremost illustrative. They begin to round out the
conceptual analysis I have already done, and demonstrate the potential contribution
that the notion of affective trust might offer to the discipline as a whole. Even
when people lack information about specific others, they still have the means to
offer a discriminating trust that varies between and within contexts. Respondents
that point to social norms are more likely to have experienced thicker sentiments
associated with trust, and those who identified cooperative norms in one culture
rather than another more commonly related trusting sentiments in the context with
those norms. In these ways trust can appear to be a part of the fabric of life, woven




By now I have beat the distinctions between general, particular, and affective
trust to a fine, Gerber-like pulp. While the theory surrounding general trust seeks
to understand how people come to have a default willingness to trust, particular
trust account for the circumstances in which people are willing to trust others with
specific tasks in specific contexts. The theory I offer explains how—that is the
mechanism by which—people come to trust in intermediate cases. It unpacks how
we decide that some risks are prudent in dealing with members of our church but
not our fencing club. The mechanism I offer is that of social norms, which generate
a context specific expectation that some rule or behavior is appropriate, giving
one reason to not only abide by the rule, but also anticipate that others believe the
practice to be justified. Doubtlessly we regularly experience all these three variants
of trust operating simultaneously. We might, for example, decide to trust someone
both because of a social norm and particular information that we have about their
propensity for following through on their commitments. This project has attempted
to analytically cleave the three apart, to look under the hood and better understand
their distinctive workings.
My motivation for studying affective trust, however, was as much for method-
ological reasons as substantive ones. Indeed I have argued that trust is limited in
scope, operating locally in contexts where people’s preferences are neither at odds
nor independently compatible as to obviate trusts efficacy. While affective trust has
political valences, generating reasons and justifications for people to come together
and coordinate actions, it is not a sufficient means of generating social harmony.
Although I am open to broader applications of the concept of affective trust, say to
explain the polarization of the American media landscape, my methodological com-
mitment to using compatible theories from across social sciences and humanities
115
limits the sweeping claims I am willing to make.1
Instead I hope to petition political scientists and political theorists to stop chas-
ing James’ proverbial squirrel around the tree. William James opens his essay
“What Pragmatism Means” by discussing a light hearted conversation he and his
colleagues had one day on a hike. They wondered if a man chases a squirrel around
a tree but never catches up to it “does the man go round the squirrel or not?” His
answer, thankfully, was that it “depends on what you practically mean by ‘going
round’ the squirrel” (James (1981): 25). I take Elinor Ostrom to offer the same advice
in her triumphant Governing the Commons (Ostrom (2008)). Are people rational?
Sure, it just depends what you practically mean by “rational.” Theorists have a way
of disregarding the practicality of the matter, discussing trust in a vacuum without
empirical evidence, while the other end of the discipline can get callous with mean-
ings and terms (e.g. discussions rife with slippage between context dependent and
context independent trust). Reading accounts of trust in the empirical literature
I found definitions which were stretched beyond credulity. Literature in political
theory, meanwhile, insists on remaining detached from observation and empirical
analysis. In this project I sought to bring these two conversations closer to one
another to demonstrate the kind of meaningful dialogue the two discourses might
have.
Rational choice theory is too broad to explain the social world that we occupy.
When we attempt to deploy it to explain all instances of trust it makes a mockery of
human experience. I have taken a different approach, building a localized theory
that resonates with scholarship in philosophy, psychology, political science, and
economics, while not violating core axioms. Thomas Hobbes can help us think
about human emotion and, like Michael Morrell and Danielle Allen, construct a
sentimental politics, one which we can come to feel good about as well as justify
rationally (Hobbes (1994); Morrell (2010); Allen (2009)). These considerations are
also bound up on the very contemporary projects of people like Anna Stilz and Eric
Beerbohm who argue for responsibility in politics that resonates with the affective
and socially normative features I lay out (Stilz (2009); Beerbohm (2012)). We (might)
take there to exist a political responsibility in light of preexisting norms that already
regulate collective conventions. As David Lewis, Stephen Darwall, and Cristina
Bicchieri point out, these norms not only motivate action, but they also generate
conditional duties to act (Lewis (2002); Darwall (2009); Bicchieri (2006)). The
construction of such a conventional understand of norms is completely consistent
1I want to thank Jon Atwell for making this point clear to me.
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with the kind of social preferences Ernst Fehr and William English identify in
trust, and conforms theories of cooperation advocated by people like David Kreps,
Jack Knight, Henry Farrell, and Natalie and Joseph Henrich (Fehr (2009); English
(2012); Kreps (1990); Farrell and Knight (2003); Farrell (2009); Henrich and Henrich
(2007)). The theory I offer in no way assumes irrationality, rather it advocates
thinking deeply about the normative and epistemic topography of a landscape
before imposing a theory of action.
I don’t doubt that the Jewish and Italian kids in David Laitin’s Brooklyn neigh-
borhood did a fair amount of self-policing (or their school administrators did,
anyway), but the reason that he and James Fearon thought to develop the model as
they did was in light of relevant, context specific knowledge that the third party
Irish cops were not involved in the dispute resolution. Whether the neighborhood
kept quiet because in-group policing was a norm or because of a second-order norm
of in-group affiliation inhibited the Jewish kids from reaching out to the Irish cops,
their model came to make sense of conditions after the fact. My intention is for this
account of affective trust to further focus the discipline’s efforts on such compatible
and context-specific modeling projects.
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